**Nature and Mind  
(1919)**

## Part I. General Introduction to Phenomenology

### §1. Return from science to pre-scientific consciousness

Following this introduction[[1]](#footnote-1) we will set to work. What we are searching for is clarity about nature and mind, and yet we do have sciences of nature and mind. It is a matter of course for us that the question as to what is an object must be answered not on the basis of naïve experience and cognizance but only through the theoretical accomplishment of science. It is a matter of course for us that such simple thinking and stating, which adjusts immediately to experience and to app<erceptions> arising from a naïve living along, do bring about statements not useless for practical life, but that they are unclear, floating, full of vague indeterminacy. It is only through the logical work of science that they are converted into a solid truth which can be acknowledged by anyone with a rational judgment, [a truth] made up of fixed and strictly identifiable concepts. It is a matter of course for us that only science can state the true nature of objectivity; to put it in other words: True being is the correlate to science indeed. On the other hand we bring to mind that each work of science presupposes a substrate after all, existing prior to science. An objectivity must first be given to us in intuition and originally in perceptions as a factually existing actuality, so that thinking can be brought into play, that the question “what is this factually existent?” can be asked, and that the truth, or rather the true being, can be worked out through the gradation of logical analysis of those vague experiential concepts and experiential statements. Thereby it also must be taken into consideration that those data of immediate perception, that is, perceptual things given in sensuous physicality by means of sight, hearing, etc., in natural living along bring manifold intellectual activities into play, and accordingly are apprehended in varying ways, changing from subject to subject, but as well [that they] are traditionally spread and preserved within groups of subjects, and then [that they] possibly **[16]** firmly adhere to the things of the intuitional surrounding world, and thus belong to the vague content of experience, scientific work is related to. All noematic app<erceptions> of the man living naturally belong to this category, but also all the practical and traditional app<erceptions> by which the man, outside the range of scientific thoughts, clothes his surrounding world, deriving from his own life experience or from inherited experience, with countless empirically vague predicates.

(At the outset it has to be taken into account that as soon as scientific work with its logical determinations emerges, it can take different directions. The empirically-intuitively given and the pre-scientifically apperceived in various ways, can show **different dimensions** of logical indeterminacy and determinability. If theoretic interest is aroused by one of them, the logical determination, bound to the unity of logical correlation (which alone facilitates systematic development), will be retained in the very same dimension. Thus it may happen that in the course of a general exploration of an object’s sphere there grows an endlessly progressing science which still never encounters on its way any problem related to the corresponding other regions its objects always belong to. For our theme, “**Nature and Mind**”, we have to keep this in view as a possibility from the very beginning. Perhaps for example that “nature” is a title for inquiries the experienced surrounding world addresses to theoretic research, inquiries which exclusively point in a single direction, that is, the direction where it will be abstracted from the maybe indivisibly combined **mental** as a correlate theme of inquiries, from which it duly needs to be abstracted. Then it would be understandable that the natural scientist, dedicating his whole life to natural research and anyway remaining distant to original sense-bestowing, through his hard work by which he technically develops and refashions theoretical methods, does not realize that nature from the start and as a matter of essential necessity leaves open different dimensions of inquiries, and that what he calls “nature”, does in fact already include the abstraction **[17]** of his theme. *Mutatis mutandis* the same needs to be expected from the humanities of course.

In all respects we are therefore called upon to tread on a path of elucidation, which is contrary to the one we would expect. Although it is quite true that science alone can tell us what nature and mind like every other objectivity are in truth, it is still not our task to work our way into this endless series of truths, groundings, and theories of natural sciences and humanities. We would become learned men, but we would not gain any clarity about the ultimate sense of nature and mind, a clarity which traverses all those truths and theories. Certainly it [the sense] is somehow logically shaped and defined by them, but every logical determination derives its sense from something pre-logical, from an original source in which the, according to our presumption, indivisibly connected [something], separating the necessary abstraction of logical-scientific work, shows itself. At this original source an original sense-bestowing upon the world, which is considered under the names “nature” and “mind”, takes place. It is just at the time we understand this primitive sense-bestowing, that we can hope for understanding the higher accomplishment of science, that we can thus set the higher-level problem to clarify this accomplishment as well as in combination with this to clarify the sense of both nature’s and the mind’s scientifically true being.

It is the only way we can resolve a - despite substantial development in strict science - not yet solved, but rather just set problem, i.e. what the world is in truth and according to its source-given sense, <and> thereby also the problem of remedying the theoretical violation of the world, nay, even of making it in the highest sense usable by turning it into an **understanding of the world**.

Thus we will[[2]](#footnote-2) commence by returning from science to **pre-scientific consciousness**. Not as if it was **[18]** a historical-anthropological investigation or an assertion as to how mankind used to think of the world before the emergence of science or how the world is seen by different peoples, still lacking science and being uninfluenced by it in their apprehension of the world. The pre-scientific consciousness we mean, which alone can be called in question for our purpose, can also for us, members of a scientific culture, constantly be brought to light or at least it is restorable in an evident way by a methodical suspension of all apperceptions stemming from former theoretical acts. From the outset it is understood that we, whether engaged in theoretical thinking or not, are always surrounded by an intuitional world. This **[19]** world is constantly present for us and comes with a sense-composition, pre-given to only occasionally theoretical work, and necessarily pre-given, because how is thinking supposed to ever come into play, without any objects, and with a certain sense-equipment in the manner peculiar to consciousness priorly being given, objects which so to speak question us, demand us to determine them in this or that regard conceptually, to find the laws of their behaviour etc.? A pre-given object can be far from intuition, as [is the case] on higher levels of scientific thinking, a theoretical product stemming from former thinking and maybe envisioned just symbolically and imaginably, like an astronomer considering perturbations in the orbit of the planet Mars and intending at the same time to theoretically define the unknown variable of a mathematical formula set up to determine those [perturbations]. But it is obvious that in accordance to the sense of every such theoretical product it must allow for being unravelled gradually, and that following the mediacies it leads back to intuition eventually. Thus we are directed towards objects of the immediately intuitional world which are given prior to all theoretical thinking and which in pre-scientific consciousness already had a sense-content used as a substrate for scientific work. However, even the scientist theorizing in mathematical spheres which are most distant from intuition, is, while thinking, still surrounded by an intuitional world, the thinking distant from intuition is just a stratum in the whole stream of his waking conscious life and just an occasional one; but a consistent [stratum] is the mental process of the **world-intuition** in the most literal sense. This world with its changing things and changing modes of appearance lies always within view, whether we take heed of it and consider it or not. We live in this world, we think, feel, judge, operate, work in it and in the alternation of those activities it [the world] is pre-given. It is not only in general, but it is a world presenting itself as such in our subjectivity in manifold phenomena, and creating from itself, from those “phenomena” an original sense.

Yet the following needs to be considered: although this world is referred to as a pre-given, intuitional, experienced world, it is thus called only in the determinate sense of our consideration. If we **[20]** virtually interrupt the natural-naïve stream of our consciousness with the question of how the world within this stream was conscious, this needs a reductive process to work out the **intuitional world**, and thereby several hidden theoretical components are to be suspended – from the already intuitional as well. What we under given intuitional circumstances casually call “seen”, the temperature on the thermometer, the air pressure on the barometer, the weight, the refraction, etc. is of course not seen at all; proper seeing, the intuiting the surrounding world for our scientific producing so to speak has manifold colorings, sediments from theoretical accomplishments. But at any time we can investigate sense to this, we can question the consciously given things within this colorings as to the colorings’ sense-giving source, and with this question as to what degrees of temperature, degrees of air pressure, units of weight, etc. signify after all, we will be led by the own sense of the respective objects’ mode of consciousness to physical concept-formation, to theoretical processes, and then [we will be led] back to pre-scientific intuition-composition as being necessarily demanded.

Furthermore we pay attention to the elaboration of an intuitively given or, if you like, an experience-world, [an elaboration] giving a certain sense to the empirical concept, prior to all impact of theoretical accomplishment, through its relation to the act of theorizing. Inasmuch as man engages not only in theoretical accomplishments but in several other fields as well, for example aesthetically, ethically, technically performing, the prospect of a possibility and maybe necessity for also otherwise oriented reductions opens up, and for the bringing out of a pre-given world as a world of “experience” which not only is prior to all theory but prior to **all** human accomplishment. And indeed it will come down to this to grasp the original source for the idea of “nature”, in fact precisely as that idea of nature which is the theme of modern natural science. And this is not all: this kind of gradual separation and suspension of apperceptive strata from the consciously given world, covered with apperceptions of various sources are in general the indispensable methodical prerequisites to **[21]** understand the sense of the original goals the radically differentiated sciences set themselves. The original structure of the world of the pre-scientific consciousness as well as the demarcations predetermined in its [the world’s] own sense essentially determine distinguished directions of possible theoretical research and thereby of fundamentally possible sciences.

#### §2. The Ego’s-Life as continuous Perceiving: Impression and Reproduction

If we thus try to penetrate into the **typical structure of the pre-given world**, we encounter a first distinction we justifiably designate as the distinction between **subjects** and **things**. But[[3]](#footnote-3) to gain full clarity we put the most radical question: concerning that **which can be pre-given to the cognizing Ego as pre-theoretical**; possibly it becomes apparent that what we intuit pre-theoretically as world just constitutes a composition of all pre-givenness, and it is of great importance to characterize this [composition], and to understand the function of everything else. (What we are now going to investigate is called “transcendent aesthetics”.) We can commence the necessary description in the following way – and you have to constantly make sure that nothing is said and may be said which is not actually brought to light in doubtless evidence, and that all expressions we use have the mere character of purely descriptive expressions.

Each of us says and may say: “I am.” He thus utters the most absolute of all conceivable evidences. I am and I am because I live. My life is an incessant stream of subjective mental processes and therewith a stream of <never>ending “consciousness”, which in itself is consciousness of something, consciousness in which I am conscious of something and in different ways: I live in the way of the “I perceive”, and while perceiving I am conscious of a perceptual object, I live by remembering, expecting, imagining **[22]**, thinking, collecting, relating, predicating universally and particularly, etc., whereby a Something becomes conscious, an objectivity in the mode of the past as something remembered, expected or imagined [in the mode of] future or [in the mode] of a subject of predicates or [in the mode] of a particular within a universality, a plenty, a law, etc. Again we find in the stream of the “I live” events of consciousness in the form of “I appreciate something”, and in that I am conscious of the appreciated, “I am sorrowful about something”, and I am conscious of a sad thing, “I want this or that”, in which a Something is conscious as desirable, as good, “I decide”, whereby I am conscious of a decision, “I act”, whereby I am conscious of an action, or rather of an act.[[4]](#footnote-4)

I[[5]](#footnote-5), my consciousness in such manifold shapes, and the conscious as such in the correlate shapes – all of that is without any doubt a pre-theoretical given, nay, in a certain way [it is] the title of the most primal pre-givennesses.[[6]](#footnote-6) In another way we say this is what in general enables pre-givennesses in the first place. It is entirely evident: For me something is given and to be given, to be given only through any modes of the consciousness (in intentional mental processes). But given and to be given as existing for me is not just the thing itself and its immanent own, but also what is foreign and external to it.

We will try to gain deeper clarity by the way this or that presents itself pre-theoretically to the Ego and how it gets a different sense from intuition itself.

Remaining in the Ego-attitude we would have to proceed thus: Running through the processes of consciousness, in which my life is streaming as an Ego’s-life, there is an incessant, according to its essential necessity never to be interrupted stream of mental processes of a distinctive type, the perception type. **The Ego’s-life is a constant perceiving**. By **perception** we mean thereby any kind of consciousness in which an individual, single **[23]** object is intuitive to us, i.e. conscious as truly being in its selfhood, in its properties constituting its proper essence: for instance these objects now consciously before my eyes, or the sight of lovely Günterstal, the memory of which emerges in relatively clear intuitiveness. However, contrary to the literal sense of *perceptio* it shall not depend on my actually grasping the given in its selfhood or not, nor [shall it depend] on my making the self-given a theme for my Ego or not in this particular moment of consciousness when I pay attention to it, contemplate it more closely and in one way or another actively engage myself with it. It may well be that plenty of objects are intuitionally present to me and conscious without my paying attention to them or, what is the same thing, without the perception being perception in the literal sense, i.e. having the distinct form of the *ego percipio*. The usage of this term derives from philosophical tradition (I refer to **Leibniz’** distinction between *perceptio sine* and *cum apperceptione*).

The *perceptiones* then in their continuous, consistent stream are split into two classes: **impressions and reproductions**. Mental processes which we also call **apprehensions**, a word we equally could use quite well when we thereby admit the same sense extension as in perception. Usually by “apprehending” we understand “an attentive perceiving”[[7]](#footnote-7); the Ego by means of attentively perceiving is directed towards an object, it acts as grasping a perceived, considering it. But our concept is also supposed to include the antithetical group of cases in that objects are perceptually conscious indeed, but are not conscious in the way of attentive perceiving. The Ego then pays no attention to them, it is not attentively, graspingly engaged with them. A particular term cannot be avoided here, at least not in those cases where this extension must be marked, and emphasized, and it is **Hume’s** expression which is suitable without of course our taking over his apprehensions. But what is essentially peculiar about the **impression**, of this kind of perception in extended sense, in contrast to reproduction? The answer is: each perceptive mental process in which the individual single object is not just generally intuitional, generally conscious in its selfness, but **[24]** with the consciousness, that it is **present in original**, is called a mental process of perception (impression). Every mental process in which the perceived itself is conscious **not as present in the original**, in other words conscious just in the mode of consciousness of mere **presentiation**, is called **reproductive**, or **presentiative** (in the broadest sense). Each memory belongs here. However vitally and clearly we may have in mind something past in its selfhood, in this mental process of memory, it still does not show itself as present actuality, as being present bodily, in its own person so to say, but merely quasi-presented in imagination, as merely presentiated. In each perception the perceived is conscious as bodily actuality so to speak, as bodily presence. But it is not the consciousness of temporal presence that matters. When we objectivate the [mountain] Schlossberg we take <it> as presently existent, and yet it is just perceived in the mode of consciousness of mere presentiation. Keep well in mind that we thereby only gave a description of what lies within the own essence of the respective mental processes of consciousness, and that the differences between bodily presence and simple presentiation of the perceived object are not brought from outside but express immanent modalities, modes of the way the object is conscious here and there and how it is characterized.

Furthermore it is a basic property of the Ego’s-consciousness, a seemingly irreversible necessity, that an incessant stream of perception, [a stream] of impression, crosses the stream of mental processes, to which the Ego necessarily belongs, and even that in a certain way it is such a stream itself.

No phase of the Ego’s-life is conceivable without a sphere of bodily presence being factually existent actuality for the Ego; attentively perceiving or not attentively perceiving, it is related to it. Structuring this impressional sphere, we find, still according to its essential necessity, the two groups of possible single particulars perceptually present: we speak of: “**Ego-foreign**” and “**Ego’s own**” (or “egoical”, in a certain sense subjective). On the one hand for example there are for each of us the objects of this room as far as his respective visual field takes them in. On the other hand of course everyone finds or may **[25]** find himself. Obviously and necessarily this includes his not only having mental processes in general, such as mental processes in the background, for instance dozing, but that he performs some kind of “**Ego’s-act**”, an “I pay attention to this or that”, “I go through regarding its properties”, “I judge”, “I value”, etc., mental processes in which the Ego is directed towards any Something and anyhow acts on this objective. Every time this is the case, a new consciousness can be attached to it, an **Ego’s-reflection** in which the Ego can have an attentively perceiving look at itself as subject of the respective acts, and, proceeding from act to act, grasps itself reflectively as the one absolutely identical Ego of these acts, whereby of course the acts as such are attentively perceived as well. Ego’s-acts and any kind of mental processes belonging to the stream of the Ego’s-life are not only but also conscious, that is, they are conscious in the way of impression; marvelously **consciousness** **exists** just as something **conscious** for its part, that is, like I said, something impressionally conscious, and, where it is not attentively perceived, it can be made attentively perceived by way a turn back of regard, by way of reflection. This as well then is impressionally conscious and a reflection on the reflection can start, etc. We shall not dwell upon this any longer; at any rate it is evident that for me my Ego’s-life and my Ego self with all its essential compositions is a consistent scope of pre-theoretical facts. This[[8]](#footnote-8) whole sphere of the Ego’s own thereby delineated, of the accessible for its grasping reflection, is a sphere of absolute impression, of absolute self-givenness, that is, every doubt whether the grasped does exist actually or just seemingly is pointless; why it is pointless will be comprehensible by the following.

Secondly we would have a realm of **Ego-foreign** facts; constantly the Ego-foreign is given to the Ego in the way of bodily presence, like e.g. these objects around, these people. Two groups emerge from this example, **things** and **subjects**, namely as **foreign subjects**. For me, the Ego **[26]** which has given them, both are given perceptually, and insofar relating to me, but yet given as not-Ego, not egoical.[[9]](#footnote-9)

#### §3. Inner and outer perception. Object and Appearance

We saw that the egoical is grasped in acts of reflection (due to the “**immanent perception**”), in one [reflection] the Ego relates to itself, in the other [it relates] to its acts, its mental processes and their single moments by merely regarding and grasping. But different perceptions, **“external” perceptions**[[10]](#footnote-10) emerge consistently in the stream of consciousness, the objects of which characterize themselves by having conscious something “**external**” to the Ego and its egoical as present actuality. **[27]** The relation between perception and perceptual object shows itself to be entirely different on both sides. The egoical or [the] immanently perceived is not only generally perceived, but it is inseparably one with the perception[[11]](#footnote-11). Both belong to the same stream of mental processes **[28]** of the Ego, and properly speaking [both] are one. But the externally perceived or Ego-foreign is conscious as “**in itself**” in contrast to the perception and its Ego. It is not inseparably one with perception itself, its continual *esse* does not merge in its *percipi*.[[12]](#footnote-12) Whereas the **egoical** exists as long as it is conscious, and is gone, past, over and simply no longer exists when the consciousness has gone, the **ego-foreign**, something conscious as being external, is according to the own sense of external perception something objectively “**real**” which is lasting even if it is no longer perceived, [and] which possibly existed in actual being even when it was not perceived at all. It thus reveals itself as something to which the being perceived, the having been and will be being is coincidental as [something] **in itself** in contrast to the de facto perception of the perceiving subject, as [something] transcending the perception and along with the perception the whole sphere of the egoical. Therefore we speak of “**transcendent perception**”. Thus each external perception in itself means the actuality of the perceived as an ego-foreign, it is according to its property perception of a being “in itself” in the designated sense, whether by the way it is perception of things or of foreign subjects, men or animals. Of course the perception can sometimes be wrong; it then posits in a false way this ego-foreign in itself.

(Generally[[13]](#footnote-13) it is evident that it is a property’s part of this type of “external perception”, e.g. of the perception of a physical object, that for **each perception** there are always two open possibilities of being an either **valid** or **invalid perception**. This means: every perception of this type lies within a wider, never to be completed nexus of experience, [and] refers to further connections of already receded as well as future perceptions **[29]**, the latter being open possibilities at any given moment. [Open possibilities] in such a way that either the course of experience harmoniously proves the original positing of actuality with its sense-content, [and] no more than defines it more closely and completes it, or that it [the nexus of experience] implies inconsistencies, and leads to rejection of the originally given and temporally kept up perceptual actuality[[14]](#footnote-14). The one was the process of affirmation of actuality, the other the process of rejection of actuality, thereby indicating that we say something like: It was just an “illusion”, it was a deceptive appearance. All of this is due to an externally perceived, although given in its bodily presence, actually being given always just presumptively, [and due] to the content or sense with which it is given, pointing beyond itself to something not-given and, if this was meant as well, [due] to the opinion having to correspond to the current further experience; and from the outset it is evident that only perceptions of this type, according to their property being just parts of actual or possible nexus of experience, [and] thus in correspondence to their sense pointing beyond themselves, are under the antithesis of “validity or invalidity”, and that correlatively only their supposed objects are under the antithesis of “actually being or deceptive appearance”.)

In the last lecture we were contrasting **immanent** **perception** and **transcendent perception**, that is, the perception which the Ego has of itself and of its egoical, and the totally different perception it has of all ego-foreign. On the one hand the Ego is always impressionally conscious of the mental processes of its incessant stream of mental processes, i.e., [the mental processes are] conscious in the mode of bodily [presence] and not just [in the mode of] reproductive presence, and they reach the Ego’s attentive grasping by way of mere reflection, through a merely grasping Ego’s regard which is directed reflectively upon them. This act of reflection then is a new mental process, itself impressionally conscious again, itself ready to perceive, a new grasping regard can be directed upon the just taken regard itself, and so on *in infinitum*. **[30]** It is evident that mental processes of the stream need to be present already so that they can be grasped attentively, and furthermore it is evident, that especially Ego’s acts must have been performed already before they can be perceived attentively, moreover <it is> evident that the Ego not only attentively perceives its Ego’s acts, but also itself as Ego of these acts just ex post facto, by way of reflection. It is just after the Ego engaged itself in performing acts that through reflection it is able to perceive itself attentively. This therefore happens in a new Ego’s act, whereby a third one is needed to grasp the identity of the Ego in all these subsequent acts and reflections. And still further we fix the evidence that it is inconceivable, in the strongest understanding of absurdity inconceivable, that an attentively perceiving perception should encompass the totality of **all** mental processes which in one moment are impressionally conscious. For posited we assumed such an all-encompassing immanent perceiving, it would be a mental process which, once come into play, soon belonged to the present stream of mental processes, but still could not be attentively aware of its own self, wherefore first and foremost a new reflecting was needed.

Likewise it is evident that an Ego reflecting upon itself is indeed possible *a priori,* and that otherwise we had no possibility to say “I”, but that this a priori implies a wondrous splitting of the Ego: the Ego living in the mode of the grasping-itself, engaging in the act of reflection, needs to be separated from the Ego which is an Ego perceived attentively in a preceding Ego’s act, perceived in the mode of the grasped. In spite of the necessary identification, performed in a further reflection, and synthesis of the one and the other Ego (a reflection in which of course the Ego just being active is transformed into a reflected and objective one), we have to distinguish [them], we have to speak of different modes, of the so to say originally living Ego which in its original aliveness, i.e., in its being during current activity, is fundamentally not grasped, and the “same” Ego which is grasped in the mode of reflection as having just been originally living, but thus no longer being livingly active. Those were the first glances we were allowed to cast into the wonder of all wonders, into the Ego-being as Ego being active and into “self-consciousness”.

**[31]** In further analyses we studied the relation between the actual being of the egoical sphere’s pre-givennesses and the immanent impression, or rather the immanent perception. Here we used the idiom saying, the *esse* of the egoical components merged in their *percipi*. This [idiom] of course is supposed to bring to mind **Berkeley**; furthermore, and again this is self-evident, it [the idiom] has to be understood *cum grano salis*. The being of the respectively actual mental processes of my Ego’s stream of mental processes amounts to nothing more than their impressional awareness which possibly here and there may have the mode of the attentively perceiving perception; perception and perceived are inseparably one and constitute a single individual being. While thereby the concerned mental process is struck by the attentively perceiving regard, it is necessarily [and] totally encompassed by this glance in its absolute selfhood. This implies that the realm of immanent impression <is> a realm of an absolutely evident being, whose actual being can give the Ego, the subject of the mental processes, no rise to doubt, to possible negation. For me my mental processes exist, i.e., those being impressional presence at the respective moment, and [for me] I am myself given in such a way that I simply cannot avoid positing me and all that is mine as being. This being is an absolutely necessary being for me. Doubt and negation are countersenseful in here.

In contrast to this, ego-foreign objectivities, things and animals are as well impressionally given to us as bodily present and actualities within mental processes of external perception, and yet [they are given] in such a way that affirmation and rejection of this actuality are possible, nay, [are] anytime open possibilities. Manifold ego-foreign objects lay before us, characterized as being “in themselves”, as objectively real actualities, we are absolutely certain of this factual existence, and yet, it may be that these objects, the things right before us, these men and animals are not as they bodily appear, nay, that in the end they do not exist at all. It[[15]](#footnote-15) is characteristic for perception itself, which makes us being conscious of them as bodily actuality, that it is split into a series of modal variations **[32]** which are absolutely impossible in immanent perception, within the reflection onto the egoical. Such modalities can be expressed by “it could be”, “possibly it is just like that”, “it is dubious, probable”, “it is not like this”. An external perception can become uncertain, can become dubious: the object is still in bodily selfhood before our eyes and yet we doubt its actuality; we then speak of it as maybe being an illusion, it may be an illusion that the thing over there, which we regard as a globe actually does have a spherical shape, and not a rather more or less similar other shape; we regard it as purely white but begin to doubt whether it may be not rather yellowish, etc. In such a way we possibly examine the colors, the shapes, we consider, we doubt, and not rarely we eventually proceed to negation. What matters is that negation, whether in the direction of the perceived properties’ actuality or in the direction of the whole object’s actuality, is possible and is any time possible, even where the object remains impressionally conscious. The terms “delusion”, “illusion”, “hallucination” express the modal variation of the consciousness within the negation, in contrast to what we take as the normal to be our starting point, as normal perception with the so to speak unbroken belief in actuality.

The impression of an ego-foreign thus has two sides to it; on the one hand it is the **consciousness of bodily presence**, on the other hand it is the **consciousness of actuality**, the believing something to be actual, the belief in the factual existence of the bodily object of consciousness. This second side may possibly modalize itself, and it can, according to a fundamental possibility, modalize itself during every external perception. (The present <given>, in the mode of the having been, turns into the mode of the merely possible, [the mode of] the contrasting-the-other-possibilities; the consciousness fluctuates in doubt, it decides against the one possibility and negates the other which just has been present as having been, as being, as absolute actuality.) It needs to be explained why this is an any time open possibility while it is inconceivable in immanent perceptions. “*Ego cogito*”. It is inconceivable that an own Ego-process, an “I think”, “I feel”, “I want”, “I affirm”, “I negate”, “I disapprove”, etc., at[[16]](#footnote-16) the same time in which my reflecting grasp has it in its grip**[33]**, should not exist, [and] it is impossible that I am uncertain about it, [that I am] in doubt, etc.; thus the immanent perception does not allow such modal variations. But this is connected with the entirely different structure of the perceptions on both sides, or rather with the impressions, and with the one providing the perceived with the sense of an objective real, of a being in itself, the other one [providing it with the sense] of a mere subjective mental process and its Ego[[17]](#footnote-17).

Now it can be discerned: a perception can in itself be conscious of a real, of something before it as something characterized in itself, only by way of a mental meaning-process, of an intending which intends beyond itself and always aims at fulfillment, and even within the fulfillment aims again at something new beyond itself. And so on *in infinitum*. External perception is such a character that the bodily existence of the perceived is always and according to an irreversible necessity mere presumption. How does this come to pass? How come that the immanent perception is not mere presumption as well and can never be [a presumption]? The answer is: all external perception is, not randomly though but with eternal necessity, perception through appearance. This latter needs to be split, and to be split inevitably according to its sense content, into the appearance and that which appears. This implies: the classes of possible perception’s objects which we called “ego-foreign” or “transcendent”, [and] “external” are only perceivable by showing themselves, by way of “appearing”. We can downright say they are what they are just as something appearing within appearances; because if they were different, perceptions should be conceivable in which they bodily presented themselves in their being different. If an individual being is actual, a perception must be possible which shows the object as it is itself **[34]** and in actuality, and which puts this being-self bodily before the eyes. We thus see that external objects, objectively real [things] are inconceivable to be perceived without any appearance.

But conversely we say it belongs to the essence of the immanent perception that its object, that the egoical and thus the mental processes of my Ego at the moment of their real being lived, and likewise the Ego itself fundamentally cannot appear. The distinction between the **object itself** and the **appearance of the object** is necessarily absent for the immanent perception. Precisely thereby it is characterized as a perception containing its perceived object as an absolute being, whereas the external perception always only contains an appearance and its object just as an appearing Something.

Now a more detailed clarification of what I said is needed. We will explain here what belongs to the own indissoluble essence of the two perceptual types, and correlatively to the indissoluble essence of both types of objects which are both perceived and acquire their meaning as internal and external, as immanent and transcendent, as egoical and outer-egoical [object] exclusively through the perceiving consciousness. Thus we will question the perception itself, we will consider how the objects on both sides present themselves, and what is contingent and what is necessary therein. We start from clear examples we take exclusively as representatives of their [respective] type.

Let us take an object we all have before our eyes as an example, [let us take] this desk and let us consider what necessarily remains in the way the perceptual object presents itself, however we might think of this object as modified in free fantasy or replaced by other perceptual objects which belong to the same highest generic type of external perception. The desk and likewise any external object, we now say, is in its bodily actual existence “**given through appearances**”, and it cannot be given otherwise. What does this imply? The desk is bodily given to us with a certain composition of properties, in a certain space and shape over which a certain color is spread as well as certain tactile characteristics such as roughness and smoothness, etc. For the sake of simplicity we will initially assume we were not able to move neither head nor eyes, [and] that in general neither thereby the phenomenon of perception would be altered **[35]** nor in any other way; likewise it was an easy case already when we preferred a static object, remaining unaltered in the course of perception. We easily transfer what then can be viewed to all other cases.

**How** then, I repeat my question, is the perceived thing, its perceived spatial shape, its color, etc. **given**? Obviously the thing is only visible from one side, and it is just given in a contingent sight, [a contingent] aspect. Likewise is each characteristic, belonging to its visible part, just given in a contingent aspect; and just as the object is neither its part nor itself is the sight it contingently offers to us, thus its own color is not the sight we have of it, and the same holds true for each property perceived in the mode of bodily actuality. In this regard we are used to speak of **perspective**, though generally just in relation to the visual field. Each thing is in each case just seen in a certain perspective adumbration, the shape itself is thereby distinguished from the respective adumbration of shape. The other properties are as well affected by this, so that we downright speak of a color perspective. The matter will be all the more obvious as soon as we lift the limitation on the case of a static perception, and include this apparently always possible change, and […] the manifold perceptions and perceptual continua in which the same object can be given. It is not just that we may generally have many mental processes of perception which are perceptions of the same thing, but this same thing again and again presents itself from new sides, presents itself in ever new aspects [and] sights, its shape [presents itself] in ever new shape aspects or adumbrations, and also the color [presents itself] in ever new color aspects, and thus each property belonging to the composition of bodily presence. Constantly we observe: one needs to distinguish between object and aspect of the object, between color itself and color aspect, and likewise in every regard. What is called aspect, sight, view, mode of appearance of the object, and what is distinguished from [the object] itself, obviously is nothing invented but something we all the time by turning our mental view pay attention to, and <what we all the time> are able to grasp; it is an undoubted givenness.

**[36]** **Two** **attitudes** are to be distinguished to which correlatively corresponds the distinction between **object** and **aspect of the object**. In the one [attitude] we are naively turned towards the object itself, perceptions proceed in their continuous sequence, [and] manifold aspects flow within them, they all the time reside in the mental process; but we do not pay attention to it, we pay attention to the object which with this attitude is conscious as one and the same, as this identically unchanged desk. But at any time we can enter this new attitude, the [attitude] concerning the aspects [and] the appearances: the object still exists as one and the same, however, we do not pay attention to it but to the “appearances”, to the constantly changing way the shape appears, to the adumbrations of shape as well as to the color’s mode of appearance, etc. In the one attitude we have something identical, and according to presupposition unchanged, as something experienced and posited in an unaltered way, as a numerical One: this desk over here. In the other [attitude] we have a flow of changes, something constantly other, although related to the corresponding identical something, in other words, [we have] a constant change of appearances, but as appearances of one identical something.

We now have the possible limit case that a perception continues without changing every passing moment. But still we distinguish between appearance and object, and we speak of a contingent appearance in which the object presents itself in this perception, because we are aware of our **ability** to set in motion our perception at any time, and to correlatively transfer the appearance to manifold appearances of the same object. Apparently is, what we have viewed here, not just a *factum* of experience, something which is thus by accident, and commonly is thus, but could as well be otherwise, could be thought of otherwise. It is just as little contingent as a number which, given as >a and <b, cannot be given as <a and >b at the same time or, to go one step further, [it is just] as little contingent as any arithmetic or purely geometric truth and purely logical truth is. Rather, what we derive from the examples of external perception, we cognize in appropriate universalization as being *a priori* in that strict sense, in which all purely mathematic is *a priori*. We discern in conceivably most perfect clarity, **[37]** that it necessarily and in absolute universality must be thus, i.e., that no object of the external type, of the ego-foreign type, is conceivable which was not given through appearances, and that it only in countersense could be thought of as otherwise given.

It is of downright unparalleled importance for the young philosopher to totally adopt this evidence which philosophy has never paid any attention to, and which is not only highly important in itself, but [which], once apprehended, enables the mental eye to see an infinity of related so-called phenomenological evidences. We will bring them somewhat closer. (An external object, the correlate to a perception which, according to its own essence, gives a non-egoical, a being in itself, is given and can fundamentally only be given through appearances.) The external perception is with indissoluble necessity **at the same time** impressional consciousness of its external object **and** of an appearance or a continual sequence of appearances of its object in such a way that every appearance in itself is characterized as an appearance of this object and correlatively the object [is characterized] as an object of this appearance. It belongs to the essence of the appearance that it is never conceivable as the only possible appearance of this object, [and] that it leaves open other, nay, fundamentally an endless amount of other appearances of the same object. If the desk is now given from this side it thus presents itself in a certain appearance, in a certain shape perspective, color perspective, etc., it could as well be given in other [appearances], although it now possibly was given in this one alone. Indeed the evidence belongs to this that the currently present perception, and thus every possible current perception, can be transferred to an infinity, i.e., [to] an endless open multiplicity of new perceptions which are all in itself characterized as perceptions of the same object, that is, which are characterized by virtue of a unity-consciousness as a consciousness of this one and the same, which can be visually abstracted from the continuous transition from perception to perception. Each external perception thus a priori belongs to an endless, determined perception system. Because what does fit in there is not arbitrary. Into this nexus of possible perceptions which, from the perception we presently bring about, we now may proceed to **[38]**, for example by walking around the desk while watching, by then touching it on every side, etc., only one perception can enter which in itself is characterized as perception of this desk and not a perception of a wall, a perception of a tree, etc.

Evidently a system of appearances corresponds to this perception system, i.e., an external object may presently be given in which appearance ever: it [the appearance] necessarily always arranges itself into an endless system of manifold possible appearances. The universal type and all possible appearance processes, which may be characterized in themselves and which were characterized as appearances of the same object, are fixed. Contrary to that it is not fixed what appearances of these belong to the actuality of the object, [and] what [appearances] will present themselves from the present experience. Because according to its essence the perception is characterized thus, that in presenting the object as bodily actuality it only shows us one side of it, and in such a way that, according to the perception’s own sense-bestowing, the other sides are not fully determined beforehand. The desk is given through perception as an object with a determining sense which the expression “desk” indicates, that is, generally speaking [it is] given as a spatial object, spatially closed in itself, with extensive properties. This sense describes a norm of possible perceptions, of possible modes of appearances. For sure thus the object has a back side, has a certain shape over there, a certain color, etc. But for the perceiving consciousness this shape in another sense is undetermined; not only is it actually not intuitively given, actually not seen, not really touched, etc., even if we know the object to some degree, it [the shape] is always something to be determined more closely, something to get to know more closely. A horizon of undetermined determinability belongs to something which actually is not given, [and this horizon] demands further perceptions, in the current course of which the uncertain would become certain, and then gain an increasingly detailed determinacy.

What we thereby learn to understand is that each external perception by being perception through mere appearance **[39]** necessarily is **perception through mere** **presumption**. Regarding its object it is perception, it is consciousness of a bodily actuality. And yet: it is only regarding one “side” of the object, regarding a limited composition of its own essential properties that it [the external perception] bodily bestows actual sense, according to another composition it merely means it along with something, is conscious of it [the object] as being co-present while in actuality this composition is not bodily present, [and] thus actually is not perceived. Always and necessarily these **two strata of external perception** do exist, actually presenting in the one layer, in the other merely appresenting. Attention should be paid to the strata being dependent. The front side of the object is nothing independent, it is not a piece of the object, but something that simply <is> conceivable as a side, and all the more what is invisible of the object, the way it is conscious within the perception, is only conscious as a more or less undetermined **horizon** of appresented material moments which, deriving from the given side and being insoluble from it, would presently become visible. Thus regarding these two strata of perception and their objective correlates “seen side” and “invisible side”, it is **not** according to a consciousness through signs, in which the perceived sign is a concrete object pointing to another independent object. Sign and the designated are separable from each other, nay, actually [they are] not connected objects. The designation does not have the character of an appresentation in which a presentiated or a continuum of “possible” presentiations, in connection with a presentation, has the function of a **co-presence,** and [in which] present and co-present are actually [and] concretely one.

Furthermore it must be heeded that even what is actually seen of the object has, apart from the **external horizon** of unacquaintedness and of incomplete determination, with regard to the invisible properties of the thing, as well and necessarily an **internal horizon** of such indetermination and unacquaintedness. We actually see the desk’s brown color on the side facing us, we see it as being evenly brown, but it is open whether, on coming closer, i.e., due to new perceptions, it might appear **[40]** as being uneven in color, whether still invisible structures of the wood, non-flatness, etc. by way of appearance become visible. Thus the evenly brown color, though seen in a more proper sense, is mere anticipation, and even if it proved to be true, every new reaffirming perception again is anticipation, presumption. **No perception**, no matter how clearly something might be perceived, is **definitive perception**. In each case it contains horizons of undetermined determinability, the object is always given through appearances, and appearances are always anticipating, presuming.

But appearance is appearance through and through, that is, not only does an external objectivity’s whole perception include an appearance of this objectivity, but also this appearance is a complex of dependent appearance components, each of which again is itself appearance-of, and objectivates any dependent component of the object, a property. Always the appearances bestow a sense to the object, which leaves something open, which requires further determination. Always appearance presents the object in the way of a **meaning** related to it and anticipating, being more or less vague, [and] indeterminate, and always is the idea of an “**adequate appearance**”, [the idea] of an appearance, determining the object in an absolutely clear, [and] complete way, [an idea] which presents [the object] in a completely exhaustive way, that is, in the way of a pure presentation without any appresentation, an “**idea**” lying in **infinity**. (This also applies if we take the expression “appearance” in such a broad sense that we call the appearance continuum, presenting the object in the perceptual flow, in which we are anxious to completely grasp all its sides, **one** appearance.) No matter how far this flow may have come, always there is an open infinity before it, we never reach an end, an end is not conceivable at all. We must not let ourselves be deceived by common statements saying: “Now, in this position relative to the object I see its true color”, or: “from over here I can see the color best, and what it actually is like”. In common life we simply understand as true color the one given in certain modes of appearance **[41]**, namely with regard to our practical purposes. The house shall be visible from a certain distance, and by its thereby appearing color [it shall] cause an impression which is what [actually] matters, thus this is the true color.

It is associated with all this, above all with the perception through appearances having this essential character to always anticipate and to have certain horizons, that for the actuality-consciousness of the perception not only the possibility of **affirmation** is at hand, but <also> [the possibility] of **suspension**. The present course from perception to perception can proceed in such a way, that the new appearances affirm the presumption that the physical thing, grasped at first sight with this or that sense, is actual, [and] actually corresponds to this sense, that is, that the properties mentally meant along with it accordingly come into proper appearance indeed. But it may as well be that it was a fake for instance, a semblance, an illusion. That is, further appearances follow the first ones contending with their presumption, not fulfilling but suspending it. Likewise all the other modalities – doubts, possibility-consciousness, probability-consciousness – are always ready possibilities, simply because external perception as a perception through appearances only posits actuality by way of a medium of preconception, of anticipation of the closer determination or of the different determination of the mentally meant along with it.

One[[18]](#footnote-18) can achieve greater clarity in the following way: the continual horizon of internal and external indeterminateness always leaves open **manifold** possibilities for closer determination. It is part of every indeterminateness to encompass in a defining frame manifold possibilities, thus it is part of perception as well. Every newly occurring perception realizes **one** of these possibilities, but, apart from its leaving the old indeterminacies without determination, again opens up new and manifold indeterminacies. In this process the perceptual object gets furnished with an ever new sense. It may be thereby that any determination, being demanded in the course of the new appearances or manifesting itself, contends with a determination derived **[42]** from an earlier appearance, added to the objective sense, and then consecutively retained of course. This possibility is continually open because every appearance through and through is not mere and pure presentation, but also appresentation, [in] that it always means more beyond the actually presented, and [in that] it belongs to the character of this as of anything tending beyond, to aim at fulfillment, while fulfillment includes, again according to its essence, the possibility of disappointment, being different, [and] not-being.

Furthermore it has to be heeded that both moments of perception, mere **appearance** and **reality consciousness** as well as its modalities are connected functionally. We will assume that the process begins as a normal perception, i.e., [it begins] in the mode of a certain factual existence. In the course of changing appearances the continued determination, taking place at every point of the perception process, can proceed in the way of **pure and continuous specification** of the perceptual object. All determination up till now would and will be preserved, and just this is the achievement of the process here, its limiting open indeterminacies, [and] giving them clearly intuitive determination. In this case the consciousness of actuality, accompanying the appearances, and through them declaring the appearing as actually being, is **completely harmonious consciousness of actuality**, that is, a certainty continually corroborating, [and] confirming itself. The appearances present the object in the continuous way of harmoniously maintained transcendence, on which the shape of the certain actuality belief depends, it is continually presumptive belief, and at the same time runs in the sense of continuous confirmation of the presumption. Thus the course of perception continually implies the consciousness of fulfillment of intention, of corroboration, of the “it is actually thus, and only determines itself more closely.”

But open possibilities are different cases, namely that the specification and the supplement of sensual perception given with it, contends with what perception put before the eyes and presumed earlier. A **certain unity** runs through the series of appearances as a continuous claim of the appearances to be appearances of the self, but the determinations of the sense **[43]**, gathered by former appearances, and concentrated into a final harmonious determination, cannot be kept harmoniously due to a **new** appearance and sense-bestowing of the same object. The object appears afflicted with contradicting properties nullifying each other; then the phenomena of vacillation between conflicting apprehensions make an appearance, the possible phenomena of the decision for one of them, [and] the cancellation of the other, and without proceeding it is clear that all modalizing of the consciousness of actuality presupposes the peculiarity of the external perception to be a transcendently presuming perception.

You see how peculiar the structure of external perception is, how much and what significance is implied in its being perception through appearance. You must make totally evident that when this tension continually exists between the object of perception itself and its appearances, this “continually” expresses an unconditioned necessity. An external object, coinciding so to say with its appearance, that is, in such a way being perceived, that what is seen of it no longer points beyond to other perceptions needed to determine more closely, to bring unseen to sight, to determine yet indeterminate, such an external object is purely and simply inconceivable. As soon as we posit this case as an ideal and look at it here as an attainable ideal, we thereby pretend there was an “adequate perception” of the external object, a perception not needing any further perception, and not demanding any further beyond itself, namely, in order to grasp the object more perfectly. However, the object then would be no external object at all, it would absolutely be included within perception, immanent to it. But if, within the frame of freely shaping **fantasy,** we try to **fantasize** any perception **as different** so that it became adequate perception, while at the same time we keep the identity of the object and of its uppermost genus, for instance “thing”, thus quickly and with absolute evidence the impossibility comes into view. The wish to have a “thing”, an ego-foreign Something of the senses, made bodily present by external perception, as object of an adequate perception is equally absurd as the wish to get a smaller number by adding units to it. **[44]** A thing, something external is *a priori* just an appearing, just inadequate, just presumptive, just conceivable as always determinable and never definitively determined, just as something remaining in suspension between being and not-being, and to ascribe to God an adequate perception of things means ascribing absurdities to him.

The **sense of externality** and of its appertinent being in itself, its being transcendent, thus simply explicates itself with the sentence: being external is a [kind of] being presenting itself fundamentally only by way of appearances, therefore fundamentally always being presumptive. This is a reversible sentence. On the other hand, immanent perceptions characterize themselves in contrast to the transcendent ones as perceptions whose objects so to say are their own appearances. But it would be better to say, whose objects do not appear but are absolutely given, [and] adequately perceived. They do not appear, that means, we include into the concept of appearance that the “appearing” is something different from the “appearance”, according to all determinations.

Thereby we emphasize the evidence: of one and the same individual object allowing immanent perception, just a single immanent perception is possible for the same duration, while for a transcendent object there are countless. Since from one and the same object manifold appearances are possible, making appear the same composition of properties in different degrees of clarity, of determination, in different distributions of intuitability and absence of sensuous intuitability, many external perceptions of the same individual are possible according to the same durable composition, and thus also in regard to the same individual duration. Because the temporal locus and the individual time-duration are no distinctive traits.

Owing to all these analyses the problem mentioned in advance obviously has been solved at the same time, [the problem] why we have the right to declare the doubt, whether something immanent actually does exist or does not exist, nay, even [to declare] a statement designating it as just possibly being or as presumably being, as absurd. And along with it we understand why it is absurd to attribute the **evidence** of the *ego cogito* to an external perception and a perceptional statement. **[45]** Because the evidence of the cogito says nothing but: It is absurd to bring into an immanently given, [into] something not appearing, the antithesis of supposedly being and truly being and actually being and actually not being. All these modal concepts and those related to them (delusion, illusion) presuppose a transcendent consciousness pointing beyond itself, [and] it is only in relation to this [consciousness] as a presuming [consciousness] that assertion and refutation can be spoken of.

One more thing needs to be mentioned here as being significant. Through pure analysis of the external perception’s content we find a distinction between **object** and **appearance of this object.** (An object in this connection is nothing more than the **self** of appearances which becomes conscious within the continuous course of these appearances in a system. Not that these appearances as mental processes had any piece in common; rather, in an indescribable way we see in ever new appearances, [and] through all these changing analyses one and the same something appearing within them.[[19]](#footnote-19) When Kant designated the object of experience as x, this means and can only mean: the object of experience is according to the sense of the original experience, of perception, always and necessarily a determinable and only relatively, [and] one-sidedly determined Something, in such a way that to intend for this x a self-contained determination of content, leaving nothing open, would be countersense.)

Obviously the **appearances** belong to the sphere of **immanence**, the external perception contains them immanently and impressionally. Therefore an attentively perceiving turn of regard grasps them reflectively, and grasps them adequately, and as something necessarily being, [something] indubitable.

Thus for us it is a self-understood statement to say: Accordingly external perception makes its object conscious through presenting it by way of appearance in immanent data, belonging to its own absolute stock of being. “Presenting”: Is it not possible to say in a metaphor: “depicting”? **[46]** Now here the dangerous cliff of naïvely **pictorial theory** needs to be heeded which certainly can only then be still a danger for us when we leave the pure Ego’s attitude behind, and thereby leave the ground on which our descriptions and inquiries were moving. How did we commence, and in which direction did our questions go? Let us investigate sense. We started with “I am” and we ask: what is pre-given to me, the present subject in the reflection, and exclusively accepting me the way I find myself reflectively as subject of the action, and how specifically, when I do have a pre-given external world, is the perception pre-giving it shaped? Thereby we encounter the described wondrous coherences between the immanent composition of perception which we called “appearances”, and the external appearing through them or within them. Leaving this attitude, and comparing in an external point of view of Ego-subjects perception and the perceived Object belonging to nature, [a comparison] the naively thinking makes readily, then the temptation indeed is very great. We will still have to speak more extensively of this attitude’s antithesis.

Here just so much shall be said: When I find men in front of me, I grasp them as external, as Ego-subjects being in relation to animate organisms, in coherence with the whole external nature. Of course I do ascribe perceptions to them, perceptions of the same nature into which I see myself. In the internal analysis I have not obtained clarity yet concerning the intentional coherence of perception and perceived, which would include my remaining purely within the immanence of my perception according to meaning and meant, that is why it is obvious however, to compare the relation between perception and perceived things with the relation between picture and depicted, and then, taking the comparison seriously, to lapse into gross errors, nay, into absurdity. There man holds within himself, within his soul, perceptual pictures of the things external to him which indeed are outside, the way I myself see them outside as well. These pictures are as other pictures more or less good pictures, depending on the respective subjects’ constitution, [they are] corresponding or not corresponding. It may be in this case, as in the case of pictures of any sort that their original does **[47]** not exist at all, while the picture does exist; and thus everything generally seems to correspond well.

But now it is necessary to investigate sense, and to recognize the absurdity of the interpretation of the perceptual appearance as a picture of the appearing. We call a statue a picture of its original, e.g. of a general. A reality here is called picture of another reality, separated from and similar to it. Is this the state of affairs with the relation between perception and perceived? The perception of the perceiving Ego is a mental process in its life-stream, immanent [to perception] is the appearance as appearance of the appearing; and even this, that the appearance makes precisely this appear and nothing else, this thing, this man or whatever it may be, is something taking place purely within the Ego: It perceives what exists, it experiences an appearance, and [it] finds itself within it [the appearance] related to the appearing. May the Ego then arrive at the conclusion the object was an illusionary one, it still does appear, there is just no actuality, no possibility of legitimation assigned to it. Now coming close to subjectivity from without, as far as [we] perceive therein a man, and grasp that he in himself brings about a perception, such as [a perception] of the tree in front of both of us, we surely attribute to his soul, or more precisely to his stream of mental processes a certain tree-appearance. But do we thereby attribute to him something similar to a tree, an analogue of a statue? Is this not completely countersense? Can we attribute to his psychic internality, more precisely, to his stream, something else than an immanent, namely such a kind we analogously find in our focusing on what lies inside?

After all, we question ourselves how the statue became a picture, how it was able to become a picture. There is a similarity between picture and original, which is able to come more or less closely to likeness. In a forest of fir trees we have thousands of firs being more or less similar to or like each other. Is thus each one a picture of the others, does each besides its color, its shape, etc. besides the inner distinctive traits of the fir, grounding the similarity, own a trait “picture” as well? Of course this is countersense. Without moving into deeper analyses it is obvious that an object is just a picture as object of a picture apprehension, which any Ego brings about. But is not the statue as such a picture, whether we see it as such or **[48]** not? We respond: Objectively the pictorial nature can only be assigned to it insofar as it is a thing that by all Ego-subjects, by all men of a certain normal and common developmental stage, provided it is perceived by them or intuitively imagined, is at the same time in a certain unique consciousness perceived as picture of another object. This includes: The pictorial nature does not adhere to the thing itself as a trait, instead it adheres to the perceived, intuited thing as such, or a new intentional character adheres to the appearances of the perceiving subject, namely to certain preferred appearances, within the course of appearances of the thing “statue”, provided the subject, developed in a normal way, precisely like it has such appearances, accompanies as picture the appearing within them with a picture apprehension as a higher consciousness. I speak of preferred appearances. And indeed when for example entering a monumental statue like the Hercules in Kassel, and having the respective perceptual appearances of inner shaping, the image-consciousness of course disappears at once. We have to view the Hercules from without and from a suitable distance and position, we must have certain chosen courses of appearances, so that, motivated by them, the picture-consciousness can set itself inside of us. But what is the main point here: It is obvious that the picture is just a picture for our picture-consciousness, and this as a higher level apprehension presupposes a perceptual consciousness, i.e., the mental processes of appearances. To interpret these, inseparably entailing in themselves as appearances the consciousness of the appearing, themselves again as pictures, i.e., to turn appearances themselves again into things, which by way of perception would be apprehended as pictures, this is, and openly manifold, countersense.

#### §4. Pure Ego-attitude and the Idea of a Transcendent Phenomenology

Indeed we will escape such basic errors, if we consider in advance, what *eo ipso* belongs to the sort of descriptions of apriori connections which we bring about in pure Ego-attitude **[49]** or, to put it in another way, if we make perfectly clear, what kind of attitude we can bring about anytime under the title “**pure Ego-attitude**”, and what firmly delimits and distinguishes pre-givenness and its possible descriptions.

From here we will start to rise to a higher methodical standpoint. Our Ego-attitude was nothing else than what **Descartes** framed in the first of his well-known *Meditations*, and which led him to the often-quoted *ego cogito, ego sum*. Thus we also began: *Ego cogito, cogito cogitata*; more specified: I have given perceptually, or rather, I may have given perceptually; - **what** is it I may have given thus? But let it be understood, that our procedure thereby looked like this, we took the respective perceived as perceived by the respective perception, precisely as the bodily given **within it**, precisely as the Something that <was perceived> in this or that sense, with the absoluteness or with the perceptual indeterminacy and determinability, with which it was something perceived. We brought about no other descriptions, and this we discover now belatedly, and put it into the focus of our attention, no other [descriptions] than those which were in this frame. We were able to move around in it without bringing about its delimitation conceptually. I simply led you through the descriptions, you followed without effort, always you had an immanent way without reflecting on it. But now bring this to your consciousness, that simply everything remained in a certain way enclosed within the frame of immanence. When we designated the egoical and ego-foreign as given to the Ego (to me, reflecting as Ego-subject on something encountered and present), when we described its properties and differences, our descriptions still did not in the slightest go beyond what was included in the own sense-content of the giving consciousness.

Nevertheless, we reflected extensively on the being true or not-being, in regard of the perceptual objectivities, and we made ourselves in general, apriori evidences conscious of the countersense of each doubt and of each not-being, regarding something immanently given, and in contrast [we made ourselves conscious of] the open possibility of the not-being for each given in the manner of **[50]** transcendence. But how was this exhibition brought about? Surely by considering everything external to the Ego purely as how it was perceptually meant in possible external perceptions, and how it was appearing in appearances, and by purely following the Apriori which, by the immanent content and sense of the perception, was predelineated in relation to appearance and appearing. The perceived thing as such lies within the perception of this thing after all, as appearing one way or another, as determinable and determined, whether the thing exists in true actuality or not; perception after all has its sense according to fullness and intentional horizons, has its changeable appearances, adumbrations etc. in absolute evidence as something belonging to its immanent content, and it was just this that we had recourse to. Purely following the sense, within the immanence there emerged the essential possibility of (the) not-being of all external objects, and it emerged that being and not-being are **indications** of certain structures of perceptual courses, according to harmonious fulfillment and confirmation, or according to inconsistency and suspension. It was just from such results of purely immanent eidetic analysis that the countersense of the picture-theory could radically be made clear. To exteriorize something egoical like the appearance, like the picture-theory does, is countersensical like it would be countersensical to egoicalize the external (which is fundamentally only given as presumption of a continuous confirmation of external perceptions’ positing of actuality).

But we are no longer interested in the picture-theory but in the fundamental, methodical progress which results from a further continuation of the reflection on the sense of the Ego-attitude’s pure descriptions. We are at this point far enough to effect a **fundamental delimitation of an idea of the pure Ego and of the pure Ego-consciousness,** and to designate a **pure method of the ego-related inquiry into the primal source** which is of highest philosophical significance, nay, of such a high [significance] that all radical philosophy depends on it. Thereby just a final and light purification needs to be effected in our previous Ego-attitude which suspends a moment, albeit not entering the descriptive content of the statements, but yet containing in an unwanted way a dispensable prejudgment. **[51]** Let us consider it thus. If each of us for himself says “I”, and deliberately states which perceptual data he finds (and in theoretical reduction, i.e., to the exclusion of all theoretical meanings and universally of all meanings won in grounding thoughts), nay, [if each of us] further [states] what he may find in possible perceptions, because types of data present themselves to him and could present themselves, thus he thereby takes as actuality what plainly presents itself to him as actuality, that is, according to the respective direction of the individual discoveries or discoveries reducing to types, he [takes as actuality] the surrounding persons, men and animals as well. But if he thereby, like it always was the case with our considerations, generally focuses his interest on the types of **possible** data and the **general** evidences which in an unconditioned way apply to such data (as an Apriori without which they could not be thought of and could not exist), the actuality of the perceptual objects lying singly and as a fact within his view, or of the intuitive memory objects, by which he possibly recalls objects of past perception, obviously loses its function for his descriptive and generally confirming behavior.

The much bespoken desk here before our eyes was for **us**, for everyone in the attitude “I and what I find”, a found individual **actuality**; it was present as factually existing and [it] was accepted thus, posited by the Ego. But it was a mere example for a whole type of **possible** Ego-data, in the purest sense of **possible** external objects of perception, an example which indeed we could change at pleasure and in free fantasy. We regarded as equally good the thing freely fantasied as different as well as the [thing] “**actually**” posited in character; furthermore at the same time we operated freely with possible objects we were allowed to draw from pure fantasy without any connection to actual experience. We did not in any given moment surrender the **actuality of perceptual objects**, the way they were indeed experienced by us; however, on the other hand this positing of actuality constantly brought about by us did not prevent us from running through the **pure** possibilities in such a way that we won the most perfect evidence that **each** object of possible external perception could as well not be **[52]**, although [it is] perceived, that is, [it is] given as present [object] in the consciousness of bodily presence, while of course for the immanent objects, those of immanent perception, the contradictory opposite was no less evident. But thereby it is absolutely sure that the positing of actuality of the external perceptual objects, although we constantly brought it about as well, and although we in no instance thought about changing something about it, does not contain any prejudgment, from the acceptance of which our results could be affected. In other words, the existence of the external things for example, which we see respectively and do not question in any way, and thus the existence of the external factual being of every sort, cannot be a presupposition our assertions depend on. Otherwise we would enter into obvious countersense. If our assertion was that *a priori* no possible external perception excluded the not-being of the perceived, the consequence immediately suggests itself that no external object, no external world as such has to exist.

Can the evident possibility that not a thing exists, depend on the presupposition that a thing which is now experienced as actual **does** **exist**? Or can the possibility that no perception has irrefutable acceptance depend on the presupposition that any de facto perception does have irrefutable acceptance? If for me the logical necessity existed to hold on to the positing of actuality of my perceptions and experiences, and to build all my other assertions upon it, they could fundamentally not be negated; thus it would be a contradiction to state that each external positing of experience was possibly invalid. We, however, have to state it that way; it is an absolutely doubtless evidence. According to this it is absolutely certain that the ongoing positings of actuality we, during the descriptions within the Ego-attitude, accompany our ongoing present experience-data with, or we would better say, in which we leave them, do not make the slightest contribution to the statements we make. It is absolutely certain that they, while running alongside, judge the given world but do not judge these statements, [and] do not contain any logical presuppositions we now had to formulate here. Thus we can, and for reasons of purity **[53]** of the method, we have to **explicitly** suspend, to put out of action these positings of actuality.

In itself it is certain and can be made clear with absolute evidence that an assertion of pure possibilities and of apriori laws (which according to their essence are nothing but laws of pure possibility) does exist **at all**, and that it belongs to the sense of all these assertions that they are tainted with no, simply no prejudgment regarding any actuality. E.g. pure geometry or pure mathematics is through and through science of pure possibilities; it judges in such a way that not the faintest content of actuality is presupposed as premise by it. And this is why it is called an apriori science. Thus it proceeds or the geometer proceeds de facto, although being a living man on the one hand, who knows himself and always according to experience finds himself as a man within the spacetime actuality, and although he <on the other hand> sometimes draws figures with ink on paper, sometimes draws with chalk on the board, etc. He does not consider suspending the actuality of all these experiences explicitly, and still it would be ridiculous to say that such actuality and any sort of actuality was a presupposition for the acceptance of his assertions. What he presupposes is stated, and it consists of nothing but of possibilities, that is, of possibilities of figures, numbers, and the like (possibly in a certain ideality) and nothing else.

A radical investigation like ours cannot proceed **in such a naïve way** as mathematics; it has to get clear on time about this absolute independence of possibility and actuality, that is, of what we have just called “pure” possibility, and gradually bring it to final reflective evidence. But especially [it has to do] this at <the> primal source of all philosophical stating, at the pure Ego of the Ego-attitude. Although I commence with statements like “I am, and I find this and that”, I can put out of action all these positings of actuality as being completely irrelevant when I speak of the set of types of possible pre-givennesses, for example of Ego’s own and ego-foreign, and more pointedly, when I speak of their pure possibilities and enounce universal Apriori-sentences, concerning the **[54]** necessary existence of something immanent, concerning the fundamental possibility of the not-being of transcendence and the like.[[20]](#footnote-20)

It would be an own major theme to make this universality-consciousness, being present in all cognition of apriori connections, completely clear. Here it shall suffice for you to see it and to doubtlessly grasp the freedom of all actuality-positings. Phenomenology calls such connections of pure possibilities to be grasped in general insight and in complete clarity “eidetic connections”, and the consciousness originally giving them “eidetic intuition”.[[21]](#footnote-21) **[55]**

In this way thus the Ego in the Ego-attitude grasps in eidetic intuition possibilities of the egoical and ego-foreign sphere, which prescribe laws, accepted in an unconditioned way, to all possibly occurring actuality.

Yet something else is of great importance for the philosophical method. Until now we focused on the absolutely evident eidetic laws we won in the attitude of the Ego-reflection. It is impossible to see why the evidences we brought to light should be the only ones which generally shall apply to possible pre-givenesses of the Ego. Rather it can be foreseen that in the transition from its actual pre-givennesses to its possible pre-givennesses respectively which the Ego can freely bring about, <it> can, within freely operating fantasy and generalizing fantasy, find a maybe endless amount of evidences, of a priori valid laws.[[22]](#footnote-22)

If we for example take the realm of **pure possibilities** which can belong to the **domain of an egoical** in the way of its immanent composition, that is, the realm which **Descartes** first designated under the title *cogito,* and from which he cognized that to its most universal essence belonged the indefeasibility of the positing of being, the expectation presents itself to us that in this realm manifold and unknown apriori laws are valid. Thus, like the phenomenological space as realm of pure possibilities of geometrical shapings is the field of an endless, apriori science, that is, of the pure geometry, we expect that the realm of the pure ego-consciousness, as title for **idealiter** possible shapings of the consciousness as such, perceptions, objectivations, judgments, feelings, etc., is the field of a new endless apriori science. And indeed, it is the field of phenomenology.

We will take up the reasoning of our last lesson. We commenced a methodical reflection concerning the Ego-attitude which in former lectures limited the scope for descriptive assertions. Thus *cogitata* were found within the *ego cogito*. Everyone described his respective pre-theoretical **[56]** data, and found thereby singular facts on the one hand, single actualities, egoical and ego-foreign, but on the other hand [he found] certain general apriori evidences as well. These evidences related to the **egoical sphere** **in itself**, and thereby related to it insofar as well, as the egoical, namely in the manner of the consciousness of something, and especially within the perception of ego-foreign, **intended beyond itself** and related to the other region, the [region] of the ego-foreign. The peculiarity of these evidences determined our methodical reflections. We made clear to ourselves that the simply doubtless acceptance of these evidences was completely independent of all belief in actual being. What these evidences enounced related to something of such a sort, without which simply neither the ego-process, the Ego’s act, the ego-consciousness can be thought of, nor an external actuality, regarding its manner of givenness in possible experience. While within the Ego-attitude we lived, described, conceptualized such evidences, we constantly had actualities before our eyes, own mental processes, but also through the medium of external perceptions [we had] external actualities, in fact, we accepted them faithfully as actualities, we readily brought about the consciousness of the actuality-belief. But it soon became clear to us that this actuality-belief running along was simply a mere adjunct which could not contain any prejudgment for the content of purely apriori evidences. Or which is the same: we could grasp the evidences in complete purity, the general sentences as laws of pure possibilities, in the sense of which plainly nothing of a positing of any individual actuality remained included. The examples being the starting point of our investigation may have been found actualities, but they were subject to free variation through fantasy in such a way that their actuality no longer mattered, and they solely functioned as examples for conceivable possibilities. Then we made universally clear the sense and the manner of givenness of a pure possibility, and the sense of a generally and evidently apprehensible cognition for a region of pure possibilities as such.

**Each** object, we say, given to us in its actuality, perhaps bodily-intuitively given, can be considered under the point of view of mere possibility, and its mere possibility is given together with the actuality in such a way that the **[57]** possibility remained even if the actuality had to be abandoned, and that it also remained and remains if we refrained from the thesis of actuality, which we deliberately can do any time. And following this *a priori* possible change of focus from actuality to possibility, it becomes evident that **this** given possibility needs to be ranged into a strictly delimited but endless realm of pure possibilities. The same is valid when the starting point is not an intuitively given **actuality**, that is, one actually grasped within the experience-belief, but already in advance is a possibility, perhaps a quasi-presented pure shaping by fantasy. As isolated individual possibility it is again with evidence to be ranged into an endless, closed system of pure possibilities as such. The[[23]](#footnote-23) method of encompassing this system, and cognizing it in its unity and closedness, consisted in arbitrarily changing in free fantasy-reshaping, whether it be the actual in perception or the possible grasped in a fantasy, while only keeping pure the objective unity or a running throughout essential type of this unity.[[24]](#footnote-24)

It is evident that thereby a self-contained infinity of possibilities distinguishes itself. Although there lies within the infinity a so to speak eternal open horizon, a consciousness of the “I could gain by way of fantasying ever new shapings, ever new objects, originating from anyone of them by fantasying as different, without ever reaching an end”, it is evident that not every possible object at all can originate within this infinity, for example an ego-consciousness *a priori* [can] not [originate] from a physical thing. Furthermore it is evident that all objects belonging to this one infinity or to any infinity of that sort respectively, do have a universal, content-community of essence, possibly that universal that a [community] more universally determined in content is no longer conceivable. The latter is the case, when <we> in variation do not restrict ourselves to any limited **[58]** type. To put it another way: To each infinity of that sort then corresponds a possible highest genus with material content as an idea which, on the basis of the intuitive production of this infinity, is to be conceived of as a concept, and this idea or this concept is called “**the region**”, when the unity of intuition running throughout does no longer restrict itself to any boundaries.

To the region including in itself the restricting essential genera then *a priori* belong general sentences which, in unconditioned acceptance, can be seen <as> being evident for the regionally delimited All of possibilities; and likewise belongs to each essential genus and [each] essential sort within the region such an “Apriori”, a composition of apriori laws. They thus declare what is valid in unconditioned universality, i.e. for the whole realm of possibilities belonging together in content, or they state without what a possibility of the respective region or genus plainly would be inconceivable, without being afflicted with countersense, that is, ceasing to be a possibility.

This illuminating consideration shows how each purely apriori evidence is void of all actuality thesis. Not the slightest positing of actuality enters the methodical process of gaining evidence, and correlatively there is no spot **in the sense** of such evidences, where actuality is judged or where an implicit prejudgment for it takes place. Even where actuality was given, and served the consideration as connecting factor, it will soon be irrelevant for the sense-bestowing due to the changing attitude of actuality positing into a mere taking of a pure possibility.

If we now consider the givennesses of the Ego-attitude, all naively brought about positings of actuality, for the ego-immanent as well as for the posited as transcendent, as external objectivity by the Ego, are there discarded where the Ego enounces those purely general evidences. The evidences we are interested in because of their type, already disclosed a wide horizon of wide, still unknown evidences, and we have been under way to delimit it, and to draw the **idea of a pure or transcendent phenomenology**. Initially it will be useful to widen the scope, and to consider the totality of the general apriori evidences within reach of the Ego in the **Ego-attitude,** and to articulate **[59]** them as far as they in regional respect, that is, according to an essence with a material content, are related to possible individual being. Thereby we exclude all formal evidences like those of pure logic, having a totally different original source, and not adhering to any essential composition with a material content, given through fantasy-intuition.

Thus we will grasp the **totality** of material regional evidences. This is not difficult. If we transfer, like we have learned it by way of our previous methodical considerations, those two classes of pre-givennesses, exhibited from the beginning, into the realm of pure possibilities, it is clear that we thereby gain two regions of pure possibilities, and that they encompass the All of individual possibilities conceivably accessible for the Ego. We thus have on the one side the universe of all possible **immanent** compositions as such, and corresponding to it an ideal universe of apriori evidences or, objectively spoken, of apriori laws governing all possibilities of this region. On the second side we have the universe of the possibilities of **external** objectivities, the universe of possible objects as a whole, and also corresponding to it, an ideal universe of apriori laws, laws of possible objective actuality in general. We did not speak of **such** evidences within the scope of our assertions regarding the pre-givennesses of the Ego, we just resorted to them in passing within other contexts. Indeed we know such evidences in the form of whole disciplines. For example pure geometry, pure theory of motion, apriori or purely rational mechanical science. Because all these disciplines deal with ideal or pure possibilities of external being, and of course of such a being which each of us, accomplishing the Ego-attitude, could exemplify to himself in his actual and possible individual pre-givennesses.

Following our methodical deliberations of the last lesson it is a priori clear that a unitary composition of apriori regularities as eidetic laws has to reach as far as does the evidently to be grasped regional essence, that is, what was to be worked out, to be singled out intuitively, and to be fixed out conceptually in the intuitive appropriation of the infinity of **external** objectivities. Thus also the **[60]** idea of the **All** of these apriori laws or of the apriori sciences of an ego-foreign objectivity universally is encompassed in an absolutely strict way, whether by the way all sciences belonging here have been developed yet or not. At least especially regarding **this** region of apriori sciences we have from the outset the consciousness of familiarity since we have and know several pertinent sciences.[[25]](#footnote-25)

It is different for the immanent region with the apriori disciplines or with the unity of apriori science encompassing them. Not unlike the pure or transcendent phenomenology, it [the immanent region] is a formerly unknown, and just in our time newly established science, a science which still has to fight for its right to live against all kinds of foolish prejudices, and against a, so to speak, natural blindness. Admittedly in a certain way the idea of an apriori science of pure subjectivity is not at all something new, and expresses, one may object, the obvious. Since all the idealists and transcendentalists always have spoken of an Apriori generally belonging to subjectivity, they have spoken of a pure logic, of pure ethics, of pure transcendent philosophy, and thus it seems that here as well known apriori sciences present themselves, at most requiring an extension. But all these disciplines are in a condition of total confusion in which formal and regional, immanence and transcendence, consciousness itself and being constituted within the consciousness, and many other things remained confused. The pure consciousness itself in its own-essentialness never arrived at a fundamental salience from the point of view of a self-contained highest region, that is, never as a transcendently pure consciousness, and as a possible field of an a priori science with a material content, a science out of “pure intuition”. And yet it is a science of all possibilities that are in the strictest sense radical, it is a philosophical fundamental science to which all possible philosophical concepts and truths are essentially related to. Of course the exhibition of this science’s necessity **[61]** and the clarification of its basis as primitive basis of all final cognition, demands greatest diligence, the establishment of most perfect evidence.

Based on our results up till now we have already a certain but so to speak naïve evidence. In a clear yet naïve way we separated the realm of the egoical, and relating to it, we already won an amount of evidences. So far it is evident as well, that an apriori science of this sphere must exist; after all there was no reason why these few evidences should not be continually multipliable. We proceeded from inner and outer impressions, from inner and outer perceiving perceptions, motivated by at first **de facto** given data on both sides. We considered for such perceptions what necessarily belongs to their essence, like for example the absolute evidence of the immanent [perceptions], or how the immanent within it is conscious as being “absolute”; similarly [we proceeded] in relation to external perception. Necessities became clear to us prior already regarding **consciousness as such**, namely that each in itself and indissolubly is consciousness of something, and specifically therein that the particular consciousness called external perception is in itself and necessarily **consciousness by way of appearances**, by way of presumption, etc. But of course one can proceed from here, one can look at each **mode of consciousness** within the frame of the attitude of pure possibility, like the fantasy consciousness, the recollection consciousness, the consciousness of liking or disliking something, of willing, etc., and ask oneself what is apriori marked out for such a general kind. Of course the method is not the same everywhere. “Recollection” has to (be?) regarded essentially: If we keep the identity of the pure type strictly within pure fantasy variation of recollections or within fantasy overlapping of different particularities of recollections, precisely what keeps intuitive a pure universality of the concept “recollection,” the universal essence “recollection,” thus we gain necessities, e.g. regarding the structure of each recollection, regarding the mode of how it “presentiates” its objective something. And likewise everywhere.

Furthermore it is a matter of course for us that if we actually aim at the **pure** possibilities, that is, [if we] actually state pure Apriori, no single actuality, thus not even **[62]** the “I am”, is presupposed with this de facto stream of consciousness, namely somehow as hidden premise, may it be absolutely evident as fact of the *cogito*. Insofar thus the whole external actuality, the mundane universe, for the pure phenomenologist, for the “eidetic” investigator of the possibilities of a stream of mental processes and [a stream] of consciousness do not exist at all, namely do not exist within his field of judgment. Insofar thus the, according to transcendent-philosophical reasons which shall not concern us here, highly important, completely conscious, [and] within a principal enounced suspension of the whole external world from the field of judgement, or the completely conscious abstention from judgment regarding the given world, is just a precautionary act. (The obviousness of this suspension and already its possibility results from the simple deliberation [acts], performed purely within the immanent, that it may be plainly considered as pure possibility, and then is one in an evident All of possibilities, etc.)

But less clear and indeed in an unconditioned way touching the philosophical difficulties of the so-called theory of cognition, or more precisely transcendent philosophy, is the relation between required pure phenomenology and the apriori sciences of a possible external world, of possible external objectivities in general.

Within the Ego-attitude, but as well in pure possibility, the external world as surrounding world of the Ego turned out to be actuality. As external it was constituted within the appearances immanent to the Ego with a certain phenomenological structure. The difference then between the immanent in itself, self-contained within the actual or possible stream of consciousness, and the transcendent as the appearing external, showed itself as acute. Thus it seems evident that one, that the Ego can within an own science investigate purely the immanent and the immanent ideal possibilities, and that in contrast the investigation of the appearing being (its matter-of-fact truths and on the other hand its eidetic truths) is a thing in itself; i.e. separate sciences, separate investigations. The same seems to emerge when we, instead of adjusting ourselves to pure possibilities, rather direct our view towards the **given actualities**. It seems then that **two separate experiential sciences** emerge. **[63]** The **immanently** found actualities, ascertained and to be ascertained by way of immanent experience, then seem to demand an immanent experiential science, the **external** actualities [seem to demand] external experiential sciences, like indeed the natural sciences are. Both seem to be obvious demands, and then seem to be separated sciences, since the immanent actual itself can be preserved even if the appearing external is left out of consideration, and maybe does not exist.

But here comes the **doubt**. Within the attitude towards the external, I have in front of me nature, the world as such. If I take pure possibility as my basis, I have [a] possible world as such. But does not then the investigation of actualities and of possibilities encompass the **whole world** and **does not the whole world include my Ego with all its experiences** just like it encompasses every other Ego which is in relation to me external? Is thus not the separation between twofold apriori sciences wrong, just like a pretended parallel separation between twofold empirical sciences, because it has consideration for a coincidental relativity? I am – with evidence I grasp myself. But whom do I grasp? Simply me, this person, this man in the world; my experiences belong to the coincidental compositions of this world. How then would I have a stark opposite of Ego and its egoical to a world through appearance, each a particular scientific sphere?

We see, the pure Ego-attitude and the separation of its pre-found objects is not yet made sufficiently clear. Certainly we find ourselves in natural reflection as human beings, but is this finding of “I, human being” the one in which the Ego in the Ego-attitude finds its Ego? We said that the Ego should see itself purely as the subject of its *cogito*. If we believe we had to identify the one with the other Ego, philosophically we are in a difficult position. The evidence of the *cogito* is apparent to us; it is inconceivable that I, reflecting on me and my experiences, my perceptions, judgments, etc. posit myself as not-being; on the other hand, evidently it is conceivable that each external did not exist, and that through the not-being of the external the **[64]** Ego and its experiences had to parish. Therefore I can suspend every external being without countersense in the way of the supposed “it was not”, while the stream of consciousness remained and could further remain, though certain rules of perception within would fall away. And is it not evident that my body in a good sense as well is something external as any other thing? And [is it] not evident that it could be different, nay, that it could be not existent, a semblance, an illusion? Maybe I am just dreaming I had a body. **I, the human being**, do not need to be = **I, the bodily-psychic being**. Because this [being] is a member of the universal world, of the same world which usually indeed is transcendent, if this world did not exist, I, the human-being, as well would obviously be annulled.

But if we now, radically and in a completely conscious way bring about the suspension of **all** “external”, i.e. of all perceived and perceivable through appearance, of all that is existent due to presumption, the body of course will be suspended, and thus I, like any external man, being a man and experiencing myself as a man. But now we cognize that I, the subject of this experience, am not the man, we cognize that the **pure Ego** and the **man** need to be distinguished.

Indeed the Ego being this man, being what I find in that “**self-experience**” which shows me exactly the man, the animated body, is by no means the Ego of the totally different **immanent** self-experience of **pure reflection**, rather [it is the] object of a peculiar external perception, while by external perception in this case again we understand a perception by way of appearances. Because my body, a basic piece of my being human, is, as I said, an appearing spatial object, and although I absolutely may have given and do have given my processes of consciousness, it is still clear that I apperceive them within the apperception “I, the man experiencing these and these objectivations, judgments, etc.” as belonging to the body, as objectively really connected to it, thus <as something> belonging into the spatial-objective world. It is included therein that I, within the sense-bestowing of the “I-man”-experience, attribute to them something that does not lie within them, not within their own **[65]** essence, the way they are conscious as absolute data in the attitude of the *ego cogito*. Due to a peculiar appresentation they contain a transcendent component, just by being thus apperceived, objectively connected with a reality which is given by way of appearances, that is, by being therefore in an own sense “appearing”.

If we appeal to the fundamental possibility that the appearing body might not exist, that the appearances run away from it, but eventually by way of conflict [they] coerce to surrender the actuality thesis, then of course in a certain way all processes of consciousness remain which heretofore were apperceived as psychic experiences of the body, including the perceptual appearances. However, neither does the human soul remain thereby nor do these mental processes remain as psychic processes, just their apprehension as human psychic processes remains, while their actuality thesis is cancelled as well. Only when parenthesizing **all** transcending and presupposing apperceptions with regard to their actuality thesis the pure consciousness remains, that kind of consciousness which absolutely grasps and keeps the **Cartesian** evidence. And relating to it the pure Ego continually remains, identically running through all **purely** taken acts as subject-*Ego* of the *cogito*.

Obviously this Ego is as well the respective identically **present** Ego, which, while being subject of the acts, is not itself objectified Ego. While I perceive something else or myself, while I think, judge, value, etc., while I thereby for example bring about the “I-man”-perception, and thus grasp myself in a perceiving way as this man, it is the finding, thinking, valuing Ego that is engaged before it reflects on itself, not Ego, the man, but Ego, the man, is object for this Ego, for which everything appearing, but as well everything thought of does exist, while even itself for itself has no material content. Only in a new and pure reflection, keeping all transcending apperception at bay, it becomes objective.

Thus in most perfect evidence the **appearing Ego** for us is separated, the Ego as external object, as an object given in a transcendence with horizons of indefiniteness, as an object, which continually is in suspension between **[66]** being and not-being, always depending on closer determination, maybe different determination, assertion or suspense, and in contrast the **pure Ego**, the Ego of the pure *cogito*. Likewise the **pure Ego’s life** is separated, the stream of pure experience, of pure consciousness, of pure Ego’s acts, and on the other side my **human psychic life**, my psychic stream of experiences, my human psychic acts of consciousness, precisely the objectively real [acts] apperceived as real moments belonging to the spatial world. To make use of the evidence of the *cogito* for **the man** is a lack of clarity, nay, [it is] countersense. To confound both, means to miss the starting-point which enables a scientific philosophy.[[26]](#footnote-26)

#### §5. The Method of Phenomenological Reduction. The Transcendent Phenomenology as Apriori Science of the Pure Consciousness

We now understand that from the beginning we, by describing in the pure Ego-attitude, indeed as a pure Ego, did not describe ourselves as human-Ego. This can be deduced from our taking it as the *ego* in the sense of the absolute **Cartesian** evidence *ego cogito, ego sum,* while reflecting within these descriptions on the Ego that describes. (We know that who in contrast to this within the attitude describes “I, this man, describe”, has under the title “I man” something appearing, to which he relates the described, while the Ego describing in true sense is the one for which the man is an appearing object.) We further understand that in the group of descriptions, where we spoke of Ego-acts, [of] mental processes, and of the apriori laws pertaining to it, we already meant the whole sphere of the pure Ego-consciousness, of the **pure** Ego-processes, and Ego-acts, constituting the **pure** stream of mental processes, insofar as we here as well made use of the **Cartesian** evidence.

**[67]** On the other hand the whole process was **naïve**; admittedly our evidence was genuine evidence, but naively produced, like the direction of regard towards the pure egoical was there, but it was naïve; this means the necessary reflective clarification, and the theoretical distinction, which alone could have avoided the confusion of both counter-attitudes’ data, of the attitude towards the transcendent and towards the objective, were missing. Since if the apperception “I-man” within the consciousness is developed, normally everyone reflecting on himself apperceives himself as human being. The Ego does not remain in purity but receives an objectification. It is just due to this merging of attitudes, which is very natural by the way, that one does not cognize the transcendent sphere, the sphere of the pure Ego, and its pure Ego-processes as a possible and completely closed field of research. If it **is** this, if it is a realm of possible experience and possible scientific thinking, then sometime it must be made a theme of a science which it only can become if it arrives at pure grasping by a strict method, by way of a method excluding all μετάβασις.

**This method is the method of phenomenological reduction**, precisely the reduction to pure phenomena. **The first and most important piece** of this reduction is the suspension, the phenomenological **epoché with regard to the allness of external actualities**, that is the whole **mundane universe**. (With absolute evidence we cognized and may cognize anytime that no external perception absolutely authenticates the existence of the perceived, or else we [may] cognize that each external being, however bodily, clearly, perfectly it may be given and cognized in relation to this, exists just under reserve, that it does not necessarily exist. With absolute evidence we cognize that the positing of possible non-existence does not harm the being of perceiving and of some other mental process, in which the external is perceived, pre-given, thought of, etc.)

(We will stick to this sphere of absolute, fundamentally doubtless, not deniable, with regart to its thesis not modulatable being. We gain it in its absolute peculiarity and purity if) we precisely pay attention to not letting anything of what we experience under the title of **an external** or [what we] **[68]** posit judicially as actuality merge into this sphere. This is effected by our formulating the **principle**[[27]](#footnote-27), and by letting it become practically and in an unconditioned way determining for our inquiry, to **inhibit** each **position-taking** prejudging explicitly or implicitly the existence of an external. We may as well say: We suspend everything that in such a way lies within our field of experience and of judgment, that it, in spite of the experience’s force of acceptance, and in the face of experiential and judicial confirmation, can be conceived of as not being, thus as dubious, as just supposedly being, etc.; we form an **own field of judgment** containing only such [entities] whose experienced kind necessarily implies a **being** in itself. Then the sky and the earth, things and animals and men, even our own body, and we ourselves as human subjects will disappear. And what remains? – An Ego, this pure Ego and my “I perceive”, “I think”, “I feel”, “I experience this streaming absolute life”.

We do not adopt this method to perform a new building [act] of all sciences, and to gain therefore an absolutely solid, absolutely doubtless ground like **Descartes** intended to, it is not indubitability as absolute assurance that attracts us, but what we want is the making visible of an endless, in itself purely closed domain of purely intuitive data, and the working out of the same as a domain of possible science. The indubitability, the undeniability is for us just an essential characteristic belonging to the peculiarity of this domain. Generally it is **not about** a restitution of **Cartesian** fundamental considerations, but [it is] about an essentially new consideration which may emerge from the **Cartesian** one by way of a certain change, purification.

We must keep acutely in view that the suspension, the parenthesizing of all objective existences, does **not** contain **any skeptics** in relation to the same [objective existences] or even a devaluation of what we call “objective existence”. In truth the objective world will not be harmed, and even our conviction of this world’s existence and [of] the acceptance of already developed sciences relating to it, will not in the slightest be surrendered. It is just **[69]** about our implementing the methodical principle within the frame of these investigations called “purely phenomenological” or “transcendent”, to simply make no use of such convictions, of each and all position-takings concerning external actualities, to abstain in the phenomenology from every judging of Objective things.

We turn our investigating regard towards what remains and towards what is always and necessarily there, nay, what is our whole streaming life, that is, towards the Ego and the Ego’s consciousness with all its forms of shaping, with all those emerging, streaming meanings, appearances, thoughts, feelings, etc., all this taken in the whole amount of own essential compositions. The transcendent thus is not just some concept, some construction of extravagant philosophy, but it is the streaming life itself, like it is actual Ego’s-life, to the exclusion of everything which in this life, by way of opinions and appearances, is just supposed, appearing, thought of and the like. (And all the more to the exclusion of all objective apperceptions, anyone may perform by way of naturalization of such a stream, by way of spatialization, by way of realizing apprehension.

(On the other hand it is also clear, though still in unanalyzed distance, that the suspension of objectivity does result in pure consciousness, […] as a self-contained field of being for the respective Ego of the Ego’s attitude, but that the external world, being continuous surrounding world for the Ego, has a wondrous relation to the field of pure consciousness, for the sake of which it makes no sense or seems to make no sense, to separate it completely from the consciousness, and to regard world and consciousness as two parallel spheres of being. Because it is the Ego in its own Ego’s life which creates its surrounding world to some degree; it is the performance of certain of its mental processes, the play of immanent appearances, peculiar syntheses of these appearances under the titles “harmonious merging within the consciousness of self-identity” and the like, that causes the Ego to have something external as bodily pre-givenness, and that it may have given one and the same external thing in ever new appearances. By itself, we noticed in the first, yet methodically naïve analysis of perception **[70]** and of perceptually given objects, the mental process of perception is consciousness and, more precisely, bodily consciousness of its object in the form of which it finds the perceived; all traits it has while perceiving, and for the one who is perceiving, are allocated to it within and by way of perceiving; identical things and its [the consciousness’] identical traits, given through all perceptual appearances just in a different mode of appearance, are sense-bestowing acts which the perception and the unity-consciousness of manifold perceptions performs within itself. The same applies to any kind of consciousness of an external, for example to memorial consciousness. If we see some sort of modified perception in memory, if we treat the expression “I remember an object” as equivalent to the expression “I perceived it, it was a heretofore perceptual datum”, it lies within the own character of memory as a peculiar consciousness of something, that it is in itself modification of the presentiation of a perception, and that correlatively the remembered object is not just past in mode as such, but past for me[[28]](#footnote-28))

But we must not content ourselves with such universalities remote from things, we must enter concrete analyses coming closer to the things. Initially [we must do this], to reach our main goal, that is, the delimitation of the method of phenomenological reduction, and the awakening of the evidence, that it has to form the indeed necessary methodical frame for all particular methods of the phenomenological sphere’s investigation as sphere of pure consciousness. Within the just pointed out lie motives which can guide our investigation towards different directions. It is evident to us that each acquiring of existence of any external perception’s object goes beyond pure consciousness, but of course likewise the existence, in which kind of consciousness ever, be it memorial consciousness, consciousness of expectation, also judging consciousness, etc., of every posited and in which kind of modality of certainty ever posited.) **[71]** We must not appropriate any[[29]](#footnote-29) objective science, because this would mean taking a position accepting its theories, its certainties, its theoretic probabilities, dubitabilities, etc., while we have to suspend all this.

Now it[[30]](#footnote-30) must be stressed that the **consciousness of possibilities** as well is a kind of position-taking consciousness for external things, and not just the consciousness of possibilities combined with actuality theses, which for instance the natural scientist develops when he ponders whole connections of deliberations concerning possibilities, [and weighs] possibilities against possibilities, [and thus] for example due to statistic assertions evaluates the possibilities of a hot summer for this year. Rather also every pure **consciousness of possibilities** [is a kind of position-taking consciousness for external things] like the geometer uses it, and continuously brings it about as basis for his considerations. Each taking position, also each taking position in form of a positing of external possibilities as pure possibilities, will be put on the index. In **none** of these position-takings we may take part, [in] nothing they give us as truly being, be it ever so justified, but objective judgment causes, functioning as our judgment causes in phenomenology. The respective mental processes, the consciousness of certainty, probability, possibility, etc. **as** **mental processes**, belong to the immanent sphere. We may and must regard them, fix them as immanent data, single out what lies immanently within them; but like it is somewhat different to use an “I perceive” as cause for the being actual of the perceived, that is, to enounce external experiential judgments, and on the other hand to posit the “I perceive” as pure fact of consciousness, the same is accepted for each position-taking consciousness related to external things. This means: Not only external actualities are in the evidence completely consciously and explicitly suspended from the phenomenological sphere, **[72]** in that they just do not belong in there, but **no less all other possibilities as well**.

A fantasied centaur does not belong to the actual external world, but he is a member of a possible external world constructible by way of fantasy. “It is” in this context means: in the pure sense he is a possible being which in the course of fantasy to ever new harmonious fantasies continually would be confirmed as possibility. The fantasy centaur as well only appears one-sidedly, [it] points to possible further appearances *in infinitum*, and, however these appearances may be fantasy appearances, appearances in the mode of the as-if, of the “as it were”, still their running through is necessary to bring to evidence the unity of the fantasy object as harmonious possibility. Always and necessarily the immanent, the multiplicity distinguishes itself. [[31]](#footnote-31)

The last series of lectures, prior to the Whitsun holidays has brought us the idea of a transcendent phenomenology as the apriori science of the pure Ego, of the transcendent pure consciousness and its pure phenomena, gradually closer. Our investigation is still not completed, and yet we anticipate already that this on the one hand is a science distinguished completely poignantly from all other sciences, but on the other hand it is no science which may be coordinated to the other sciences. What we anticipate will soon become completely clear. Indeed it will become apparent that the phenomenology embraces in a certain way all sciences, and in true sense encompasses all their fundamental problems, of course all problems, relating to the final sense of their theoretic accomplishments, and thus to the final sense of the real and ideal world explored by them. All we legitimately oppose as philosophy of nature and philosophy of the mind to the non-philosophical sciences of the nature and of the mind, either concerns parts of the transcendent pure phenomenology, or [it concerns] appliances of this pure phenomenology to the given fact of the natural and cultural world to the attainment of what legitimately can be called metaphysics, metaphysics of nature **[73]** and mind. Thus we are not in any way astray off the theme of our lectures, because we went from the first natural reflection concerning nature and mind, or from the first natural distinction between things and subjects to the attitude of the ego cogito, [we] entered the ground of the pure consciousness, and considered in the pure consciousness possibilities of the research. Most of all [we are] not [strayed off the theme] because we brought about the laborious and disconcerting distinction between empirical Ego and pure Ego, between empirical psychic life in contrast to pure Ego’s life, and let follow the treatment of the necessary method, by which alone pure consciousness can become a theme of research: the method of phenomenological reduction.

The **unparalleled importance of the methodical discussions** in which we remained, prompts me to a remark here, which is supposed to eliminate unclear misunderstandings and harmful inner resistance that will emerge. When the beginner is eager to be introduced into a natural science, nothing is more boring for him than an abstract methodical explanation. And with reason. One should put the things themselves before the [beginner’s] eyes, one should make the next demanded theoretical tasks clear to him, and show him by way of a concrete solution to those tasks how such things and problems according to their own sense are to be treated, and which means, [and] technical courses therefore are useful or necessary. It is just after the concrete exercise and practice of the method that general justifications concerning the methods of the respective scientific sphere can become prolific, and therefore of course the already seasoned is grateful. Now he no longer is bored. But in our case the circumstances are quite different, because the method of phenomenological reduction has a totally different sense, a totally different function than the methods of pre-philosophical sciences; for example in algebra the methods of algebraic or approximate solution of algebraic equations, or in the geometry the methods of analytic geometry, of the vector-analysis and the like, or in the natural science the methods of measurement, the particular methods of thermometry, or the determination of refraction indices, in the biology the methods of microscopic technique, of the **[74]** methods of staining, etc., likewise of course in historical and philological methods.

In all such sciences the fields are **pre-given** through experience or through eidetic intuition, and “method” is the title for technical courses which can be shown as useful devices for a theoretical treatment of the respective field. In our case, however, in the case of phenomenology, exactly this field is **not pre-given**, and a method is first of all needed, to bring the same, the pure consciousness, and its pure phenomenology into the theoretical view, and to create criteria, whereby a pretended pure consciousness **demonstrates** its pureness, and to put a stop to all false attributions of empirical transcendent things, and to those transgressing the frame of transcendently pure phenomena in general. Nay, prior cogitative work corresponding to the method is needed, to understand and see the basic difference between natural and transcendent things. There is **no royal road** into phenomenology and thereby into philosophy. The **phenomenological reduction** **is the one and only entrance gate** leading into the philosophical realm.

What the phenomenological reduction demands of us lies evidently **within our freedom**; evidently we **can** put out of action each taking position concerning each transcendent, or, what is the same, external actuality. However firm our conviction of their existence may be, however much certainly confirmed by experience and discerning reasoning: Any time we can freely make the decision not to bring about a position-taking, not to make use of a [position-taking] that concerns in most universal encompassment all external actuality. Those are two different things, to have a conviction and to make use of this conviction within the judgment-sphere, and to be given a field of being by it. Every conviction, each experiencing and theoretical position-taking can be put out of action. We thus delimit our phenomenological judgment-sphere by not allowing to be given actualities through position-taking concerning external things, neither in the way of acknowledgment nor in the way of denial, neither by doubting nor by presumption, etc. We do not remain in this attitude temporarily but throughout **[75]** the whole phenomenological investigation. In the whole judgment field or the field of phenomenology thus there is no nature, no man, no animal, no science, and art, etc. For the phenomenologist as phenomenologist the all of transcendence, the mundane universe does not exist. Suspending it, however, not nothing does remain, but the field of the pure *cogito,* and just by way of this suspension it is able to stand out in its purity and own-essentialness. Given to it continuously thus is its pure Ego, its streaming life, and experience with all its appearances, meanings, also external convictions, valuations, and actions relating to external things, streaming along, but each thereby connected transcendent position-taking is just taken as phenomenon of the consciousness, as this streaming experience. This means that at the same time the index of phenomenology, the phenomenological bracket is attached here, the index saying: This conviction, this taking position is your private matter, the thing posited along with it as external actuality does **not** belong to the judgment field.

Thus for me, bringing about the phenomenological reduction now, all external experiences, all objective perceptions, memories, expectations, judgments, etc. do belong into my field as being my experiences: I may predicate of their being as mental processes within the complex of lived processes, likewise of their being perceptions of this and that object, that this or that emerges within them. But the experienced objects as such, namely as present **actualities**, I may not judge; because this would mean, to step onto the ground of experience, to participate in the thesis of experience, acknowledging it, [and] to let it be valid. Thereby all objective sciences, physics, chemistry, astronomy, linguistics, history, etc. lapse to the phenomenological reduction. It is peculiar to them after all, to move on the ground of experience, to take a position respecting experienced actuality **as** actuality, and to judge it in different modes of judgment theoretically determining, acknowledging, maybe discarding.

**[76]** An[[32]](#footnote-32) important complementary piece to the phenomenological suspension of all external actualities is the suspension of all external possibilities, and the resulting suspension of all apriori sciences relating to the idealiter possible external actualities from the judgment field of phenomenology. This is the point where we stopped.

Not only the consciousness we simply call experience is a position taking consciousness, but also the consciousness of a possible experience, originally the consciousness of possible experience of external things including the positing of a **possible** actuality transcendent to consciousness. At the same time it must be heeded that one kind of possibilities of external being is already excluded due to the previous reduction. In a manner of speaking the natural scientist and likewise the researcher in all other sciences of matters of fact continually brings about probability considerations. External actualities are fundamentally just posited actualities under reserve, and one is forced in connection with this, while ascertaining and more closely determining external actualities, to bring about considerations of probability, the essence of which includes the pondering of possibilities against possibilities. Like, for example, when the meteorologist, because of statistic ascertainments related to the weather conditions of the last century, ponders possibilities and probabilities for a hot summer in the current year. It is easily cognized <that> all such possibilities are related to the **given** world, which is accepted and presupposed as actually being present and to some measure already known. All such “actual” possibilities cease to apply for us *eo ipso*, if the whole world is phenomenologically suspended.

The pure consciousness of possibilities, not bound by any connection to a pre-given world, [and] moving within the frame of a completely free and pure fantasy, is what interests us here. Thus for instance what the geometer constantly brings about as basis for his theoretical formations of ideally **[77]** possible spatial shapes, and for correspondent pure or, what is the same, apriori laws. The same holds true for the apriori kinematics, apriori mechanics, etc. We now explicitly extend the phenomenological reduction thus far that each position-taking concerning pure possibilities of external things, of things transcending consciousness, will be put onto the index as well; the true composition of such apriori possible transcendent objectivities shall thus be fundamentally excluded from our phenomenological field of research. Again this suspension is necessary if we want to gain exactly the pure consciousness, the realm of pure immanence as our exclusive theme, and to keep it pure.

A fantasied centaur for example, fantasied in pure and clear fantasy intuition, represents an apriori possibility, the possibility of an external spatiotemporally actual being. It does not belong to the de facto external world, it belongs as member to a fantastically further to be shaped, ideally possible external world. “It exists within [the world]” is an imprecise expression for its being an ideally possible individual reality which, in continuation of harmonious fantasy would be ascertained as possibility, while indeed we do have the evidence that this fantasy process, demonstrating the composition of possibility, can be constructed. (Dissimilar to the case of a round square of which the geometer says, that it does not exist, this means, it is a pretended ideal form-possibility not being in truth; pure fantasy intuition, and thinking based thereupon lead to an evident contradiction here.) In the case of the possible centaur it is clear that it is, though as possibility, as transcendent as any actual external thing. It is as well just given through appearances, and fundamentally [is] given in each of its appearances just one-sidedly, just by way of changing aspects; with it we also will be referred[[33]](#footnote-33) from appearances to ever new appearances (necessarily in the parallel case of actual experience in order that the conditional positing of the possibility confirmed itself. Certainly the difference is that actual experience has to wait for actual further experience, **[78]** while in fantasy we can create new fantasies freely, and gain the evidence to be able to create them thus, that the possibility we had already grasped in a continuous appearance remains preserved. Even so) we have here as well the continuous contrast between something **immanent**, the continuing fantasy processes with their included compositions of adumbrations of fantasy, fantasy appearances, and syntheses of appearances, and on the other hand the **transcendent**, i.e. the fantasied centaur itself, posited in the mode of fiction, of the “as –if”, into the fantasied transcendent world.

But if we inhibit ourselves from each taking position respecting transcendent apriori possibilities, all apriori sciences making theoretical and general statements about ideal possibilities of the transcendent sort: about a possible nature as such, about possible space as such, about possible spatial shape and space laws therein, about possible motion, but also about possible intellectuality as such, about norms and forms of possible psychic life in an ideally possible world, *eo ipso* lapse to the phenomenological suspension. Admittedly, phenomenology as well does judge apriori possibilities, but it intends to judge exclusively possibilities of the pure consciousness, and apriori possibilities of pure Ego’s acts, i.e. possible acts not apperceived as occurrences to external objects, called bodies, as psychic acts of possible animals and human beings, but as acts of the pure Ego, for which every empirical Ego is just a phenomenon of consciousness.

One[[34]](#footnote-34) just must not let his vision be blurred by **prejudgments**, one must within the frame of our pure Ego-attitude, in which indeed **[79]** all our methodical considerations continually move, not let anything be accepted than what can be seen in absolute evidence. How obvious is it to reason otherwise: Outside is the actual world, the objective sciences are related to it, those being experiential sciences, because external things are given by way of experience. If instead of the experience I move within free fiction, and if I there conjecture pure possibilities, the fantasied objects are not to be found within the actual world outside, thus they are within me, in my mind, in my fiction consciousness, therefore they are immanence. Thus all apriori sciences as sciences of pure possibilities belong to the science of pure consciousness. (There are many similar modes of observation and modes of argument. For example a theory is indeed a certain weave of sentences; each sentence, and likewise each theory, is nothing in external actuality. Since there might be the verbal sound or the written marks, the books from paper, printer’s ink, etc., but these are not the theories. It thus only depends on the judgments, the signification of the sentences. Judgments are nothing outside, thus they are within the judging soul, within the judging consciousness, therefore the whole analysis for instance is something ultimately immanent. But is the sentence that 2 times 2 makes 4, or the **Pythagorean theorem** as many times existent as there are mental judgment-processes having it as judgment-content? Is it not evidently in many, nay, according to pure possibility [in] endlessly many judgments **the same** judgment, the same theorem? Does not evidently the judging, in which the sentence as its content is a judged What, has to be separated from the sentence itself?) But is it not evident that a possible **object itself,** and the **consciousness** in which it becomes conscious as possibility, must be distinguished; is not even an infinity of phenomenologically different processes of consciousness to be separated evidently from this one, **[80]** for example those in which the same fantasied object hovers in ever new modes of appearance, and yet is intuitive as **the same**, as identically the one and the same centaur; and is it thereby not absolutely doubtless that this one is not a part, a respective immanent moment of these experiences, but simply something transcendently appearing within them? Therefore one needs to have a look at the consciousness, and the conscious itself, and to stick to the evidence of absolutely given differences instead of drawing conclusions based on prejudgments completely hovering in the air.

The[[35]](#footnote-35) phenomenological suspense of all transcendent actualities leaves us as only actuality the stream of pure Ego’s life. All objective experiential sciences are suspended. Thus one experiential science seems to remain, the one of pure consciousness. Furthermore, by way of suspending all transcendent possibilities the immanent possibilities remain for us, and if by way of suspension all transcendently apriori sciences are concerned, the apriori science of the pure consciousness remains. Therefore **under the title “phenomenology” two different things seem to remain, an empirical and an apriori science**.

If we now speak of a pure or transcendent phenomenology we mean exclusively this latter science. That is, not a science which makes statements about actualities emerging for me as judging within the frame of my de facto stream of mental processes, but an apriori science, a science <which> does not develop any thesis of immanent actuality, but rather takes each given here just as an example for a type of pure possibilities. This way we proceeded already in the ascertainment of our evidences within our first analyses. We asked: what is *apriori* **[81]**  an essential part of the immanence, more precisely of a perception universally, still more precisely for example of an external perception universally;

What is part of the essence of a memory universally, of an intuition universally, etc.? The “universally” does not imply: “due to experience”, but it says: for each conceivable, for each generally possible perception, memory, etc.

It cannot be clear yet why we bring about this restriction. It becomes apparent that not experience and experiential science is the first here, but apriori science or essential science, the yet to be fulfilled necessity to get to a science of the immanent in the strict sense. While in **natural attitude**, the one of common experience, a science of facts is possible prior to an apriori science, here it shows itself within the radical of all cognition, that the eidetic science and eidetic laws must be there before scientific existential statements can be made.[[36]](#footnote-36) All transcendently philosophical problems of modern age, for instance all **Kantian** problems, insofar as they can be held as scientific ones, are in truth eidetic-phenomenological questions.

(But[[37]](#footnote-37) now an understanding is needed in the following point belonging here, which I just want to treat by shortly indicating it, and which can be accepted as example for some similar objections. If I want to make consciousness in its purity a theme I must not overlook that each sentence I utter as truth, especially that each apriori and simply valid law, is something transcendent with respect to the consciousness. The external being has often been called transcendent by us, but as a general title we were occupied by all individual, that is, temporal being, more precisely conscious-transcendent [being]. An apriori law[[38]](#footnote-38) is no individual, is no temporal being, rather [it is] a timeless **[82]** being, but of course [it is] transcendent as well. “2 times 2 makes 4” is, like we said earlier, not to be found as a moment within the consciousness of the insight that it happens to be thus, otherwise it was also something temporally being. Consequently we have to suspend all Apriori as well, each sentence in general, and thereby of course a phenomenology would no longer exist.

The answer is: Among the sphere (of the) possible phenomena of pure consciousness there are also judgment phenomena, there are also mental processes of the type “apriori evidence” which is called judging in the manner peculiar to intellectual seeing within the consciousness of pure necessity. The conscious within is the sentence, an apriori law of this or that kind. Of course we have to suspend what is posited transcendently within the modes of consciousness to grasp them in purity. Thus, when we study the essence of the apriori intuiting, and thinking and want to ascertain what a priori belongs to such acts we must not embark on the Apriori and posit along what the respective acts themselves are conscious of and posit, but we need to just posit the acts themselves, and to establish the Apriori that makes them be a theme (not what they within themselves make a theme). Anyone who makes general statements concerning the peculiarity of geometric cognition, and the manner of judging has them as a theme themselves, but does not have geometric sentences as a theme. Geometry can give no premises for a theory of geometrical **cognition**. On the other hand the phenomenologist does judge, he wants to judge and to judge immanent things to make apriori statements about it. He thinks in an apriori way, and thereby gains apriori cognition which to suspend was nonsense. Phenomenological thinking does not designate a thinking which makes phenomenological thinking itself its theme, although there can be and necessarily is such phenomenological thinking of second order. The phenomenologist suspends respectively what posits in itself the immanent phenomena he is studying as transcendent. And universally in a single act he can suspend the external world. However, regarding the immanent sphere which he then keeps, he of course is possibly going to suspend all those transcendencies that are conscious within the type of immanences he is studying and that have been posited. Thus, when he studies geometrical thinking, **[83]** the geometry, and when he studies phenomenological thinking, the phenomenological thought within such thinking. Until now we described the phenomenological reduction as method of suspending each and every transcendence from the province or from the judgment field of phenomenology (aside from the one and only transcendence which the phenomenologist is looking for himself, that is, the system of eidetic laws of pure consciousness). Right from the beginning, by way of explanation of the confusion between pure and empirical subjectivity, whose fateful significance for philosophy we will pursue later, it emerged that the suspension of the external actuality, what we in the widest sense call “mundane universe”, “nature”, plays the most important part).

For the suspension I used the expression “**parenthesizing**” now and then. It is necessary to bring about a highly important completion of our characterization of phenomenological reduction which shows us how, in a certain way, everything suspended remains within the realm of phenomenological composition, and how the investigation of consciousness exactly thereby is transcendent, and includes the universal problems corresponding to the possibility of the cognition of transcendent things.[[39]](#footnote-39)

At the end of the last lecture I showed that a phenomenology as science of the pure Ego and <of> Ego-processes has to not only suspend all external actualities, but also all external possibilities from its judgment field – also **pure** possibilities, the way they can be viewed in completely free fantasy, bound by no empirical thesis. Since apriori sciences are nothing else but sciences of pure possibilities thus all apriori sciences concerning ideally possible, external physical or intellectual worlds are excluded, therefore Kant’s pure natural philosophy for instance, likewise pure geometry, pure theory of motion, an apriori psychic doctrine, etc. If a science of the pure consciousness shall be **[84]** constituted, either according to actuality or possibility, exactly the transcendence in every shape needs to be excluded, and certainly the temptation is great to falsely embed as real into consciousness fantasy shapings universally, and thereby free possibilities of external being as well.

(However here it is vital to not become confused by obvious wrong modes of argument being only possible if one leaves the ground we strictly keep, the [ground] of pure intuition, and of evidence. Indeed at first one would like to argue thus: Either I move upon the ground of external experience, then I engage with experiential sciences, or, what is the same, sciences of the external actuality. Or I move within the realm of my free fantasy, and consider pure possibilities of the external being, then my field is nothing external, because within the external world fictions are nothing. If they are nothing external, then [they are] internal, immanent in the consciousness of the fantasying. Thus each Apriori belongs to the realm of pure consciousness, apriori sciences are sciences of possibilities within the pure consciousness. Therefore the intension to exclude apriori sciences is wrong, they are themselves nothing but phenomenology.

But this mode of argument is completely wrong. A freely fantasied centaur, a freely fantasied spatial formation, a fantasied motion, etc., everything of that kind certainly is nothing in external actuality; but as well it is nothing within the immanent actuality, i.e. nothing being within the stream of mental processes. A fantasied centaur is not by any chance within the process of fantasying, this peculiar mental process actually occurring within the stream of mental processes in this or that connection. To be conscious of a centaur by fantasying does not mean to have it as a really included thing within this mental process. A centaur, a thing of flesh and blood combined with a foreign psychic life does not lie within my mental process; just as little as in the case of external perception the perceptual object, the physical or psycho-physical real, lies within the external perception. Moreover, this is countersense. Here it will suffice to point out that it is part of the essence of the **[85]** external real to be only intuitively conscious by way of appearances, and that necessarily, whether we are perceiving or remembering or freely fantasying, appearing and appearance need to remain distinguished. The appearing external shows itself always only from one side, by way of adumbrations, no appearance is the last one, each necessarily points to a new possible appearance, which, although a new one and different in content, is still in itself an appearance of the same. This also holds good for fiction. When we fantasy a centaur we constantly have an open infinity of possible appearances, and ever new appearances of him; it is inconceivable that an appearance, and even a sequence of appearances should fantasy it adequately; The object itself can evidently never be identical with its appearances, with its changing adumbrations. This is fundamentally true for all external, immediately if it is physical, mediately if it is a psychophysical being. If we thus intend a science of the pure consciousness, and a science of possibilities of pure consciousness, then fantasy process with all its fantasy-appearances, and everything which as experience is inseparable from it comes into consideration; but we may only judge this, not the external possibilities themselves, which in apriori universality pure geometry, “pure” natural science and another apriori science of transcendent direction do judge.)

Following the preceding double reductions of external actualities and external possibilities for phenomenology, now there seem to remain two kinds of investigations, on the one hand the immanent actualities taken in transcendent purity, thus for me, the phenomenologically investigating Ego, my purely apprehended stream of mental processes, on the other hand the immanent pure possibilities. This seems to point to an empirical and an apriori phenomenology. However, with good reasons we now exclude each empirical inquiry, that is, [each empirical inquiry that] is related to the de facto actuality of the stream of mental processes and its compositions; we go so far as to even <exclude> the question, whether and to what extent I can make scientifically valid statements concerning my de facto pure experiences, [and] concerning the realm of the *ego cogito*, in what way I find it in fact. **By transcendent phenomenology we understand exclusively the apriori science [86] of the pure consciousness**; we thus demand with it also the **suspension of each assertion** concerning that what the phenomenologist does **in fact** mentally live in his pure consciousness.

The reason why we restrict ourselves to the Apriori, that is, to the set of eidetic laws of a pure consciousness as such, [and that we] therefore do not, like in the natural focusing on transcendence, juxtapose science of matters of fact, and apriori science from the outset can according to its subjacent reasons not be explained at this point. Suffice to say that in the **natural attitude** doubtlessly the empirical science can precede apriori [science], may it be that it is just able to become an **exact** science by way of connection to its apriori parallel sciences. But if we pass over into the phenomenological attitude, that is, if we make pure consciousness the theme, the reverse is true. There it becomes apparent that within this radical cognition **apriori science has to precede**. Just[[40]](#footnote-40) when there is an apriori science of the pure consciousness, when there is a transcendent phenomenology, the pure consciousness can **as** **a fact** become a **scientific theme**, and like it further shows itself, but first sciences of the external actualities must have preceded as well; because only through a phenomenological clarification of senses of objective sciences actually scientific statements concerning **facts** of pure science can actually be gained. This [is given] for reflection to advanced students.

We now have to conclude our considerations with an ascertainment which for the beginner in phenomenology according to experience is disconcerting, but which through the previous careful deliberations should be obvious. It is: all transcendent actualities and possibilities being suspended from the judgment field of phenomenology are, after they are provided with the index of suspension, that is, within a certain modification of sense, an endless field of phenomenological work. What does this mean? **[87]** The[[41]](#footnote-41) transcendent could, it seems, and may it be just an example to view the eidetic universality therein, just then belong to the working sphere of an apriori science if it was about creating apriori sciences of **possible** **transcendencies**, i.e. sciences like geometry, the pure natural science of Kant, etc. But we have suspended all these sciences because we are only aiming at a science of the possible consciousness as such in transcendent purity. Still however, we say, all transcendent and all work with the transcendent by way of consciousness in which it constitutes itself, belongs as an example and as universal being to the sphere of pure phenomenology.

Assuming it was a phenomenological **investigation of perception**: the putting out of action of the thesis lying within the perception, [the putting out of action] of **perceptual belief** disables us to judge the perceived regarding its actual being or possible being, that is, [we can] not [make] a single judgment of the kind the “objective” sciences make; but on the other hand the **perceived as such** is not gone therefore, since it inseparably belongs to the composition of perception itself. What is accepted in relation to perception, is accepted in relation to each transcendently directed and transcendence positing consciousness. A memory of a theatrical performance does not end being a memory of this **[88]** performance, if I, what lies within my freedom, deny myself the participation in the thesis of memory, that is, to accept the being actual of the remembered, and to now naturally judge it. Likewise, if I carried out any **conceptual thought** concerning the world and human beings in the natural way, in which the being actual of such things was posited along by me or accepted by me, <and> I subject <it> to a phenomenological reduction, it remains transcendently directed like it used to be; it still means world and human being like it used to mean it, I just conferred an index of inusability, of putting out of action to the included actuality belief, to give me a ground of actual existence.

In a word, the phenomenological reduction equals a **parenthesizing** indexing the **way** judgment is used, but within this parenthesis everything remains what prior existed without parenthesis. To investigate pure consciousness thus means to make the concrete *cogito* in its completeness, the life-stream in its whole fullness and satiety, a theme. But insofar its *cogitatum* belongs own-essentially to the *cogito*, its objective something in this and that mode which the terms “perception”, “memory”, “thinking”, etc. designate, as well as in the respective totally different modes which for instance the terms “appearing through adumbrations”, “through perspective sight” and the like designate, insofar we have the All of actual or possible worlds in spite of the phenomenological reduction in our field. **Never** will actual or possible **pure and simple worlds** be judged, because this meant taking (a) position respecting them, to posit actuality, to posit possibility. Instead **perceived worlds as such** will be judged, perceived stones, stars, human beings purely and simply, remembered as such, thought of, valued, wanted as such, that is, purely as **correlates to the perceiving**, the remembering, the thinking, be it generally, be it of a respective particular type of perceiving, remembering, thinking, valuing, etc. as correlates, how they are own-essentially included in such modes of consciousness. A fantasied object like <a> centaur is, logically spoken, in other words from the standpoint of the question of the actual being, a Nothing. But the dream-perceiving and fantasying of a centaur is consciousness **[89]** of a centaur, and exactly of this one, with blond hair, with the brown body of a horse, etc. If we judge wrongly, like [when we say] that the moral level of humanity has risen over the last one hundred years, within the realm of actual being the judged affair-complex is not to be found, it is, like we say, null. But within the judgment it is a judged affair-complex, a wrongly **supposed**, and as such [it] belongs inseparably to the immanent experience. This supposed, exactly the way it is a supposed there, exactly with its clarity or lack of clarity, its determination or indeterminacy, with its objectivational basis, etc., is a phenomenological theme, completely self-understood, because we want to investigate the pure consciousness after all.

If we now cognize[[42]](#footnote-42), that the non-being and wrong as well as the being and true belonged insofar into our field of work, because it, in which mode ever, is something conscious thus in a certain way also the non-being **as** a non-being, the judicially **wrong as wrong** as well as the **being as being**, namely as being in truth, the judicially true as true; in a certain way, namely again from the side of consciousness, in which truly being and non-being, truth and falsity as such come to legitimating givenness. Among the **modes of consciousness**, in which external objects and objects as such come to givenness, we also find the modes of the so called **evidential consciousness**, a consciousness originally giving any kind of right, or legitimating any mediately discerned right: Right for the positing of being and positing of any **[90]** truly existing facts. That, by bringing about experiences in a certain way of original intuitiveness, by judging in a certain “evident” way, and grounding [these judgments] onto one another, we gain legitimate cognition of true being, lies within the natural attitude of our conviction, and naively we thus proceed. As **phenomenologists** we prohibit this naivety, because it [the naivety] itself will become our problem, also we parenthesize each evidential consciousness. But **that** such a consciousness with manifold modes, and related to manifold regions of possible objectivities performed within itself a so-called original legitimation [act], a so-called legitimation of objective truth, of course belongs to the realm of pure consciousness; thus to the manifold modes of how the objective consciousness is, belong also those [modes] of how it is within the consciousness itself conscious **as** being, among them the modes of the being-in-legitimate-truth, while, like the thesis of actuality **universally,** we have to put out of action the thesis of the however well grounded actuality’s legitimacy.

A fundamental equivocation here encounters us everywhere, which necessarily inheres in the philosophical, nay, already in the pre-philosophical discourse of “objects”. Impressively it enters into the field of vision of the philosophical history with the ontological proof for the existence of God by **Anselm,** and ever since confuses constantly philosophical thinking without ever having arrived at a sufficient clarification between pure and simple objects and intentional objects as such. If we speak **purely and simply of objects** we experience, we judge, we theoretically, by way of valuing, by way of wanting take or are supposed to take position to, these objects are actualities **for us**, i.e. grounded to all these position-takings is a so-called naively brought about taking-for-actual, like a simple experience of what lies before our eyes which thereby is simply existing actuality for us. Each simply stated categorical judgment like “the benches of this lecture hall are of a yellow color” has at the subject’s position an objectivity, an “object pure and simple”, which of course is already accepted by us, the judging, as being.

But if we bring about a **reflection on the consciousness** of judging with all its foundations, like we have just brought it about ourselves, **[91]** but which of course we do not bring about in naïve judging, and if we speak of an object being subject of the judgment, of its properties which are conferred to it on the position of the predicate, and the like, or if we reflect on another consciousness, and speak of what is **conscious within this consciousness**, a **new discourse** **of object** carrying an essential modification of sense leaps to the eye. Certainly we can together with this reflection, and with the objective grasping of the consciousness, and of its conscious object at the same time still retain the past positing of actuality, but we can also put it out of action, and then the **intentional object of the pure consciousness as such advances**.[[43]](#footnote-43)

You see this is a change of the manner of judging, a change of attitude of exactly the kind which was demanded by our phenomenological reduction. By way of **reflection** on any consciousness, and by way of a putting out of action of a naively brought about position-taking of consciousness, a directly perceiving grasping of the pure consciousness, and of the intentional object as such, belonging insolubly to it, grows. But this need not be a complete phenomenological purity. Also when I, **as psychologist,** make a perceiving, a judging, valuing, being sorry, desiring, [and] wanting a theme, and thus if I thereby take the human subject, and its mental process in connection with the world, I am above all interested in what belongs to the respective process of consciousness in and of itself. There as well at first I have to put out of action all position-takings with respect to the actuality of the conscious within the respective consciousness, all **[92]** questions concerning its actuality for instance, and in particular if I, as a psychologist, pay attention to my own psychic processes, and make them a judgment-theme I have to put out of action the naïve positings of actuality within the same, exactly like in phenomenological reduction. It is only in some other respect that I do not bring these about, because I constantly grasp my mental processes as natural actualities, and not as transcendently pure mental processes. Since of course the phenomenologically pure mental process with its very **own** composition enters the psychological apprehension as human mental process, it is valid on both sides that the mental process in itself has a so-called intentional object, or, like I used to say, an object put in inverted commas, and that this “object” is to be distinguished from the pure and simple object. And this <holds true> for any kind of consciousness, and not only for a consciousness of external realities. The object in inverted commas, the immanent Something, as consciousness of something for the consciousness, is a fundamentally non-selfsufficient something; it is what it is, just as a Something of this or that consciousness, as well as the other way round a consciousness only is what it is, as consciousness of its Something. This is a correlation of an unparalleled peculiarity, a wonder if one, mislead by the habits of natural-naïve attitude, constantly tends to slide from the attitude of pure reflection into the natural-naïve attitude.

In the logical consideration a pair of correlative concepts corresponds to each **relational complex**: on the right-hand side of something, on the left-hand side of something; Father – son, etc. A being on the right side is inconceivable without a left, a left without a right. But this does not exclude that what is there correlatively was there, and exactly was there the same way without any **relational complex**. The father was no longer father, if he had no child, but he still could exist as human being, and the child as this human being could exist without a father, like coming into the world by way of a wonder. Thus one wants to believe: The perceived, the judged, and in any other way conscious object **comes into** **relationship** with the perceiving, etc., and is what it is, without perception as well, thus generally objects of consciousness and consciousness as such. However, we do not speak of the relation of **perception** to an accidentally perceived **thing** as [if this perception was] a being, [and the thing was] another being. We put out of action the position-taking of **[93]** the respective consciousness, thus the perceived object as being pure and simple object is not there for us now. (We brought about a phenomenological reduction, therefore an existent thing universally does not exist within our judgment field.) Just the perception is there, and to this [perception] itself a “perceived as such” belongs, which it keeps even after the reduction. Like any consciousness it is in itself consciousness of something, and this Something on the one hand is not the perception, and on the other hand still “immanently” belongs to it [the perception] in the peculiar way of consciousness. Therefore, **what** is conscious there is a **non-selfsufficient** correlate to the consciousness, i.e. something, which a priori is **only** conceivable as correlate to the consciousness, whereby from the outset not a correlate to the consciousness of just an individually single act of consciousness is meant, whereas rather an endless number [of acts] could have the same immanent –we will come back to that later.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Each object is original for the Ego, it is bodily there through that kind of consciousness called perception in the widest literal sense. An immanent object as such, this non-selfsufficient What **[94]** of consciousness is perceived in the reflective kind of perception, and is here perceived in an absolutely evident way. A pure and simple object, i.e. one considered as actual in a naïve positing of consciousness, is given by way of a corresponding perception, that is, if it is an external object, in external perception, which, like we already know, is perception according to mere pretention. Other acts, purely and simply referring to objects, are related back to perception insofar, as the positings of their objects can be valid or invalid; and, always considered from the side of consciousness, this means that an evident rational grounding of the accomplished positing needs to be brought about or not. This is thus fundamentally not required for immanent objects, for objects in inverted commas, where there is a consciousness related to them. They so to say express a structure which in absolute acceptance needs to be singled out of each consciousness by way of immediate reflection.

The contrast between naïve positing, the positing of a pure and simple object, and reflective grasping of a correspondingly immanent [object] as such can also be regarded as a relative [contrast]. And it turns out that the **inverted commas, which hint at the modification of sense in the discourse respecting the “object”, exhibit an operation which is reiterational into infinity**. The reflection as consciousness of a certain immanent object naively posits [this object] purely and simply. We can in a reflection of a second degree take out the immanent object of the first reflection, as a result the first immanent object, which priorily is simply posited, [and] perceived, by way of modification is changed into first reflection’s perceived object as such. We receive an object with double inverted commas. And so *in infinitum*, since we can reflect into infinity, and in evident freedom. On the other hand we are lead in opposite direction towards a consciousness which no longer is a reflection towards any other consciousness, and towards an object being a simple object in absolute sense, i.e. an object which is no longer immanent.

**[95]** Let[[45]](#footnote-45) us now consider more closely how the **intentional object as such** lies within the respective consciousness, in which form it is found by pure reflection, which thereby has the character of a perceptual act. The consciousness we hitherto have studied phenomenologically in several directions shall serve us as an example, the [consciousness] of external perception. Thus, if we go over from the naïve attitude of an external perception, in which the perceived is conscious as actual thing, as actual process, into the attitude of pure reflection, we realize at once that the mental processes of perception properly are in a constant flow, and are conspicuous multiplicities. We just have to remind what has already been said. While we speak of the same object standing unchanged as perceived actuality in front of us, we find infinities of perceptual appearances within the reflection, each one in a phenomenological way distinctly separated from the other, and with each [we find] another perspective adumbration of the object given. Each appearance thereby to be singled out intuitively **in itself** is related to the same object. Each one “means” something in its own essence, and each one means the same. This is not deduced, but absolutely given in direct reflection. In doubtless evidence intuitively it is to be singled out that the supposed Something is the same everywhere. But is this supposed as something supposed a real datum, something to be singled out as a piece, as a part?

We will not stick to the facts; in ideal possibility we can go over from a given perception which in reflection has become a theme, to possible new and ever new perceptions of the Same; *a priori* we see that the possibility belongs to the essence of a perception as such, to have open infinities of perceptual possibilities at hand with which necessarily this perception comes to a **certain unity-relation**, the [relation] of **identifying coincidence**, and exactly through this peculiar coincidence we view with evidence a consistent point of identity, a Something, a This-there as substrate of determinations being for their part again unities of coincidence. And we observe as belonging to it *a* **[96]** *priori*, that this identical substrate of continuous properties is never itself a real datum within the mental processes, instead it is only something appearing, i.e. it is just given within a “How” of appearing, within changing presentations or adumbrations which alone are actually, and really given as material compositions in a temporal stream of mental processes, as its real components. This holds true for every **distinctive trait** that is singled out intuitively. It is never given in another way than in a mode of appearance, in the form of an adumbration, and in ever new adumbration, always it is just given as the x being adumbrated thus and thus. The adumbrations, the Data of sensation, for instance presenting a color, are really given within perception; likewise the apprehension in which this datum of sensation presents itself as appearance of the physical color, and a new [datum] as appearance again of the same color, can once more directly and really be brought to light within the consciousness. But the physical color itself, called a perceived one, is always just something presenting itself, appearing one time in this, the other time in another way, and never really given, never to be brought to light besides its presentations.

What then is the intentional object as such, that which we find by the turn of the reflective regard within the consciousness? Something unreal, i.e. never ever a real piece of the stream of mental processes in which on the other hand we find manifold and wondrously real components like everything we called adumbrations, apprehensions, or else character of the bodiliness, or of the pictoriality, [character] of presentation and representation, of the indeterminacies as open horizons, etc. We find peculiar modes of combination, and modes of fusion which we metaphorically call “coincidence” of consciousness and consciousness in the “Same”, and due to the essential peculiarity of the consciousness to send itself into such coincidences of identity, we view in the running through of such coincidence the supposed unity: the supposed identical something, and therein again a substrate-identical something, and those other directions of identity we call unity of properties in such a way, that substrate and property are inconceivable without each other. But all these identity-moments are unreal, each is an x, a point of sense, namely identical sense of an appearance and thus of the infinite number of appearances which coincide in the sense, their x is the same. The substrate x thereby is always the x of possible continual determination, **[97]** that which holds the properties, but which still has an undetermined horizon of unknown, not given properties, i.e. of [properties] pre-meant as being empty, but not yet appearing, in actual appearances not intuitionally presenting themselves. The immanent objects are nothing more than such points of identity which receive their sense from the appearances, and from their connections of unity, or which inhere in them one time the already intuitively presented, the other time the not yet presented sense.

Likewise perception, likewise *mutatis mutandis* **each** consciousness and thus also a not-intuitable [consciousness]. May also the objectively supposed, the substrate of any determinations, and furthermore of higher produced formations shaped from it lack any kind of appearing or else intuitive presentation, always the consciousness itself according to its real composition, according to the real parts it is made of, is to be separated from the sense within it, which is supposed to be consciousness of something. A perception or memory of a group of separate objects is apparently a concrete whole, we can distinguish real parts within, perception of this or that object; each member of sets is represented by (its) own appearances within the real composition in perception. Real moments are all the Data of sensation and their components to be found within pure mental processes, like colorings, brightness, quality, [and] intensity. If we separate perception and memory, the phenomena on both sides are distinguished from each other through real moments. However, on the other hand, if we take together manifold perceptions, memories, expectations, [and] cogitative acts, relating to the same object, that is, meaning the same within their own sense-bestowing, with evidence we ascribe to each **the same** supposed with the help of the evidence of the identifying coincidence, thus what they do have in common is just that they all mean the same in endlessly distinguished modes, in endlessly different sense-bestowings, and directions of sense-bestowing, [and that they] are meaning, appearance, [and] thought of the same.

Within phenomenology the just now brought about fundamental separation between real compositions of consciousness and their intentional correlates and their composition is terminologically given expression to with the relative concepts of **noesis** **and [98] noema**. “Noesis” within this relative distinction means the consciousness itself, the stream of mental processes in its whole fullness and concretion, that is, according to everything into what a real analysis, a separation into parts, into pieces, and abstract moments may result. “Noema” in contrast is a title for all compositions with evident reflections to be taken out as well, but on the part of the supposed, of the conscious as such within the consciousness, that is, in respect of what the consciousness is simply consciousness. With the reflection I can inquire each consciousness of what was meant in it, of the sense with which there is consciousness of an objectivity within, for instance as a thing, as the definite individual table, as colored in such a way, as given from the side, undetermined on other sides according to the sense, but *a priori* more closely determinable in certain courses of appearance of pre-designed style, as thus and thus oriented, as actual or illusionary, etc. within the space of appearances. Thereby it is shown that all noetic moments do have a noetic function; there is nothing within the real composition of a consciousness which does not turn out as sense-bestowing in any directions for the noematic x. Consciousness is through and through consciousness of something; separating according to all layers, pieces, [and] moments we always find the “of something”.

The noematic thus is always something identical, something existent in its own way, but purely existing as something that can be brought to light in respective noeses as their identical something. We also say they are what they are, namely consciousness of something, insofar as they constitute a supposed, a noema within themselves; and again the same signifies that consciousness as consciousness is a sense-bestowing function; it is, this means that due to its peculiar essence as consciousness it brings about the accomplishment to make an x, a Something as a Something of a certain sense, an object of consciousness insertable into the sense.

How about the object as noema, the perceived object for instance as such, [how about] the pure and simple object? If we speak of the sky, and the earth, of things within our surroundings, of men with whom we are associated, there is the opinion that they actually exist, that they are in themselves existing actualities. It is clear that the pretended actualities are not only the mere suppositions, the appearing things as such, the judged as such, the noemata. If a perception **[99]** gives us an object, its noema belongs to this perception in absolute evidence, this object supposed within, [and] posited as real. Nobody can deny [the perception] its noema, detach it. It does not lose it if the course of experience leads to [the conclusion] that the perception was deceptive, that the supposed object “in truth” does not exist. To be able to deceive in relation to the object, it needs to be already perception of this object.

What exactly is this object-in-itself in its existence-in-itself, regardless of our consciousness, of our manners of givenness? And what does it mean that an object not merely appeared, that it was not merely supposed, thought of, etc., but that it existed in actuality? Let us consider: In the natural attitude we experience, and experiencing we stand upon the ground of the positing of experience, i.e. according to our analyses, we live in the presumption, we bring it about constantly, [and] living within perceptual belief we posit the perceived not within the How of the givenness, not as something appearing thus and thus, not as something in this or that way undetermined, but we posit it purely and simply, and this means, the positing of the perceptual belief thus anticipates, posits the relatively undetermined in such a way that we continually expect the coming or possibly coming perceptions always to continue in the sense of a confirmation, and at the same time in the sense of a more closer determination, not as if we, reflecting like we do here, conceived an idea thereof, instead this is simply the essence of the natural experiential attitude. What comes experientially, comes as expected, we are prepared, and the expectation is directed towards a **harmonious** confirmation, and a mere [act of] getting to know more closely. As long as this attitude remains, and the expectation confirms itself, we say, the object existed, and if the expectation was disappointed, if the belief in actuality needs to be abandoned in the sense of the cancellation of the posited, we say the object did not exist, it was merely illusionary.

But existence does not signify the accidental occurrence that we were in such an attitude, and expected thus. Also it is absolutely not a predicate relating to the subject, predicating an existence. Moreover it relates itself, it relates the positing of actuality purely in the direction of what is conscious within the consciousness of actuality. It posits the noema as an identical something of an endlessly open horizon of continuous **[100]** harmonious experience. In other words, existence or being actual expresses an idea, the idea of an x as theme of a positing continuously confirming itself under mere closer determination, or at most re-determination, which permits to constantly maintain the identical something as actually posited in confirmed positing. This idea is thus connected *a priori* to the **accomplishment** of each transcendent positing of actuality. To affirm the existence of an object means accordingly nothing else but to assume a noema, an intentional correlate to a present opinion concerning actuality, for example in the form of perceptions just having proceeded or [in the form of] memories, and not to posit this intentional correlate for itself, but to posit through it one’s continuation of identity in an endless horizon of harmonious experience, like letting the beginning of an extent continue *in infinitum*, that is, [the beginning] of the correlate to an infinite system of possible experiences which would affirm what was experienced up till now. The thing does exist, the further experience can only be affirming, I can enter the experience, go over from perception to perception, I would only get to know the thing more closely, [and would] never have to give it up; The presumption always aims at the actually posited x with the properties not only already grasped, but also determining themselves by entering the yet undetermined experiential horizon.

According to this presentation an immanent object as such, and within the How, is in the original in a complete way directly given to us in an attentively perceiving reflection on the conscious object of a consciousness. Wherever a consciousness, a relatively simple, or a produced formation of manifold acts of consciousness joining together to the unity of a consciousness, is a mental process, the reflection can direct itself to it, and, after suspension of the thesis of the consciousness, the conscious object as such can be drawn from it. Where the Ego brings about a consciousness without performing this reflective operation, there is present for it a pure and simple object, something purely and simply accepted as being. Certainly the object does not have to exist; “it exists in actuality” means that the consciousness is to be integrated within a legitimate grounding, that the being actual is not only supposed, like it is the essence of the unreflected consciousness of being, but [that it is] legitimately supposed, [and] thus is demonstrable. Originally given is an object purely and simply in a perception, an **[101]** external [object] within an external perception, while the reflection on the perception grasps the perceived object as such, the object as such supposed to be originally given, originally grasped.

**But two pure and simple senses of the object:**

1) The present Ego, living within the act, experiences an object or judges it, the experienced, or in any other way supposed to be being, “posited” [object]. It [the Ego] “accepts” the object as actuality.

2) Within the phenomenological attitude, where the present Ego is the one phenomenologically viewing and judging, the respective consciousness having been present is reflected, or a (in any other way) “supposed” consciousness. (This objectivation then is itself a quasi-present consciousness, experiencing a change into reflected [consciousness], thereby having become a theme.) Thus for the phenomenologically reflecting present Ego the Ego, being present consciousness, becomes a reflected and objectivated, no more present Ego; the consciousness becomes a theme, and therein its objectivated something, its experienced, its thought of.

An object then is purely and simply the identical something, and posited as identity as such, the substrate of properties which is something supposed, and affirming itself, or experiencing a cancellation in further manifold processes of consciousness, etc., which can become thematic within reflection.

In contrast to that then, to the “pure and simple object”, correspond objects within the How of supposition and givenness. The pure and simple object has all properties which the consciousness, further determining, [and] in harmony following the given, finds, cognizes, etc. The “object within the How” only has the properties of the respective act assigned to the supposed, in the mode of its indeterminacy, etc., the merely supposed respective [properties] as such in the mode of the supposition.

The difference between the actual object, and the supposedly thus and thus appearing [object] respectively, enters the phenomenological attitude, and is in itself actually won through it. However, not everything is thought through to the end here; compare the investigation of appearing as such, etc.

Our thesis of the immanent object’s non-selfsufficiency in contrast to the consciousness is of greater philosophical **[102]** importance than can become apparent here. Because, should it come out that each possible true object, and especially each transcendent object, is a correlate to an ideal multiplicity of rational positings, the possibility of which must necessarily be entrenched within an actually being consciousness, if thus it should come out that the “Being-in-itself” of a transcendent object existing in truth does not annul its relation to the present consciousness, and that therefore the true being from the part of possible consciousness is only a distinguishing index for a rule of the identity of a distinguished characterized immanent object, immanent acts of consciousness of an open multiplicity of related streams of consciousness, it would come out that no object at all is conceivable if not as object of consciousness.

Since our discussions on Saturdays give us the wished for possibility to treat in a completing way within personal statements different aspects of the phenomenological method, which experientially usually cause problems to the beginner, and the fundamental distinctions belonging to them, I can now venture to only draw the conclusion of the lastly commenced explanation, to then proceed more quickly.

In the natural-naïve, philosophically speaking, in the dogmatic attitude there exists for us a so-called world, an endless realm of transcendent actualities, [and] related to it manifold sciences, natural sciences, humanities, among them all cultural sciences. Apart from them we have many apriori sciences (except from the analytic sciences like pure logic, and the discipline of the *mathesis universalis*, pure theory of sets, arithmetics, [and] theory of magnitude, pure theory of multiplicity, etc.) already developed, or still to be developed, relating to possible transcendent objectivity as such, that is, to possible nature, to possible individual and social intellectuality, to possible culture.

By phenomenological reduction every being distant to consciousness is excluded according to actuality and possibility from our scientific field of research, and thereby all these sciences of matters of fact, and apriori sciences aiming at something transcendent. The **realm of a possible pure consciousness [103] as such** will be our peculiar field resting completely upon itself. No cognition we gain as phenomenologist can depend upon any cognition of the excluded sphere. (The absolute independence of the pure consciousness according to its essential structuring of any scientific judgments of the dogmatic sciences of possible externality has been ascertained.) The change of our attitude did not make the external, the in common sense so-called Objective, disappear, in short the **world purely and simply turned into the world phenomenon, the world sciences [turned] into scientific phenomena**. We ourselves, that means everyone reduced to the phenomenologically investigating Ego, first change so to say into subjects being purely **like** **eyes,** or, we could also say, into **radically non-participant spectators** of the world, and of all the possible worlds which present themselves culturally with all single things, cultural objects, pieces of art, books, men, associations, nations, churches, languages, customs, etc. and of all sciences relating thereto, as a matter of course.

The locution of the **disinterested behavior** is used in different connections. Thus the truly ethical behavior is called disinterested, namely in that each egotistical interest is suspended. Again the aesthetical behavior is called disinterested insofar as each emotional interest in the actuality has to be left out of account for the specifically aesthetic position-taking, like the passive one of appreciating the beautiful things, thus each desiring, and each practical process of setting a purpose. But however much the aesthetical attitude in its way suspends the actuality, this still simply happens with regard to the end, to lead over into a specific emotional mood belonging to a certain phenomenon, to an appearing in this or that way, encompassed by such and such sounding thoughts, similes, fantasy emotions, etc. as such.

All this thus relates to certain determinately directed disinterests of the respective Ego, [and] suspensions of certain specific position-taking acts, while straight positions are to be taken into certain other directions, [and] interest is to be developed. But how about this disinterested viewer whom we call **phenomenologist**? He as well **cannot [104] in every sense** be disinterested, and indeed, he wants to investigate, to scientifically investigate, thus [he wants] to theoretically determine what is given to him through a kind of intuition, given as being. This intuition is an act positing a being, giving a field of being, which pure reflection, the universe of the possible pure being conscious, gives him as a theme, while at the same time all external intuition, external perception, and external fantasy regarding its taking position remain put out of action. **This is where his disinterest lies**. But within pure consciousness there lies given as its intentional What, as the content of the externally supposed therein, of something appearing, of something presenting itself in this or that way, the whole external actual, and possible world as **pure phenomenon**. Excluded along with this are **all** present position-takings to it [the world], also the aesthetical as well as the ethical and all others. For me, as phenomenologist, the things with all their **predicates of value**, their beauties, expediencies, scientific usefulness, etc. are no actualities but pure phenomena. As phenomena they have an objective content of properties with corresponding **modes of appearance**, with which they are conscious with the single consciousness, or in further actual and possible processes of consciousness, and as well with the character “actual”, or any other modality of being; because if a thing presents itself as actuality, in the reflection I find this character of the “actual”, although as phenomenologically reflecting Ego I am not “interested” in the actuality, that is, I do not take position to it in a believing way myself. The same holds true for the modal character of the mood and the will. This thing shall be a **work of art**. **Work**, i.e. shaped according to ends, it points back to **poietic acts**, which again may presuppose certain valuing position-takings, desires, etc. To all this I do not take a position valuing, wishing, willing, approbating the volitional bent: The work for me is a phenomenon as work, I take it in an uninterested way as to the character of the aimed at, obtained **as such** in this or that type of acting. Furthermore, insofar as it is a work of art, I put myself into all corresponding aesthetical acts, but again I do not step onto their ground, I do not have to enjoy the work of art, or to judge the value of its art, but the work of art for me is as a work thus as a substrate for appearances to be valued **[105]** as beautiful, **merely a phenomenon**. And accordingly for all shapings of actuality and value, works and acts, for all nature and culture.

I, as phenomenological Ego, make a theme of each and everything in pure sense phenomenal something according to its type, according to its essential shapings: As “phenomenon” in this sense there are no pure and simple natural actualities, no ethical, aesthetical, religious actualities, no actualities of the culture, nor any respective pure and simple possibilities. It is the described disinterest which gives them the character of the phenomenon. The All of possible phenomena thus is a correlate to the All of possible consciousness, and at the same time is as phenomenon what it is only as something conscious within the possible consciousness, therefore in contrast to it [it is] non-selfsufficient. The consciousness cannot be studied without paying attention to what it is conscious of; the object of consciousness as such on the other hand is only conceivable as something conscious within this or that possible consciousness.

However, it is possible to make studies in **two** directions within the pure consciousness. To be studied are the essential kinds of possible consciousness as such, being an integral part of a possible stream of mental processes, the essential types of perception, of memory, of fantasy, of the consciousness of a depicturing, of the significative consciousness, the acts of explication, of the collecting summarizing, of the taking out, of the relating, of the comprehending, of the predicating, of the valuing, of the wishing, of the desiring, etc. The study is morphological, however, not empirical facts, but essential types in eidetic intuition are distinguished, arranged, described, pure as they are. Thereby the purpose can purely aim at studying the **real structures** of those types of mental processes, the pieces of the composition, the abstract moments, the forms of connections with which they build themselves, from which typically ever higher formations grow out of elements.

On the other hand the **intentional** What, the conscious object within the consciousness, can be brought into the theoretical focus, the intuited, the supposed as empty, the thought of, the valued, the wished for, and the acted as such, the objective something, its properties, its shapings, etc., but simply as objective something of such modes of consciousness, and then again in the changing mode of its **[106]** consciousness, thus taken with the corresponding positional character, actually, possibly, probably, valuably, lovely, usefully, etc. or regarded according to the modes of clarity or unclarity, intuitiveness or absence of sensuous intuitability, bodiliness or pictorial character, illusionary character, etc. in which it presents itself. According to all of these, and still many more directions, the “phenomena” are to be regarded, and while just now **real analysis of consciousness** has been performed, i.e. description of the mental processes according to their actual parts, [and] pieces of content, now the **intentional analysis,** and exploration of intentional mutual relatedness as well as of unities will be performed. The one is called **noetic** investigation (title “noesis”), the other **noematic** (“noema”). With both of course two inseparably related directions of observation are designated, since after all consciousness is nothing without having something conscious in any kind of mode, and the conscious object as such [is] nothing without consciousness.

Regarding from this point the transcendent problems of cognition (“theory of cognition”, “critique of reason”), which have been thrust in their most primitive forms onto mankind through the ancient solipsism already, and which since **Descartes** have become the main driving force of modern philosophy, one soon comes to the conviction, while at the same time affirming my former assertions, that they lie within the circle of problems which we have just described, and that they only within the phenomenological field can become pure problems with pure solutions (and exactly thereby it is stated that all “metaphysical” problems, all questions of the last achievable truth, or rather of the last achievable sense of the given world, although themselves not transcendent-phenomenological, are still related to the transcendent phenomenology, [and] accordingly need such a phenomenology for being tackled). **Exactly this is why we call the eidetic phenomenology of our sense a transcendent phenomenology**. In most primitive form we possibly can point out: For me, the cognizing subject, the world exists due to the connections of my mental processes, encompassed by the title “grasping of the world”, due to my experiences, that is, perceptions and memories, etc., due to my **judgments** of experience founded within them including all acts of explication, collection, **[107]** disjunction, relation, abstraction, ideation, predication, relation [sic!], etc. entering them, which they presuppose, processes ever more developing within the inducing, grounding in a mediate way, deducing, etc. There is no world before experience, and what is in truth within the world and how it is, for us is only present **by way of** such processes. In our opinion, if we want to be **sure** of true being, these processes must have a particular shaping, [the shape] of a grounding examined by evidence. But is not the **world in itself**, and this whole process a **life-shaping** of the one who cognizes? How does a world, being in itself, care for our cognition formation, and itself for the possibly evidence immanent in it?

At the end, in my stream of mental processes there runs its course a process of experience, and of so-called evident, or rational experiential thinking concerning an experienced world, and in spite of all evidence or rationality there does not exist any world, or is it completely different from what I believed in evidence? Did not in the end a **Cartesian** lying ghost shape the Ego in such a way that all transcendent is mere illusion despite all inner evidence, despite exact scientific evidence as it may be? The question is not: “How shall we proof the existence of the world?”, but: “How shall we **understand** the cognition of a cognition-transcendent world?” How else should such problems be tackled than by calling in question the whole transcendent world, that is, by fundamentally not making use of this actuality in a universal abstention from judgment, and by going back to pure consciousness, and more precisely to the consciousness of cognition? Thereby it must be heeded that not a single actuality regarding the possibility of its cognition is excluded, and each kind carries the problem in the same way. How else thus could we proceed than by practicing phenomenological reduction, and by than asking: Anyway, what does cognition look like, and especially transcendent cognition, what does belong to its essence according to all shapings, how does it make transcendent actuality conscious within itself, how does it posit the conscious object as actual, and what does a “verification of the actuality” look like? If it is the cognition by which external being universally becomes conscious, then accordingly it must give a sense to the concept of transcendence within its own essential content: The external being **[108]** **as such**, and therein for instance the being of a physical thing as well as the sense content of physical things themselves, must at first originate within the own sense-bestowing of the consciousness, and thereto we have to return, to become clear, what this thing and the thing’s **being-in-itself** means in contrast to the subject, what therein is and effects evidence, etc. All objectivity is only to be understood from the own accomplishment of pure subjectivity, and is only to be understood within the attitude of phenomenological reduction, and within the eidetic attitude, within the insight into the essentially necessary accomplishment, which after all can only become understandable from the immanent sort of the respective pure consciousness of cognition according to the interrelated shapes.

All confusions of the theory of cognition (or better said transcendent philosophy) in the first place derive from remaining within the natural attitude, from not radically suspending all transcendent actualities, or, what is the same, from universally not understanding the complete sense of the problems. But something else prevented the former theory of cognition from being productive. It lies within its genuine sense that it has to relate objectively true being to consciousness not only generally in empty variable universality, but also **in a concrete way** considered with respect to all kinds of acts belonging to the idea of the cognition as such, and then with respect to all **object-regions** materially particularizing the logical idea “object”, and to the essential types of sciences relating to them. The consciousness itself in all its functions has to be studied in a concrete way! But as **pure consciousness**.

As soon as this genuine ground is obtained, [and] thus the cognition of the necessity of a methodical phenomenological reduction has been reached, without which one cannot have a ground of transcendently pure intuition, one realizes that **something truly existing** cannot be anything else than the essential correlate to that type of **rational consciousness**, or evidential consciousness, from which it is stated in natural attitude that with its help man reassures himself of actuality (which was believed in advance). But this is not a single mental process, a single experience, but for instance in regard to the physical nature, [this is] the ideally endless process of harmonious experiences, and of scientific **[109]** thinking based upon it, in the manifold acts of which everyone may have his own immanent object, but in such a way that within this proceeding cognition-complex, in all interrelated and consciously connected members, the immanent What becomes obvious as the same, as ever more closely and more perfectly **grounded** something, grounded in originality or **evidence**. Thus the purpose of the transcendent theory of cognition, as far as it is directed exclusively towards the possibility of cognizing a real world, like it is traditionally [directed], has been in the first place directed towards the transcendent investigation of the **experience**. But here the study in completely vital intuition is necessary, the study not only of single formations, but of all formations of connections, and then the study has to proceed to the thereupon based essential formations of **scientific** groundings occurring in theoretical-logical forms.

All that, however, is only a small segment of the consciousness as such, and cannot <be> considered in its isolation; the whole connection of possible cognition, and eventually the whole connection of possible consciousness must be taken [into consideration]. All theory of cognition, moving within empty universalities instead of addressing itself to concretely and intuitively investigate in phenomenological reduction the almost unbelievably manifold and actualized essential types of the **intuiting** and **thinking** consciousness-life, must necessarily remain without any actual and definite scientific fruit. Like natural-dogmatic science is actual science only due to nature being studied through concrete experience in observation and experiment, and due to all theory being oriented according to this empirical intuition, like apriori science as well in that way that geometry can only be productive through creating its concepts from concrete eidetic intuition, and does not conjecture with empty verbal concept foreign to intuition, thus the theory of cognition can only be actual and genuine science by studying cognition within itself, and according to the sense of its problems by studying it as pure consciousness with the originally given kind of intuition coming into question here, the eidetic and transcendent reflection. A theory of cognition for instance without phenomenology of perception, of memory, of fantasy, **[110]** and of all the acts exemplary designated above, is a nonsense. And each title of this kind brings about descriptions of an at first overwhelming multiplicity.

At this point[[46]](#footnote-46) the following needs mentioning: I) When we commence with epistemological reflection, we find as already exemplary material several pre-scientific as well as scientific cognitional acts which we can study in essential attitude, and in the methodical habit of the phenomenological reduction, or [we find] correlatively several **Objects of cognition**, which we in noematic turning can study purely as objects of the respective processes of cognition, and of possible further processes of cognition, presenting themselves possibly as belonging to the same objects. One may and one must **at first exclude** the **scientific consciousness** of cognition, as far as it goes beyond the **pre-scientific** one, and must look around within the pre-theoretic sphere, and then approach the scientific [sphere]. Thereby **universal** and **particular** modes of observation have to be distinguished. Within the pre-scientific sphere we find pre-given several types of objects, physical things, organic beings, animals and human beings, human societies, nation, church, etc., cultural objects like weapons, tools, works of art etc.

1) We can phenomenologically have in mind the **formally-universal** by seizing and picking out any examples and by considering noematically the objects as objects of cognition **as such** (i.e. here [objects] of the pre-theoretic cognition, above all those of intuitive experience). This means we are focused on the question: How are **objects as such** pre-theoretically given, in which modes are they symbolically and immediately intuitively conscious; which modes of symbolic and intuitive givenness are to be distinguished, no matter what objective regions; what phenomenological relations do these modes have *a priori*; in which way are all intuitive objects, taken in the mode of their intuition and <in> the sense they provide them, related to each other; how does each **[111]** symbolic consciousness of something point to something intuitive, how [does] all intuitive [point] back to the consciousness “in person”, etc.? One may say, the transcendent clue of the investigation here is the formal idea “object as such”.

2) But one may and must as well proceed according to **regions**, that is, make further observations transcendently guided by each material region of objectivities, to singly treat the particularizing groups of problems. For instance, “physical thing” designates a particular region of objects, precisely of external objects as such. What do pre-theoretically conscious **things** and then later intuitive [things] **as things** look like, in which modes of givenness are they given as such things? What do physical modes of consciousness look like? And then the adumbrations, [and] the aspects make an appearance, the structures of which are parallel to the sense of the appearing. Likewise for other fundamental classes of pre-theoretically given objects. Therefore this is a **morphology** of the **intuitions** above all which correspond to the material regions according to **noesis** and **noema**.

Within this **pre-theoretic sphere** of consciousness thus, we may say, the idea “**object as such**” with its categorical variants and the **complete regions** **as the highest genera** in material intuition of objectivities which need to be proved, form the **transcendent clues**.

II) Let us now use the sciences which are pre-given to us as men of this highly praised culture and pre-given as correlate to its **consciousness** which theoretically shapes complex formations and grounds actuality, [and] which in each scientific group has its particular set of types:

Then again we find 1) a sphere of most universal phenomenological inquiries, namely of such which are directed towards science as such and scientific thinking as such as a theme of scientific determination as such. In connection with the universal theory of the cognitional level of pre-theoretical objectivity as such, this results in a **formal-universal theory of scientific cognition** of objectivities as such. (Since it is to be discerned at an early stage, that scientific **[112]** cognition of objectivity in general is the higher and concluding cognitional level, which is inconceivable without the lower level of pre-theoretical and later immediately intuitive cognition.)[[47]](#footnote-47)

As a result of history we now have a **formal theory of science** since **Plato** and **Aristotle** until the presence shaped in ever more rich disciplines, and a correlatively formal science of objects as such: including the admittedly yet to be purified and to be clarified disciplines formal logic, pure arithmetic, pure theory of sets, pure analysis with many particular disciplines. Referring to a term of **Leibniz** I use for the totality of this indeed harmoniously interrelated disciplines the expression “*mathesis universalis*”. Like any apriori discipline not directed towards the pure consciousness, this is no phenomenology. But obviously the described formal-universal phenomenological investigations are essentially related to it, to its fundamental concepts and principles. Therefore, if one already has it [the mathesis univeralis] in any tolerable form, the **fundamental concepts and principles can in phenomenological reduction serve as clues for the investigation**. That is, the logical concepts, relating to the *logos*, to the essential constituents of the idea of the sentence, like categorical sentence, existential sentence, etc., and the correlative most universal formal categories, arranged around the idea of the “object as such”, like determination of consciousness, relation, whole, part, majority, unity, number, genus, kind, etc. Of course: If the formal mathesis is really developed, it is to be understood any time with insight and given in its acceptance, thus each term represents a type to be grasped with insight in the seeing essences, and during the process of such an insight the whole play of cognitional acts is at work which lead the formal essence of the object regarding the respective categories like property, determination, whole, etc. as well as corresponding connections by an eidetic law to the original givenness, which so to speak make it [the formal essence of the object] itself and absolutely seizable.

**[113]** However, several things have to be considered here. On the one hand obviously it is something different <to> perform the acts of insight as someone thinking logically and mathematically and to have knowledge of themselves. The problems of the possibility of a cognition as such in formal universality concern a searched for clearer understanding, how objects as such are related to their cognition, how cognition accomplishes what it accomplishes, and which **sense** objectivity can have **as** objectivity, i.e. [as objectivity] which originates in such an accomplishment. While thus the scientifically-theoretically thinking and teaching subject, for instance the arithmetic, naively mathematizes, the **theoretician of cognition** has to reflect and to make in phenomenological reduction the essence of the cognition’s accomplishment and of the cognitional objectivity as objectivity in such an accomplishment the theme of his totally different cognition. Mathematics is not the transcendent theory of the mathematical cognition. But everything the mathematician has simply given according to fundamental concepts, [and] principles, now becomes a **clue** to transcendent theoretical investigation in such a way that the mathematical is performed in most perfect insight, and that exactly this insight itself, the original consciousness, in which the mathematical is completely properly given, according to noesis and noema, becomes the theme of investigation. However, the fundamental concepts of the formal *mathesis* are nothing but expressions for the most formal-universal essential formations of possible theoretical modes of formation of objectivity as such. Thus accordingly formal theory of cognition, tackling the very most universal problems of possible cognition and cognitional objectivity, and *mathesis universalis* are related in a correlative way.

Further it must be heeded that this is the reason **why each radical clarification of the fundamental concepts and methods of science** (and what is accepted for the *mathesis* is likewise valid for any other science) is **so closely connected to the transcendent theory of cognition**. No naturally growing science remains within the frame of pure evidence. Several impurities can be considerably ineffective for cognitional successes, although they once result in confusions. Moreover all scientific cognition aiming higher is **symbolical**. What has been cognized becomes verbally fixed, learned in **[114]** external verbal form, while the evidence which originally functioned in a primal-creative way, lacks in mechanized thinking. One relies on being able to obtain it back, to go back from the symbols and symbolic judgments to thinking processes which provide insight. But this is exactly where the deficiencies for the institutionalized research derive from. Since there is a lack of insight, conceptual compositions slightly not belonging there mix with the symbolic concepts, or confusions become possible which in the evidence were impossible. Thus the constant **need for ever new clarification of the fundamental concepts and fundamental methods** grows.

But this clarification, which at the same time is a **critique**, a separation of what legitimately belongs to the content of sense, that is, of what actually functions within the scientific original evidences, and of the redundant, e.g. associatively entraining itself and possibly harming the sense of the symbolically used concepts and axioms, however, such a **critique** **demands reflection,** **and demands the comparing of meaning and meant, intentions of consciousness and thereby intended**. Thus the phenomenology is the school of clarification, also where there is no determining transcendent-philosophical interest.

II 2) What we explained regarding the essential relatedness of formal logic and *mathesis* and the formal theory of cognition spreads to the **material apriori and empirical sciences** and to the corresponding transcendent theories of cognition. Here as well there exists an essential relatedness. (First of all it is important to stress again and again that it does not suffice to consider scientific cognition and scientific objectivity in formal universality and to solve transcendent problems in this universality. However profuse they may be, however many investigations they require, they are not sufficient.)

**Each material region ideally spoken designates the field of an apriori science**. Physical nature for instance is the field of the apriori natural sciences. **[115]** (Kant’s pure natural science.) With[[48]](#footnote-48) its fundamental concepts and principles it naturally offers clues for material transcendent investigations. A transcendent theory of cognition and objectivity as such concerns, as I said, only what is accepted for objectivities of which material type ever. A **particular theory of theoretical cognition** is needed **for each region in its own-essentialness**. And since the true being of objects as such is a correlate not only to simple intuition, but to theoretical thinking, we have for example inserted a theory into pure geometry, namely a **transcendent theory of the geometric cognition** which phenomenologically studies the essential formations of the geometric intuition and its correlates space, spatial form, etc. as well as on a higher level the peculiarity of theoretical-geometric accomplishments. A phenomenology of the spatiality and spacetime is an own, vast theme, from which a formal-universal theory of cognition does not know anything. Likewise the **phenomenology of the physics and of physicality** in the total sense, which thus not only investigates, how a material thing as such pre-theoretically comes to givenness in consciousness formations according to all its **essential moments** and according to all specifically physical particularizations of the categories, but also [investigates] in which way then **theory** establishes itself, not theory as such, but **natural scientific theory**, not science as such, but possible natural science. The correlate of the latter is the thing of physics, which only now, as correlate to a phenomenologically studied natural-scientific cognition becomes understandable, that is, in eidetic universality. **Likewise for all regions**. For instance for everything which the vague title “mind” as a theme of the humanities encompasses.

We descry there the **philosophically fundamental connection between apriori disciplines and phenomenological disciplines**. We cognize how much a previous training in apriori **[116]** disciplines means for a transcendent philosophy. Without himself as phenomenologist performing these disciplines, without being geometer, natural scientist, he still uses the fundamental principles and methodical accomplishments in these disciplines as **clues** of his transcendent investigations. If those apriori sciences are not existent yet, he is forced to create them according to a universal idea and fundamental concepts, thus to establish dogmatic science for the sake of phenomenology. If empiric sciences are existent, they serve him as singular possibilities, as correlatively the given world becomes an example of the idea “world as such” for him. And from thereon he considers possible empirical science as such of the respective type of science – whereby he already has entered apriori considerations and creation of respective ontologies. But even insofar naturally developed apriori or at least empirical sciences present themselves, they must not be taken by the transcendent philosopher as ready pre-givennesses. Regarding their fundamental concepts and principles he has to perform an ontological work with them. He has to proceed towards the very **last**, towards the last, not further dissoluble, absolutely primitive fundamental concepts and concepts of essential elements and primitive forms of connections, towards the very last, no longer shown thus absolutely immediate axioms, expressing the absolutely last eidetic laws; since only thereby the phenomenologist gains the true clues for the correlative structures of consciousness. The mediate derives from the train of reasoning, which has its formal, in all fields similar types. Accordingly for example the enormous interest the philosopher for example [sic!] <holds> for the modern investigations of the mathematics, which are directed towards an absolutely primitive axiomatic grounding of the mathematics, and why the philosophers themselves engage in such a work. It is the necessary forecourt of philosophical work.[[49]](#footnote-49)

**[117]** The tendency of modern phenomenology and phenomenologically founded philosophy in its radicalness tends towards final and noetic-noematic clarity going *eo ipso* hand in hand with the **Cartesian** tendency towards absolutely secure sciences and with the tendency, to let the **allness** as such of possible sciences in most perfect evidence and systematically spring from an original ground of ration, to thus serve the idea of absolute cognition, i.e. [the idea] of the philosophical [cognition]. We do have natural dogmatic science prior to philosophy, but completely objective science is only possible within the frame of a philosophy and through the methodical work of the philosophy. But then it is no longer merely dogmatic. The naivety in which the Objective something is investigated without as well investigating transcendently the essential relations between consciousness and objectivity is suspended. The **last** dogmatic science is the one for which the last clearing work has been performed already and which has a correspondent phenomenology beside it. With calm logical conscience **such an objective science** stands or stood upon the natural ground; in natural attitude it can investigate without having to fear the reflection; it knows that beside it all transcendent problems are tackled in a transcendent phenomenology; thus every man is any time capable of reflectively answering sense-questions and transcendent-philosophical questions without confusion and of being secure against all false metaphysics.

### Part II. Considerations concerning a transcendental theory of Nature and Mind

#### §1. Articulation as comprising things and subjects correspondent to the division of Nature and Mind

Following the indispensable general introduction to phenomenology and transcendental theory of cognition **as such** and to transcendental theory of cognition directed to **external** actualities and possibilities in particular, that is, to the cognition of Nature and Mind, we [now] resume the former themes.

We had already commenced, in a quite naïve way though, to give a first thought to the separation of Nature and Mind. We had already grasped the world as the world of our cognizing consciousness, [we] had already decided to initially suspend everything the scientific cognition contributes to the world phenomenon and to consider the world as the world of pre-theoretical consciousness. As a first very rough separation of Nature and Mind belonging here the separation of subjects and things emerged. We keep all this firmly in mind, it just receives a new valuation in our present phenomenological attitude, its distinct eidetic-phenomenological significance. In accordance with the last statements relating to epistemological things we have to pursue the relation of all pre-theoretical cognitional consciousness back towards **originally giving intuition**, thus if we are looking for the **legitimate** sense of Nature and Mind (as far as it presents itself pre-theoretically) [we have] to gain it exactly from the original experience, from perception and memory, namely from perception or memory being as perfect as possible, as far as possible proving true on all sides and from there [we have] to carry on an ontological analysis, as far as such an analysis has not yet been carried on as preparatory work within the possibly a priori sciences of Nature and Mind. Indeed this shall make the transcendental clue for the required first epistemological investigations, that is, for the experiential theoretical [investigations], whereupon the questions concerning the performance of **[119]** natural-scientific and humanistic cognition would have to be grounded.

Yet we cannot aim at a whole or complete transcendental theory of Nature and Mind or rather of the achievements of pre-scientific and scientific knowledge of nature and of mental cognition, not least because a universal phenomenology of the **consciousness structure preceding the rational problems** and likewise a universal formal theory of cognition being equivalent to a transcendental theory of the formal-logical and formal-mathematical cognition can neither be presupposed nor given.

But together we will design a coherent series of phenomenological and ontological theories being accessible without larger presuppositions than those we have acquired up till now seemingly without connection to our proper themes, theories, able to open new perspectives to all those coming from natural sciences or the humanities and <having> the rare need for clarity concerning sense and achievement of these sciences. Furthermore, what has to be kept in mind constantly, even if we do not mention it explicitly any more, is the **phenomenological reduction** with its concerning the natural attitude sense-modifying performance and likewise the philosophical end of **ontological analysis**, precisely, of an analysis relating to those kinds of possible transcendent actualities that are designated by Nature and Mind.

(Thus the fundamental question is: **How** is transcendent objectivity (which we designate with the still completely unclear titles “Nature” and “Mind”) *a priori* given as a correlate to external intuitions? We do not take the fundamental kinds of external objectivities as fundamental kinds of external actualities and external possibilities pure and simple, but as clues to noematic-noetic phenomenological investigations. This has to be kept in mind constantly; we cannot repeat all over again that when we talk of things and other transcendent objects, the locution has to be put into inverted commas, that we do not mean ontological investigations but noematic [investigations].)

When we, deriving from the empirical, view the external intuitions and their intuited objects as such, there are **[120]** indeed given as correlates to external spatio-physical perceptions and intuitions of fantasy simply **things**, more precisely, spatial things, as a type, but [they are] not [given] in such a way that we could already make the right use of it. And likewise for subjects. **In order to be able to gain originally the radical noematic differences within the objective regions** and to understand them in their own peculiarity and their being related to each other, certain *a priori* predelineated noematic analyses or noematic operations are needed. We all know what the thing and <the> subject are according to the clear givenness of possible experience, and that things are not subjects and subjects [are] not things. In the “ontological attitude” (that is, in external essential intuition) we can start to analyze **what *a priori* does belong to things as such**.

We do not need much to start with, initially quite rough indications to originally to be acquired matters of course suffice. Each possible external concrete individual which we have or can have intuitively given by way of exemplary external experience or possible experience, is a **temporal Object** and necessarily has **temporal predicates**. Moreover, according to ideal possibility, to each concrete individual another one has to be conceived of as being factually co-existent and again another one and so on *in infinitum*. Thus an **infinity** of compossible, i.e. possibly co-existing, individuals has to be considered as ranged into each possible concrete individual in endlessly manifold ways.

In doing so we have to understand existence in the widest sense. If we posit that both objects A and B taken in their whole individuality, that is, each one with its temporal position, do exist, then we have posited them as existing. Therefore, existence then does not mean simultaneity. If we now take a world, that is, a sum-total of co-existing concrete individuals, then the ontological law is in force that in accordance with their time all of these individuals range themselves into a single time which thus is the fundamental form of all factual co-existence. If we conceive of the allness of the factual co-existing something with an optional individual A and of the allness of the factual co-existing something with another individual B, then it is accepted axiomatically that both kinds of allness are in fact one and the same allness, wherefore we posit both A and B as actually existent and both have a certain temporal position in relation to each other and to all **[121]** co-existing objects within **one** infinite time. This can be discerned for external objects prior to all in whatever way performed theory and science, nay, for individual objects as such, therefore it can be acquired from pre-theoretical data, more precisely, from the data of originally giving possible experience. The time is not the pure form of **intuiting**, but rather of **the intuited** **as such**, however, in the given sense, which implies that it remains actual in harmonious intuition, which is not a matter of course for external objects.

Again for objects, that is, for external objects as such it is accepted (within the frame of the region acquired by regional universalization of external experience’s exemplary data), that all concrete individuals fit into the spatial form as a universal and single form of factual existence in a special way that needs further description [and] which becomes explicit in ontological truths, the original truths of all a priori natural science. Things in contrast to subjects are *res extensae*, they themselves have an “extension” within the space, i.e. [they have] a “shape” which fits into the space in every point of time by way of rest or by way of continuous movement. Subjects, as far as they do have bodies which for their part belong to the *res extensae*, **mediately** have a space-relatedness, a position within the space due to the body. Again it is accepted that there is just one space for the spatially objective world, or rather, each possible world has a single space which is the form encompassing **all** possible existing extensive being. This shall suffice here.

*A priori* we can conceive of things without them being bodies of subjects, and even if we do have bodies before the eyes, we can conceive of these bodies being no bodies in truth but rather like manifold other things without any connection to a subject. We thus have a clear distinction of Nature and Mind at our disposal when among the concrete objects given in the universal temporal form we restrict ourselves to those which through their own-essential content fit into the spatial form, that is, by way of restriction to the *res extensae*. Nature in the specific sense, the theme of natural science, is mere things, the things as mere nature, i.e. the *res extensae*, while **[122]** we abstract from the possible combination with subjects which confers the character of bodies on the respective things. In addition to that we pre-theoretically would have the theme of a science of subjects, the theme of a psychology, the latter insofar as possibly the **animate organism as substratum of the mental life** according to actuality and ideal possibility should also only stand <under> theoretically to be cognized sets of laws, factual laws and eidetic laws.

Nevertheless, that quickly neither the concept of mere nature, of *physis*, which a physical natural science explores, can be acquired nor can the region be brought to pure distinction which gives a radical unity to all modern natural sciences. Accordingly celestial bodies, stones, desks and benches, tools, pictures, works of art, temples and churches, weapons, notes of one hundred German marks, etc. would be in an equal manner physical objects. This is indeed what they all are, and, according to their essence, most of them are something more.

To make this clear we consider the following: The objects consciously pre-given to any Ego furthermore by way of the Ego’s turning towards them and making them themes of ever new acts, e.g. valuing and practical acts, then assume new predicates, for example value predicates, lasting determinations accruing to the objects, with which they then are pre-given within future consciousness. Within the conversation between the subjects such predicates of beauty, usefulness, expediency in the manner of tradition (in the widest sense) pass over from subject to subject. Like external objects as such are not only objects for a subject, but rather in a way comprehensible to each subject are at the same time there for the totality of subjects possibly communicating with each other, thus they are as well there as pre-given objects with regard to those ever new predicates. Such predicates which through the performance of the subject’s acts originally accrue to the objects, [through] acts in the previously described, conspicuous sense, for want of a more suitable expression I called **predicates of signification**. External objects are (for us what they are by the changing sense-bestowing of the experiencing and other consciousness. The way they are given to us they are) in **[123]** continuous change. But they are thus not only in the manner of alteration, but also in the way that they, according to the determination-content corresponding to them, in truth remain identical and unchanging and yet by way of a sense-creating performance of **acts** relating to them they assume layers of new predicates, which they can keep even after the acts are over: Thus objective predicates are meant and not only reflection predicates which merely express **that** this or that act related to the respective objects. Some examples will make this clear.

If, in the danger of a hostile assault, I find among scattered stones some to be suitable as missiles, among pieces of wood some as clubs or hammers, and if, in the respective valuing and an end setting acts of volition, I determine them thus, then the things themselves remain unchanged and yet for me they have assumed a lasting significance, that is, new predicates: precisely those designated specifically and in a distinguishing way by the words “missile”, “club”, “hammer”. From now on I view them in a different way, or rather, they themselves present themselves, whenever I regard them, as something else, although not objectively changed. I can trim a piece of wood according to my ends, I can work it so that it becomes a stake, a board, a spear, a club, as a carpenter [I can work it] to a chair or a table, etc. Certainly the thing is changed thereby. But **by way of my action** (action= not only an objective process pure and simple, but rather a process animated through a willing, an expediently directed intending and realizing) and by way of my lasting practical position-taking of an end-determination it [the thing] stands there **with a mental significance**, as a **product**, as a **purpose-shaping** and moreover as an object which lastingly is **determined** and **suitable** to serve certain future ends.

Universally it is accepted: **Mental significance**, consisting of certain predicates belonging to the object, originally is the productive correlate of certain subject’s acts bestowing signification to pre-given objects. It is connected therewith that such predicates can only be understood in a completely intuitive way, if one goes back to an active subjectivity, and they become understandable in a completely intuitive way **[124]** if one conceives of this explicitly as a subjectivity performing such acts, as the correlate and performance of which then the respective predicates originally constitute themselves in the objects. The significance conferred by any subjects, shaped within a signification-conferring is not merely understood, but rather taken over actively when other subjects join in the practical position-takings which are contained within the acts taken up in the manner peculiar to the understanding and thus **accept** the significance. Thereby it is immediately clear that all such acts, or rather, all such signification-predicates are **founded**, that is, on a higher level, that objects have to be originally already there for any subject, they have to be **pre-given** so that the subject can **bear a relationship** to them by doing acts and confer on them the significance of an expedient object, of a weapon, a product, a tool, a machine, a signpost, etc.

At the same time every alteration, changing the pre-given object as a real object (and even if the subject engages with it, the real alteration produced by it) is clearly distinguished from the real creation or change of those totally different predicates, ascribed to the real things as predicates in truth, and yet they are not **real predicates,** and therefore their new appearance and change need not at all be always accompanied by real alteration. This is what the first examples have shown already, and others are easy to be found: While wandering through a pathless forest I can keep in mind any conspicuously shaped tree as a recognition-sign and designate it as such. In reality it remains unaltered and yet, for me it goes on being a recognition-sign, a signification which by tradition can be transferred on any number of other subjects.

Our everyday surrounding world is almost completely filled with objects, apperceived with manifold meaning predicates by us and by all those tied within the unity of a tradition – [they are] thus immediately apperceived that these predicates like the real things, given in most immediate sensuous experience, are downright designated as perceived, as seen, as heard, etc. How common is the locution: “I see that this is a hammer”, “I hear the sound of a violin”, etc. Of course this is not merely sensuous seeing, hearing, but rather, apart from this as founding experience, it is an understanding of the meaning predicates and possibly an acknowledgement of their being universally accepted[[50]](#footnote-50).

By the contrast of “**real predicate**” and “**meaning predicate**” we now gain a certain **concept of reality**. All that is needed is the suspension of the still possible relativity of the related concepts “real predicate” and “meaning predicate”. It is readily clear that pre-given objects which receive a new signification could indeed have had a signification already (watch – expensive souvenir), but it is as well clear that by way of a recourse from meaning predicates towards their substrate-objects we arrive at ultimate substrates which already are whole objects and yet completely free of any signification. In this way an object must be singled out reductively which has real predicates in an absolute sense not merely in a relative sense. If we thus explicate the sense of any pre-given object, or, what is the same, if we consult the consciousness an object gives us as to what this object as noema of the consciousness was **intended**, than in general we will be referred to new intentional mental processes and among them possibly to Ego’s acts in which by way of identifying coincidence with the consciousness that is the starting point the sense actualizes itself, **made intuitable** in its originality. In other words: we are referred from the covered or unclear object’s consciousness-of to respective clear intuitions originally giving objective essence. Thereby all predicates being subjectively[[51]](#footnote-51) originated **significations** must become apparent. We proceed from them, we go back from them to their substrate and eventually as **intuitive core** the **pure real** remains, that which in all signification-bestowings was presupposed from the side of the subject’s acts as an object **prior to all acts**, prior to all **active** subject’s performances.

There might arise concern here. How can an object become a givenness for a subject, grasped by it **as an object [126]** in another way than through acts, in an original manner by intuiting acts? And if we talk of its predicates we thus predicate, and is not predication and consequently also the predicate as a product correlate of doing acts, the acts of the logical sphere? This is certainly right. But as to the former, that intuiting acts like perceiving perceptions originally give objects, the answer must be that simply not all acts do have a **constitutive** relation to the **essential content** of the object, to its predicable material content. The form “object” may be the correlate of a grasping of an identical which as grasping of an identical is the same everywhere, like an object is an object everywhere. But that what is the content of the object, that what within the predicative explication displays itself in the distinctive traits on the side of the predicate is not therefore productive correlate of the act and of any other act. Rather, this applies only to specific predicates like value of the object, beauty, usefulness, etc., predicates which in content point back to acts, which for their part presuppose already grasped objects.

Something similar holds true for the unanimous further objection. Certainly the logical concepts, judgments, webs of judgment, are productive correlates of acts; they are not real objects. But it now has to be heeded that what we call logical thinking – concept-forming, explication of a subject’s distinctive traits, an object’s relation to another object, etc. – designates a closed series of acts, which can be related in identical form to all imaginable and **pre-given** objects whereby new, not any more real objects originate from the same as productive correlates, the predicates related to these objects as predicates, sentences as sentences, etc. If we understand a sentence as a statement, we thus even have a second layer, that is, the verbal [layer], that which gives the sense of words and statements to sounds or written marks, these are signification-bestowings sui generis, exactly those that make them a sign. All this is formally alike in kind, which objects are pre-given in underlying acts and are made substrates of the *logos*. Again following the cognition of this *a priori* formal state of affairs we have to go back exactly to the **content** of the respective predicates **[127]**, sentences, proposition-complexes, and this leads back to the acts which are **substrate-acts** of the mental performances we designate as logical.

By way of this consideration we have gained an original and obviously quite necessary concept of reality, and of **nature** specifically. If we perform the just now described reduction-process, if we take away all meaning predicates of an individual object, we acquire the pure real, and if we thus proceed with a spatial thing we acquire the mere **natural object**, i.e. the mere spatial thing as something real. To view given objects as mere realities, things as mere nature, that is thus, to view them while suspending all signification, all predicates which have their apperceptive source in subject’s acts.

Obviously the suspending is not an abstracting in a common pregnant sense. At a concrete thing we can exclusively consider its spatial shape, more precisely, make it our theoretical theme, that is, without regarding all those moments qualifying this shape, like the color, etc. The shape becomes a theme of its own, but it is non-selfsufficient, a mere “abstract moment”, it is only conceivable within factual existence with any kind of qualification. In our case it is quite different. What we call mere reality, mere natural object, is something concrete, something completely self-sufficient, something which, even if it does have meaning predicates, could as well exist without them as a concrete-complete object. This we cognize because it is indeed imaginable that a thing exists without ever having received meaning predicates by actively performing subjectivity, and also because if an object does already have meaning predicates it can be experienced as a concrete-whole object by every other subject not knowing anything of its signification. Who does not see a stone-arrow like an anthropologist as an arrow, still sees a concrete thing, the mere natural object, the stone.

We add the following remark: when we have just recently commenced to analyze in an ontological way the essence of the pre-theoretically intuitive things, we had **not** abstracted the meaning predicates with which they were apperceived respectively. Now it is clear that the thing keeps its ontological determinations as *res extensa* if we take it as a mere natural thing. Nay, **[128]** considered more closely, the *extensio* properly and originally only belongs to the real as to something real and expresses its essential form [of the real]. All predicates of the mere natural object are essentially related to the extension, but the meaning predicates only improperly, that is, only insofar as they do have a natural object as substrate. A flag has an extension and extensional predicates as natural object; the meaning predicates which constitute the meaning “flag” are irreal, they do not in themselves have any essential relation to the space.

I have fixated the concepts **reality** and **nature** in such a way that they do not coincide with each other. Reality is the wider concept; because subjects as well, taken as pre-theoretical objects of our external world, have to be considered as realities, they as well can have and usually do have manifold meaning predicates; we can for this group of objects of possible external intuition as well suspend so to say the signification layers pertaining to them in empirical apperception, and we then receive as remaining the subjects as mere realities. As illustration it may suffice to point out that in common life we constantly apperceive fellow men as servant, soldier, general, professor, gendarme, worker, etc. We apperceive them so to speak with a continuous mental livery corresponding to them and the possibly physical livery itself is a symbol for such a significational function, like for a coachman, a porter, etc. Yet it is a good thing to give further and in a cognizable way simpler examples. If I regard somebody due to empathy into his habitual practical position-takings against his fellow men as an unkind egoist, and again another one as a clumsy and unpractical man or as scientifically unskilled, etc. it does not end in fleetingly passing valuing acts, but rather they establish within the valuing subject a habitual apperception. The valued persons have so to say a lasting token. It is pre-given for the concerned subject, as often as it is conscious of it [this token], with the respective value predicates as lasting components of the sense – unless that subject abandons its valuing position-taking, changes its conviction, cancels the former position-taking to be reproduced by way of memory.

**[129]** You readily feel that such predicates are of another character than those of the first group of examples, in which social functions of members of a society express themselves. But before we enter deeper analyses it shall suffice that both sides are meaning predicates which not only express a behavior of the random subject, but rather “objectively”, i.e. in a validity which can be verified by “everyone”, belong to the object itself, in this case to the persons – if the signification-bestowing performance is an accepted and not only a supposed performance.[[52]](#footnote-52)

(What[[53]](#footnote-53) does essentially have its part in the extension? We will adhere to the kinds of predicates which, as <belonging> to the regional generic essence of the thing necessarily have to be present in every originally giving intuition of a thing, and therein [we will adhere] to those, <which> have to be given in the first place, no matter whether other things are considered along with them or not. These are the traditionally so-called “secondary” traits. More distinctly articulated, each thing according to its regional essence first of all has formal predicates of the time such as the duration. Second [it does have] predicates of the space, of the spatial form and initially the spatial shape which for its part has a changing position within the space resulting in different spatial determinations for the thing. All predicates of spatial form are, regarding the temporal-formal traits, predicates of the time-content, and this also applies to all other predicates. Third [each thing does have] a spatial shape, understood as the *extensio* is a non-selfsufficient moment remaining identical in each change of position, like already expressed within the concept **[130]** of form. It is inconceivable without a spatial **content**, a contentual What of the shaping. Each thing taken in itself, that is, regarded according to what part of it comes to original intuition even if every other thing had vanished from the intuitive field, does have spatial content traits, whether it be color, roughness or smoothness, and the like. The **typical** **of these traits** is that *a priori* they are only conceivable as expanding over the shape, extending, as extended, that is, inconceivable without extension, without shape, like the other way round an extension is inconceivable without anything extended.

The thing itself as identical substrate of traits belonging to it is called an extended [thing], insofar as it does have qualities which are only conceivable as qualities of an extension, only <as> spatial shape in our sense. This results in a specific concept of quality in contrast to physical predicates as such, [in contrast] to disposition as such. The duration is not a quality, the spatial extension as shape and all the more as position is not a quality, but color, roughness, warmth are qualities. However we may fix the terminology and maybe perform further possible distinctions within the last group, we will meet a first necessary structure and sequence of structure-levels within the regional essence of a thing as such. We soon cognize that, fourth, a totally different group of determinations of the thing would have to be mentioned, namely such [determinations] of the real connection, the substantial-causal dispositions, the peculiar and higher-level ownness of which shows itself evidently in that they cannot come to original givenness within the single thing, but rather presuppose a plurality of things in intuitive givenness.

All these structures belong to the regional essence of the thing as natural thing, thus e.g. [they also belong] to the flag, to the sign-post, to the weapon, to the piece of furniture, simply insofar as they are things. But that which characterizes them as things with a signification, e.g. as a flag, these are determinations which only have a spatial relation **through** the real; they are not qualities which extend themselves, which in the proper sense change their spatial position along with the thing, or express [it] like the causal necessities **[131]** within the temporal-spatial distribution in respect of the being thus which is determined according to the qualified shape.)[[54]](#footnote-54)

Like it is the case with things, to external objects which we call **subjects** the **meaning predicates are external of their essence**; they are simply predicates including in their sense a relation to another subjectivity which relates by way of acts to these objects conferring on them a signification. According to ideal possibility ever new subject’s acts can relate to other subjects as external objects, and with regard to this merely ideal possibility predicates valid in themselves like beauty, ethical value and the like may belong to them. But neither is it necessary that they actually become themes of such acts, nor do they have to be considered with respect to the possibility of such acts. However: Apart from all possible and actual signification they do have as subjects their own concrete being, they do have in the sense of the now leading concept of reality their real being in and of itself, which is to be found intuitively and to be exhibited without regard to subjects relating to the real (which is subject here itself) within their acts.

The **appertinent** of these realities, of the psychic, subjective [realities] is certainly something totally different than <that> of the *res extensae*. They simply belong to completely different regions, insofar as we take the mere subjects and do not take along their bodies. It corresponds to their real kind as subjects **to be according to the manner of the [132] consciousness**, wherein again lies consciousness-of and being conscious of oneself, to be or to be able to be an actively performing Ego and thereby to be able to be actively directed towards something else and towards oneself in the manner of grasping, of the position-taking in this or that way, etc. Consciousness-of implies the possibility to be able to be conscious of external being, nay, according to the ideal possibility, to be able to be conscious of any external being. The objective real **is**, but it does not know anything of itself or of anything else, its essence excludes the mental process, the consciousness-of, the consciousness-of something else and of the consciousness itself. Supposed it was correct that, like some, **Bruno** or **Leibniz** did believe that each thing was animated, this would only mean that each thing was a body for a subject. But still the bodily thing as mere *res extensa* with all those extensional determinations of materiality does within its physical real essence exclude the psychic, everything the titles “consciousness-of” and “being conscious of oneself” designate. This is exactly what then belongs to the essence of the soul which is only connected to the thing as body, so to say cumulated to the organism. Furthermore the real thing, the mere natural object is, like I said, not a mere abstraction, there is no discernible necessity for a soul to be connected to it, thus it is something concrete in itself.

It may be, in the reverse direction, that a subject as member of the external world, that is, of a spatio-temporal world, is only possible in connection to an organism, but, like we have to say, [it may be] that still the proper essence of the psychic reality in itself as a *toto coelo* shuts off different things against all physical real and simply makes up an own reality the essence of which is mental process, consciousness with everything belonging to it, but of course this does not include the consciousness relation of other subjects to this subject. If a subject knows of other subjects and their acts, if it knows of the meaning predicates assigned to it from there, still the same do not therefore belong to its own real essence, to its subject reality; They are not real components of it, but rather mere intentional objectivities. Not they themselves belong to the real content of the respective subject, to what it is in itself as a member of the real world, but only the consciousness of them, in the best case intuition of them.

**[133]** Our regional distinctions within the world given in pre-theoretical intuitability (we could also say, within the idea of a surrounding world as such which can be viewed at the example of our factual, intuitive surrounding world) also gain an essential supplement and a further articulation, if we in relation to the subject’s sphere introduce a fundamental difference, namely between **singular subjects** and **subject-groups**, special single persons and personalities of a higher order, social communities. By subject-groups we do not mean mere multitudes, mere pluralities of subjects, but rather unities of a higher level formed by subjects, membered subject-wholes in which the physical bodies of the subjects take part, but in such a way that not they as physical objects determine the connection and the articulation, but rather the subjects exclusively [determine them] being the last members in their singleness. The “connection” thereby is a “mental” one, it is a performance constituting itself in **subject’s acts** through the relation of the subjects to each other, and possibly propagating itself and self-sustaining within the change of deciding and evaluating subjects. They[[55]](#footnote-55) are unities of a mental metabolism, the substances are the subjects as realities.

If we call the subjects as subjects of performing Ego’s acts “**persons**” or “**mental subjects**” then a **subject-association** is an association of subjects as persons, as mental subjects and <it> [the association] is constituted through their continuous mental performance as personal unity of a higher order. The personal associations themselves in a universalized and basic essential sense have the character of a subject and possibly even of a person. In a close or a far-fetched analogy it can itself be spoken of as a subject of **acts**. Already what we call a “**party**” in the common social life, like a tea-party, is more than a plurality of subjects and even more than a plurality of persons; thereby a comprehensive “**social spirit**”, another level of social subjectivity has been constituted albeit only temporarily. Likewise, when we consider a marital union or even any club as a **[134]** community of purpose of manifold kind, further a congregation, a state, a people.

Within such an **association of persons** each single person has its **own life** and the association itself has its **association-life**, a **community life** which is not a mere sum of single lives. Each single person functions therein as a member of the association and as such [it] has its functional predicates apart from its own real predicates. Of course this is an own kind of **meaning predicates**; because everything belonging to the community association [and] constituting unity beyond the single realities of its personal members, that is, [constituting] the association as association, is, according to what I said, performance of personal acts, acts in which the single persons are related to each other and thus bestow signification to each other and possibly in conscious encompassment of all. We can also say: The personal plurality becomes a social unity through a unity of signification, which is not to be bestowed by any external person whosoever, but rather which the members of the community bestow on themselves and on each other reciprocally and on each other as an allness.

I do not need to say that the previously in the first place given examples for meaning predicates of single persons, servants, civil servants, a general, privy councilor, worker, etc. are predicates of a social function. In regard to the acts functioning here as originally bestowing signification, which thus are originally constitutive for all sociality I may already point out that they belong to a distinctive group of Ego’s acts called “**social Ego’s acts**”. These are acts which so to speak do have an address, [and] in which an Ego turns to one or multiple other Ego-subjects, possibly itself included, whereof the variants of the personal pronouns acquire their sense: you, he, we, they, etc. The Ego turns to others with the intention to determine them; this implies that they understand, that they are conscious of their being addressees, they understand the addressing to be an addressing, they grasp him as subject of the respective acts, and the intention belonging to the same is to be **determined** by way of this understanding. Yet this “determination” has the sense which alone is to be acquired from the subject’s sphere, the sense of motivation. Mere suggestions, no matter whether they are intended by the one side **[135]** and even cognized by the other side as suggestive, unintended actions, are not social acts and do not constitute a social connection yet.

As to the essential analogy between single subject and association: it obviously lies within the possibility to speak for both sides analogously of **life**, possibly in the sense of the personality of **acts**. Like a single subject has its private convictions, its private intuitions, valuations, willing, thus an association, e.g. a club, a parliament, a faculty, and the like has its joint convictions, association-intuition, -decisions, -orderings, -orders, -wishes, etc. On both sides these are momentous acts as well as lasting, habitual directions acts. The personal character is completely pronounced where, by the acts of social willing, a unitary habitual **association’s will** constitutes itself.

In parallel with the distinction of the enlarged concepts subject and subject’s acts, and more closely of the concepts personal subject and personal act in **single persons** and **personal socialities**, in single-personal acts and acts of the personal socialities themselves, now a distinction of the **meaning predicates** does emerge. They can constitute themselves through **personal acts** **in the common sense,** and no less through **personal action of socialities**. Socialities as well do carry out “mental performances” in the form of lasting significations, they as well create by way of such performances, whether it be physically, psychically and psychophysically, **objectivities with a signification** from pre-given objectivities, and then [objectivities] **with a social signification**. Each cooperative work is an example of this. Objectivities having predicates with a social signification in this regard point back to a social subjectivity and specifically a personality as the meaning-bestowing subject of a higher order.

Previously we acquired a radical, an essential concept of **reality** and later of **nature**, the [concept] of physical nature. It encompasses all real objects, the essential traits of which manifest themselves in their being *res extensae* and just this, that is, abstracting from all signification. If we understand nature in the sense of the **natural mundane universe**, then this means the **allness** of coexisting extensive realities, and, what I have touched on already, this is, **[136]** because of the essence of extensive reality, not an allness in the collective sense, but rather the collective totality of coexisting physical realities at the same time forms a **combined unity**, a **unity** of reciprocal dependencies. A **world** is not a mere heap.

Further we became acquainted with **subjects** as **realities**. They are unified insofar as they are subjects with bodies, due to the bodies being physical things which find their place within a unified nature, or, what is the same, within a physical world. Yet we met a second unification here in the form of a social community, a specific **mental unification**. Apart from that also communities can be combined to communities of a **higher order**, like the personal unities of the villages and cities within the unity of the state. Other and higher personal unities can be regarded apart from all meaning predicates that can be attributed to them. This then means to regard them as realities. Thereby we see that the moment we exclude signification as such, the subject’s worlds reduce themselves to isolated absolute subjects, the subjects or rather persons in the common sense which then are fated to mental isolation.

By the way it is obvious to posit next to the concept of nature in the pregnant sense of physical reality and physical world an **enlarged concept of nature** which often enough is also in use, [and] whereby **nature** and **reality** coincide. If we for instance ask what is an integral part of the mind’s “nature” we obviously mean the mind as reality, we want to have abstracted from its meaning predicates. Likewise when we speak of the “nature of the state”, etc. But also when we identify **nature and external world** and take as one the allness of all realities, of the physical as well as of the subject-realities, that is, of the proper realities in the absolute sense; we thereby do not take peoples, states, religious associations, etc, as proper realities, but rather we regard them as psychic formations. This concept of nature, encompassing the all of realities, is indispensable, especially in the sense “**natural world**” – we again have there a combined unity, because together with the physical totality of Nature all single subjects are unified as well.

**[137]** We now keep these radically delimited concepts firmly in mind under the title **nature in the narrower and the wider sense**. Or physical and psychophysical nature.

Where the nature is spoken of also the speaking of **culture** is close at hand due to an obvious association of ideas. I also bring to mind the usual juxtaposition of natural science and cultural science.

Through our investigation we now have also gained the radical concept of culture which, like the concept of nature, is essentially related to the now studied idea of a possible mundane universe (of an all of possible external objectivities for an Ego, that is, individual and possibly together existing [objectivities]. Each of these determinations is necessary because the widest concept of objects encompasses objects as well which do not have an individual being, that is, find their place within time according to duration and position. And moreover, not every allness of possible time-objects is compossible).

Let us make clear everything from the bottom up. In a possible mundane universe (the surrounding world of a possible Ego), apart from things, personal subjects can be possible and these personal subjects can relate to each other through reciprocal understanding and through the thereby to be founded act relations which we call **social**. At the same time they necessarily have a **common** surrounding world therefore they necessarily have bodies, and thus are humanlike subjects and have a consciousness in which they apperceive themselves reciprocally and each of them himself as a man of this common surrounding world. Certainly all of this in accordance to the eidetic necessities expressing themselves therein requires more precise ontological analyses. But this may suffice within the current stage of general alignment. This type of a mundane universe with a plurality of Ego-poles taking their place within it shall thus be taken as a basis, then initially it is an all of realities, that is, we find it essentially built of concrete objects as members, each of which has its reality, has its nature. Moreover, the members have changing meaning predicates with relation to subjects which are themselves within the world and have their reality within themselves. Together with the meaning-creating performance of subjects the constitution of subjectivities and personalities of a higher order takes place which, founded within realities, **gain their unity of association through meaning-bestowing [138]**, but in such a way that the association itself is a plurality of personal subjects each of which, like e.g. it is the case with a state’s people, receives its meaning predicates, but not each for itself and disregarding the others, but rather thus that thereby within the reciprocal connection relating the single subjects or groups of single subjects, and again the groups and groups to each other, **all members of the association receive a combining unity form** which is a **unity of meaning performance**, a mental unity in the pregnant sense. Within the hierarchical structure of the association’s forming then the associations themselves now and again assume meaning predicates, they become relative realities with meanings of a higher level. Finally everything leads back to pure and simple realities as (the) lowest substrate of meaning-bestowing.

Yet not all meaning-bestowing acts are social acts, not all meaning predicates of objects, of pure and simple realities or of already social associations are social predicates. The distinctive sign I determine as such is still without any social meaning, even if another one adopts it from me. It would just be a primitive beginning for a social meaning if we agreed upon reciprocally making it a sign for each other, perhaps in such a way that it indicates and shall indicate to the other that I was there, or from him and to me that he was there.

We now form the widest concept of **culture**, in a manner which certainly exceeds what is linguistically common through our thereby taking together all real objectivities singly or in groups containing meaning, possibly synthetically connected by way of meaning performance, that is, all real objectivities which are not mere realities or which are not only regarded as such by us, but rather which are, or insofar as they are **equipped with meaning by subjectivities creating meaning**. It does not make a difference for us whether they are single realities or reality groups, things or subjects having received meaning predicates from any **single** subject functioning in an asocial way, or whether they acquired singly or in common contribution a meaning in the most different possible forms from **socially** functioning subjects.

**[139]** Thus **culture** as such would be the **correlate of performing subjectivity**; specifically all **sociality** is a correlate of performing subjectivity. It is the performance of subject’s acts which unifies it, makes it a sociality; the unity-form is a meaning-form and from the unified subjects it is predicable in the form of meaning predicates of an own type: e.g. citizen, this is a person, socially connected to other persons within the unity-form “state.” Then within this widest <concept> of culture the concept of culture in a narrower sense shows itself as the [concept] of **social culture**. It thus reaches so far as social acts are constitutive for meaning-bestowing of objects. But where meaning-bestowing is provided by subjects functioning in an asocial way, may they be social functionaries in another respect, there the respective meaning-containing things or persons are cultural objects indeed in our widest sense, but they are asocial. There would belong all the meanings which a subject being excluded from all sociality like a Robinson creates in its surrounding world, and then finds at its objects. This abstraction indicates at the same time what asocial spheres remain for a subject functioning in an asocial manner, whereby of course it is not excluded that the concept of the asocial relativizes itself, namely insofar as certain meaning-bestowing of the social kind are created which, like the juridical-legal, encompass **all** spheres of life in a positive or a negative way, and which are simply not always apperceived.

In the previous juxtaposition we have on the one side nature as the world of mere realities, as the **meaninglessly** considered world, as the world which is regarded irrespective of any meaning. On the other side the **meaningful** world, the world in its meaning bestowed by single subjectivity or community-subjectivity or even to be bestowed by a possible subjectivity, that is, regarded in this meaning, for the sake of its kind. The juxtaposition of **Nature** and **Mind** says nothing else if we consider in the last respect especially the “**Geisteswissenschaften**” [humanities] and the sense which the word “**Geist**” [mind] there alone has and can alone have. If we speak of **culture** then we have in view the **products** of a subjectivity which bestows meaning **[140]**, sublimates through meaning-performances and also mentally combines. Of course the clearing up of a cultural product requires the transition to the personal subjectivity as a meaning-performing [subjectivity]. Inversely when speaking of the **mind** this member of correlation takes the first and stressed place. Since mainly this was the prevailing intention of the discourse of mind so much loved by the German idealism and our classics, to consider the subjectivity with respect to this active performance, that is, both the single person and above all the community which we longed to grasp indicating it as mental meaning performance, cultural performance. Whereas the **pre-Kantian** naturalism had mainly or one-sidedly only realities in view, and also with regard to the subjectivity had only reality in view, or [whereas] it blurred all consideration of mental things by supposing to be able to treat it with regard to the reality consideration, the one-sided interest of the **post-Kantian** epoch, essentially an epoch of the mind, aimed at the subjectivity only insofar as it is a mentally performing subjectivity, and thereby at a world as a world of mental sense and according to all its mental shapings.

Thus considered it is a **verbal controversy** whether the true distinction was nature and culture or nature and mind. But what is decisive here, the working out of the radical ontological and phenomenological distinctions to which the terminology must be related and to which continuously has to be appealed in a scientific way, was completely lacking.[[56]](#footnote-56)

I said beforehand that our distinctions relate to the **world**, to the realm of **pre-given** individual being. At the beginning we had excluded all science to gain a pre-scientific world. But we still had left open various performances, meaning predicates with which the respective subject finds its surrounding world to be clothed. But obviously also the theoretical layers belong to the meaning layers, and all theoretical performances of men are meaning products as well as any others. Insofar as they are already there **[141]**, pre-given to the subject in its surrounding world, like for instance different sciences [are pre-given] to us, they themselves simply belong to the world, which with regard to them is pre-theoretical for the subject, insofar as they themselves are theoretical indeed, but are not themselves themes for scientific research. The suspension of the theoretical did aim and could not aim at anything else than at the initial exclusion of the difficulty which consists of the sciences making on the one hand **any** fields theoretically cognized, and on the other hand as mental products being themselves again pre-theoretical, namely belonging to the realm of a completely different science as **themes**, as objects to be explored, namely [belonging] <to> the science of the mental shapings as such.

Thus this is the state of affairs: anytime within the surrounding world given to us and to each possible subject we have a hierarchical system in the most complete and widest sense of a world of pre-givennesses. For each possible subject the surrounding world is something ever new shaping itself according to the ideal possibility, taking on ever new content through mental performance of the subject. The ideally lowest level thereby is mere nature which is a structure continually running throughout, also within the mentally shaped world. On top of that, according to kind and direction of the intellectuality’s constitution respectively, manifold layers build themselves; especially sciences can also thereby emerge which, as far as they are formed and are accessible pre-givennesses for the respective subjects, now belong to the surrounding world as well, and thus constitute in a possible surrounding world as such an essentially peculiar layer.

Therefore we now have the most complete universal conception of the **idea** of a possible surrounding world as such as correlate of a subject as such, that is, according to all its possible abilities: On the one hand it is the subject of possible sensuous apperceptions in a passive manner, i.e. of such which without partaking of mental performance gain their sense-content. Put in other words, it is the subject of mere nature. And on the other hand it is a mental subject, subject of possible mental performances, thus subject of a mentally significant world.

And now, because of this insight within the structure of a surrounding world as such we can raise[[57]](#footnote-57) the question of possible **[142]** sciences being able to relate to the givennesses of possible surrounding worlds. The mental performance we call theory, science, has a universality which according to ideal possibility encompasses all belonging to the surrounding world, but also all mental performance, also the mental performance “theory and science” itself, since each mental objectivity can become a substrate of mental theoretical performances, can be included in theoretical themes. Thus the question is, what, regarding the type of scientific performance, emerges through the consideration of the structural articulation of the world, that is, which possible sciences are to be separated.

Of course for now the group of the natural sciences emerges, the science of the mere realities as *ex definitione* meaningless or with abstraction of all meaning considered extramundane objects which, according to the previously demonstrated, form a concrete world in themselves. Here, again not randomly but rather due to essential reasons, the science of nature in the narrower sense of physical nature takes the first place.

A possible Ego, with insight cognizing an optional, supposed to be actual world necessarily in the first place is an [Ego] initially intuiting the world, and then theoretically determining it. It belongs to the results of the formal phenomenology that thinking with insight is not possible without intuition, what you by the way will readily concede and what we already used earlier. And something similar we further more use continuously. If we thus understand this Ego initially as an Ego intuiting the world (i.e. the supposed to be actual [world]) in perfection which means, the world shows itself in mere experience, while we fantasy that it still abstains from every theoretical performance of thinking. Then this Ego finds the world within the structures we ascertained, nature – mind, with insight, like we did it: we ourselves thereby were in function of this Ego. Then the **phenomenological or transcendental task** would be to study reflectively the consciousness itself which originally shows this world according to its set of types. **[143]** But this world’s set of types is built from the bottom up.

Obviously it is necessary to follow this structure which has its inner order of founding, and thus to commence on the lowest level and then to proceed upwards, since of course the higher the levels the more complicated the originally giving consciousness will be. For instance the consciousness of mental performances of course presupposes the consciousness in which realities show themselves originally.

#### §2. The fundamental sorts of possible sciences according to the articulation as comprising Nature and Mind

The considerations we concluded in the last lecture resulted in an articulation and stratification of the idea of a possible surrounding world acquired from the phenomenological sources which for any Ego can be pre-given. In relation to the Ego it is an external, transcendent world, although the Ego itself ranges itself within this world insofar as it ranges itself into the self-apperception we all perform as men within the world. Originally we wanted only to grasp and articulate the pre-theoretical surrounding world. But now we see that this limitation is not necessary and must not be kept; because each theorization relating to pre-given objectivities which belong to the surrounding world is in itself a mental or cultural performance, and the first suspension of these performances only had the function, while constantly using scientific apperceptions, to initially clear the way to the intuitive objectivities prior to the science. But also there we first had to abstract from manifold other formations of spontaneous activity and corresponding meaning layers to clear the way to the core of all mental formations, to what we called reality, and thereby to gain the pure contrast between nature and exactly this mental formation designated as culture and mind.

Furthermore it is regarded as imperative to keep away a confusion which arises easily from the sciences emerging in the complete surrounding world **[144]** as mental formations, whereas they themselves, as soon as we go to the question as to what basic types of sciences *idealiter* are predelineated, through the radical structure of a possible surrounding world as such elaborated by us, among others appear as objectivities belonging to a surrounding world, thus they shall be destined to become themes for sciences. This peculiar double position of the sciences is an important philosophical theme. Sciences with all their theoretical objectivities shall have their position within the surrounding world as pieces of content of culture and history. On the other hand they intend to provide system theoretical truths determining the true being of the world, and along with it the cultural world, and thereby again the sciences themselves as cultural formation. This is something we still have to discuss.

Now we begin with a new step of our investigation, namely: The correlation “an Ego related to a surrounding world external to it” designates a scheme for manifold primitive or more complicated types which by the way can also be regarded as stages of development from the point of view of development. We can now survey these possibilities and we also could construct them gradually. We will content ourselves with the predelineated radical articulation and ask ourselves, **which fundamental sorts of sciences** are predelineated in relation to this articulation of the surrounding world?

The question can be understood in two ways according to the doubly possible attitude we can adopt. First the **ontological attitude**. We accept the possibility of a natural and mentally shaped world with all structures *a priori* included therein, we take as our basis these possibilities given in an eidetic way. The question then is: Which possible sciences and initially possible sciences of matters of fact belong to every such possible world? And likewise: Which apriori or “eidetic” sciences belong to the eidos of a possible world as such, or rather, to each specifically apriori type of possible world? Thus first: Each individual single possibility of a world can hypothetically be posited as actuality, as fact. Then sciences of matters of fact would correspond to it which treat in single facts and factual laws what de facto belongs to this world.

**[145]** But insofar as the world posited as fact actualizes **only one** possibility amongst an infinity of other possibilities, and as this infinity stands under the eidetic laws, laws stating what belongs to the general essence of a world as such, that is, to each *a priori* possible world, for each world to be preferred as fact there are two kinds of truths: **eidetic truth** (**Leibniz** would say: rational truths) and **matter-of-fact truths** (or empirical). Each rational truth leaves open an indeterminate range for possible factualnesses. A possible material nature of the type which our world realizes for instance can never violate the Apriori of geometry, since spatiality belongs to its essential form, and yet geometry alone can never determine a fact. Therefore the empirical is needed as well as the empirical method, and it ascertains the single factual thing and the universal non-apriori rules of the facts. But anyway it is the task of purely apriori consideration to shape for **every** such type (a difference of the pure genus world) the types of corresponding empirical and apriori disciplines.

If this task of apriori ontology is formulated with this determination and accepted, then it is clear that we already have base lines to approach their solution to a certain degree. We are in possession of an essentially already articulated type of a possible world as such, we have the articulation or essential stratification into **Nature** and **Mind** (or, if you like, culture). On the part of **nature** which here is understood in the wider sense, we have the distinction of **physical nature** and **psychic nature**, whereby the latter title encompasses all subjects as mere realities. Insofar as we see in advance that the psychic nature cannot emerge in an isolated way, but only combined with physical bodiliness, and that thus only an increment to physical nature is possible, we have necessarily something psychic as layer of psycho-physical double realities. In advance this thus results in possible sciences, empirical and apriori ones.

First A) natural sciences. 1) The word in the common sense means sciences of matters-of-fact, or, what is the same, only **[146]** named after the *a priori* thereby required method of cognition, empirical natural sciences. Of those we would have a) empirical sciences of the physical nature as empirical physics in an enlarged sense of the word, b) empirical sciences of the psychic and psychophysical nature. 2) On the other hand we would also have in advance apriori sciences as necessary requirements, sciences which analyze in disciplines the eidetic essence of physical, psychic and psychophysical nature according to apriori principles (axioms) and [according to] all consequences included therein in a theoretical-deductive way, like, at least in the direction of the spatial and temporal form of nature, geometry and the pure theory of time and motion do. Of course the fundamental concepts of the apriori sciences are taken over for the respective empirical sciences and form in these the continuous, indispensable framework, they express the universal essential form of the empirical field, whether the empiricist is aware of this or not; a note which of course is not only valid for the sphere of physical nature.

B) Then the title “culture” would come into question, the subjectivity as mind, as carrying on mental performances, and mental performance itself, as objective formation and according to all its possible shapings. <1)> Again thereby a horizon of types of possible empirical humanities opens up as a requirement, based on the to be designed specific set of types of possible intellectuality according to personalities and personal formations. And second, again of course the requirement of apriori humanities which again explicate the respective Apriori in disciplines, that is, everything without which mental subjectivity and mental formation cannot be conceived of, and that thus marks the apriori frame which necessarily encompasses all human scientific empirical, or, what means the same, which designates a system of norms to which all empirical science has to be submitted.

This frame designed in advance is of course of great value for the completely conscious use of the sciences which have been cognized as necessary. The highest scientific goal-setting always points back to an Apriori. Highest goal-settings are those destined **[147]** to light the path for all scientific endeavor and to breath the mind of the highest rationality into it, <and they> can only be won in apriori cognition and actually they have to be won, if cognition shall not remain something contingent, limited and contentually incomplete, but rather shall correspond to the ideal cognition.

Nevertheless, however valuable the first attempt may be, it does not suffice. Initially we complete what we saw previously by way of transition from the objective ontological attitude to the **phenomenological attitude**, the focusing on the transcendentally pure subjectivity. Then all possible worlds and types of worlds change into “phenomena”; they, not only the actual but also the possible worlds, resort to the phenomenological parenthesizing. What remains is nothing else but the realm of possibilities of a pure Ego and Ego’s consciousness, and thereby of all such structures of consciousness, nexi of consciousness, in which such possibilities were to constitute themselves as accepted unities. This results in the task of the eidetic doctrine or of the eidetic of the pure consciousness, and more specifically of the originally constituting consciousness, i.e. of that consciousness in which possible objectivities, possible worlds **show** themselves as “truly being” entities, and thereby constitute the frame of pure subjectivity. In the sense of what we said in advance, our doctrine of the transcendental clues then the outlined ontologies, although they already have the index of the parenthesizing, function according to their fundamental concepts as clues for the phenomenological investigation and specifically for the possible worlds of constitutive phenomenologies.

Here of course we abstract from the formally most universal and to be presupposed as already performed phenomenological investigations having their transcendental clue within the formal logic and the residual *mathesis universalis*, investigations thus, which relate to the formally universal of each objectivity’s constitution **as such** as objectivity of possible cognition as such, but which are immune against the regional particularities distinguishing the objectivities of a possible world as such and more closely as physical nature, etc. Exactly this is what interests us now. If we asked what is to be done for this purpose we had to consider the following. The **[148]** idea of a possible world is related to a possible Ego as the noematic correlate of which, more precisely as the rational correlate of which it constitutes itself. “It is a possible world” means it is harmoniously imaginable, perceivable in possible, reciprocally confirming perceptions, to be shown in possible showings, theoretically to be determined in possible cogitative acts according to their true being; thus we are referred to a possible subject of such intentional mental processes and complex of mental processes.

We can grasp the results of the last lecture thus: We form the idea of a cognizing Ego, of an Ego, which, guided by purely theoretical interests, proceeds from cognition to cognition on all possible levels, and towards all possible directions. It is then the subject of all possible sciences. We thereby take cognition in the pregnant sense of theoretical ration, that is, related to acts in which the Ego in evidence ascertains a true being so that therefore sciences as well are “genuine”, i.e. valid sciences, [and] that their principles, doctrines, theories are not mere suppositions, but rather discernible truths. If the cognizing Ego is related to a pre-given external world, like it is the case for us and our present experiential world, then the *a priori* to be designed regional articulation of the pre-given world *eo ipso* results in the de facto articulation of all possible sciences, which such a cognizing subject is able to develop in relation to its world. Thereby we have the basis of a classification of the sciences gained from philosophical principles – I bring to mind the titles “natural sciences” and “humanities” – and for the natural sciences the articulation in physics in the enlarged sense, psychology and psychophysics, whereas for the humanities further de facto articulations would have to be searched for first of all.

The classification does not belong to us human beings and to this world as if it was bound to this fact, it belongs *a priori* to the idea of a cognizing Ego as such, related to an external surrounding world as such. It completes itself when we remind ourselves that there cannot be only regional, materially bound sciences, but that rather a cognizing Ego as such must also **[149]** possess formal logic and formal *mathesis* as such. If truths, nay, whole sciences belong to the idea of an “object as such”, irrespective of its [the object’s] regional determination, then a cognizing subject is not conceivable which cognizes objects without being conceived of as (a) cognizing subject of these formal sciences. Thereby the most universal classification of the sciences supplements itself with the part of the formal *mathesis universalis* including all its single disciplines: formal logic, formal analysis, theory of multiplicities, etc.

Furthermore there is the system of the phenomenological disciplines, of the disciplines of the pure consciousness as such; each cognizing subject can as such practice phenomenological reduction, it can only have given and conceived of objects in certain acts which *a priori* correspond to these [objects] according to form and content, and, more closely, acts which constitute insights, the true being. The eidetic study of all these acts and their essential connections is a necessary task for each cognizing subject if, like we do it, it is conceived of <as> directed towards (the) greatest possible fulfillment of its theoretical interest. Thus the **same** acts it brings into play to establish ontological disciplines, formal and regional ones, within the reflection, but in eidetic universality, it makes a theme of a new scientific group, that of the phenomenology and more closely the phenomenology of the cognition. More specifically still the task of the **constitutive** phenomenologies emerges, i.e. of those disciplines which study with the clue of the ontology the consciousness being constitutive for truly being objectivity of any possible sort, and [which] thereby make all relations of being and consciousness definitely and on all levels of concretion clear. Therefore the de facto most universal classification of possible sciences has acquired a new fundamental part and at the same time its concluding part. **[150]**

#### §3. Baseline of an ontology and phenomenology of the physical nature

We are now especially interested in the ontologies and phenomenologies corresponding to the regional articulations of an external world. The transcendental task to study, following the predelineated set of types within the articulation of a world, [and] according to its essence the consciousness which constitutes it [the world] in the manner of cognition, is only to be tackled in a certain progress. The world has its apriori hierarchical structure, and obviously it is necessary within the phenomenologically constitutive investigation to follow this structure on the ontic side, that is, to begin with the first level and then follow the built-up layers. Of course the originally giving consciousness of a **founded** objectivity is more complex than that of a **founding** one. Of course for instance, each cultural formation arising from mere natural objectivities through significational spiritualization already presupposes, in order to be given in the manner of cognition, the cognitional givenness, and thus ultimately the experience of nature as a lower level of consciousness. But the lower level at all events is the [level] of the physical nature; since psychic subjects regarded as nature, like the closer ontological investigation demonstrates, are *a priori* only possible in a build-up on a physical bodiliness.

Thus it is certain that the transcendental phenomenological investigation has to commence with the physical nature, that the constitutive phenomenology of the nature relating to it must be the first of the transcendental constitutive phenomenologies. But we are already on this lower level, on this de facto most simple [level], in a difficult position. If we had a complete ontology of the physical nature, a science which explicates terminologically what is necessarily implied within the apriori essence of a physical nature as such, then we would have the fundamental concepts and principles as transcendental clues for our investigation. Yet, although we do have whole disciplines like pure geometry and pure theory of motion belonging to the content of a physical nature’s ontology, our desiderate thereby is not even partially fulfilled. The ontologist, i.e. the researcher who in eidetic thinking is turned towards objects, **[151]** normally is not interested in exhibiting the absolutely primitive concepts and the corresponding principles. As a rule he contents himself with an insight that ascertains the security of his starting points to endeavor from there upwards to deductive consequences. But the phenomenologist has to distinguish. He has to commence with the complete concretion of the exemplary pre-givennesses and work out the **pure** eidos with its pure structures. Everything which intellectually seen in a mediate way must be suspended, since the phenomenology of the mediacies is an own theme. And within the immediate he has to keep distant **everything** that is accidental, blurring the purity of the eidos, otherwise blurring wrong opinions are inserted into the transcendental consideration. None of the previous apriori disciplines with regard to the foundations is thus deeply grounded as would be needed for our purpose. All one-sided abstraction must initially be prevented; the abstraction for example, creating the mere space and the mere spatial formation can only then be accepted when the whole concrete physical thing and physical thing-connection is brought to universal intuition, and when then the abstract views within the universal eidos the spatial shape as a moment essentially connected to the other abstract moments and thus is understood in its function for the concrete whole.

The first task thus is this **primal ontological** one. We can also designate it as a task of a pure and original description of the idea of a physical world as such, that is, as a world of mere experience. In complete intuitability a physical world is made objective, viewed prior to all theory, and now the description of the essence is performed as the first of all theorizations; all constituents of the essence, all simply necessary real pieces of content within the essence of a physical nature as such are singled out and expressed in pure concepts accommodating themselves in a completely true way.

Obviously this is an enlargement of the common concept of description, but an enlargement following a pure tendency inherent in it [the concept]. We perform a pure description of a thing experienced in perception or memory, or of a thing in fantasy hovering before us **[152]** when we explicate the individually intuitive essential content of the given, that is, [when we] purely express in concepts and state what we find by intuiting, what immediately is given along in contrast to everything we contribute to the object due to a thinking which reaches beyond the itself-given and relates, induces or deduces. Thus we transfer the concept of description only from the field of sensuous intuition and the empirical into the [field] of eidetic intuition.

If this description of the eidos “physical world” is performed, that is, the necessary structure of a physical world is carried on in originally acquired adequate concepts [and] according to possible things and thing-connections, all-encompassing forms, etc., then we have to approach the parallel phenomenological task. The same shapings of consciousness we have to live mentally within ourselves in order to be able to carry out such an intuitively eidetic description, namely of such a kind in which the eidos “physical world” with all its essential components comes to completely evident givenness, shall now become themselves themes of a scientific and an eidetic description, of the **phenomenological** description. That which in the ontological attitude is one constitutes itself within essential multiplicities of the cognizing consciousness, and what is demanded here is not simple reflection, but rather a grasping and analysis of highly complex multiplicities of consciousness. Thereby for the phenomenological theme “physical nature” both great parts of a transcendental aesthetics are exactly characterized, that is, of the transcendental aesthetics in the complete, indispensable sense. Of course this determination of the problem is accepted like for the physical nature thus for **all** regional articulations of the surrounding world, we have a transcendental aesthetics for each. Yet on closer consideration, which we are not yet competent to perform, it is shown that there are still layers to regard that make a necessary, closer concept of transcendental aesthetics come to the fore, running parallel with the closer concept which goes hand in hand with the wider concepts of perception and of intuition as such.

**[153]** But[[58]](#footnote-58) now there emerge difficult problems, extending in different directions. First they concern the last clarification of the regional shaping of concepts and the question whether the region we have gained as representative of a world as such, is the only possible region. This will become clearer as follows: We find as belonging to the given region like it is acquired from the example of our de facto physical world, the **Euclidean** space, a regional form which geometry describes and theoretically pursues in a deductive way. But the physical world falls under a universal title of the formal *mathesis*, called “**definite multiplicity**”, and under this title endlessly many equal possibilities stand within the formal *mathesis* next to the **Euclidean** multiplicity of three dimensions as the mathematical form of the **Euclidean** space, i.e. of the space as such, the **Euclidean** multiplicity of n dimensions, and these all themselves are only a limiting case of the multiplicities of continually changing measure of bending, etc. One would like to say now: If we had as exemplary starting point for the regional generalization in which we gain the eidos “physical world” and “space of the world” instead of our de facto external mental process a mental process of another, for us inaccessible type then we would acquire another and ever again another upper region for world and space. It would be analogous to the following case: If we only had lived mentally sensuous data like red and blue, etc., but never tone or another quality of that kind, then we would with the example of given color data receive color as (the) highest region. We would easily believe there could not be other sensuous data. We simply would not have been given exemplary a coordinated material genre, we thus would not have a higher regional concept although it indeed is a possible [concept]. The logic, or rather the formal **[154]** *mathesis,* predelineates formal possibilities without guaranteeing that material genres fill them in. It thus also leaves open worlds of another sort, each for the exemplary bound a highest region, whereas the exemplary binding also makes this region inaccessible for him who does not have examples of other regions. Thereby the central problem of the non-**Euclidean** multiplicity or rather the multiplicities of other kinds of spaces is designated and at the same time universalized. As transcendental problem it concerns the ultimate clarification of the induction which constitutes the pure idea of a world in every region as well as of the limits of its claim to universality.

During last lecture’s development of problems we came across the following problem. If we take our experiential world as the example with the help of which we practice regional generalization, then we arrive at a material idea of a possible world as such which encompasses the theme of all **material ontologies** universally accessible for us. If we stick to the spatial form belonging to this most universal idea of a possible world, then it is the **Euclidean** space of geometry. The legitimate sense of the necessity of the space is no other than that no change of the world is conceivable which would change the space somehow, and it would remain always and necessarily a **Euclidean** space. Formally regarded in a logical-mathematical way the world is a connected unity of manifold objectivities – a multiplicity in the sense of the theory of multiplicities, and more closely a so-called definite multiplicity. But within this genre there is an infinity of multiplicities shaped in a different way, **Euclidean** and non-**Euclidean**, which can be described in mathematical exactitude as formal mathematical-logical possibilities.

One would like to say now: **For us** the starting point for the gaining of the eidos “world as such” and of a “mundane universe as such” is the given nature of the de facto experience. Would it not be possible that an Ego would have an experience of a totally different kind of type, an external apperception in which a completely different kind of nature, inconceivable for us, would experientially be given to this Ego in such a manner that <it> by continually starting out from this de facto experienced nature as example would shape a completely different regional idea of a nature as such, with not a three-dimensional, **[155]** but e.g. a five-dimensional space-like world-form? We can also illustrate this with the following example. Someone who is born deaf does not possess the conception of sound. If we conceive of a being not knowing any sound and likewise [not knowing] any scents, tastes, etc. since it never had any corresponding experiences and fantasies at its disposal and exclusively [had] colors. Then the color as such for this being would be the only, and at the same time highest, genre for sensuous data. But we, having through sensuous intuition many such genres, also have a higher regional concept “sensuous Datum” as such, and we have to leave open that despite of that still other coordinated genres within this region are closed for us. The formal logic and *mathesis* predelinetaes without contradiction possibilities of world-forms, not as materially given possibilities though, but only as forms the material fulfillment of which presupposes a corresponding actual intuition. It thus leaves **open**, one would like to say, that there are worlds of another sort and world-regions of which we cannot have any intuition, [and] which thus for us are empty possibilities. Maybe indeed this is completely right. However, thereby the central problem of the **Euclidean** and non-**Euclidean** worlds and space-forms, or rather the [problem] of the possibility that a world, although certainly not in our experience an intuitable world, has another sort of form, a space-like form, is stated and at the same time universalized. It also encompasses the question of the possibility whether our type of experience itself could be thought of as changeable, in correlation with intuitively not to be realized possible worlds. Is it true that within the type of our empirical apperception the possibility is predelineated that the experiences within the unity of the continuous world-experiencing consciousness would run thus, that the whole type of experience would become another and that we afterwards, instead of a **Euclidean** physicalness moreover would have to find a non-**Euclidean** [physicalness] as a noematically constituted correlate? Such questions can only be answered by way of an ultimate clarification of the performance of the regional and of the formal mathematical and of the analogizing universalization and together with that of the range of the evidences reaching beyond the actually intuitive exemplification, that is, concerning possibilities which, whether they are purely formal, or through analogizing **[156]** at the same time they transcend the intuitive sphere with the intuitively proven.

But still another, more accessible direction of a problem comes into question. (If the physical nature is our transcendental theme, then in the following sense: Posited, a physical nature actually existed, what is the corresponding cognition, up to possible natural scientific cognition essentially like, and how, from the side of phenomenologically pure cognitional consciousness, are as correlate of this cognition all questions concerning the senses put to nature to be answered?)

If we consider transcendental questions for mere physical nature then it is at the same time thought of as a **possible substratum for psychic beings living in it**, among them possibly cognizing subjects, as cognizing scientific men of variably high critique of reason cognizing exactly this nature and the whole world. Prior to all transcendental philosophy there is the **fact** that many subjects cognize the same given world and initially physical nature, and in the form that they are bodily gifted subjects and thereby have their place and position in the physical context of nature. But there multiple problems arise: Posited, one or multiple subjects are related to the same existing nature as its cognizing subjects, do they have to take their place in this same nature then in the manner of psychophysical subjects belonging to it? Universally speaking: What are the conditions for the possibility of a cognitional relation of one or multiple subjects to the same physical nature? Furthermore, if a cognizing subject cognizes **one** nature as truly being, is another cognizing subject able to cognize another nature as truly being? Correlatively one should be able to say that two different natures can exist at the same time.

If we go back to the **fact** of our given world then I can cognize a thing as truly being, someone else [can cognize] another thing [as truly being]. But then the ideal possibility is guaranteed (although the empirical conditions therefore need not be realized) that everyone cognizes each thing of the world, i.e. comes to his thing by walking through the space, and <I> experience it and then make it more completely cognized and he *vice versa*.

**[157]** Likewise thus for the whole world, it is for everyone the same and, fundamentally spoken, within his possible cognition field. Maybe this is due to our belonging to this same world as psychophysical beings and our looking into it at the same time and cognizing into it by way of our bodily organs of sensation viewing, hearing, etc. Thus also the objectivity of the scientific cognition seems to be guaranteed as inter-subjectively accepted. My scientific physical truths are the same like those of anyone else, and since the conditions for reciprocal mental association are fulfilled, we can convince ourselves of it.

But how, if we tried to assume there were still subjects external to our world, subjects having no bodies and organs of sensation **within it**? Nay, if we even tried to assume there might be subjects being able to cognize a world while being bodiless subjects altogether? But, even posited they were psychophysical subjects and **should** be such. Is it possible that multiple such subjects exist, that each cognizes into a world but in such a way that the different subjects or different groups of subjects cognize into **separate** worlds and fundamentally have to cognize into [them] because due to apriori reasons they can only cognize into those worlds their bodies belong to? Thereby one has to keep in mind the previously said: **For us**, nature as such is a region, namely in the sense of an eidos gained through regional generalization using the example of our experienced nature or quasi-experienced nature. If we consider the possible de facto natures subsumed under this eidos then it may be that we *a priori* can have the insight (like we can indeed), that within the infinite multiplicity of these possibilities respectively just one can be actualized, that there can be just one space, just one natural time, just one world of physical things – but *notabene* just one of this regional eidos. But it could possibly be that still other species of nature yet unknown exist, gained by cognizing subjects of an experiential type differing from our [type of experience] the highest generalization of which results in another pure eidos “nature”. This would signify that our eidos “nature” is a highest genre only for us, that it moreover and in itself is merely a species of a higher region inaccessible for our generalization. Certainly then **[158]** the highest region for us would exist only as possibility of the formal *mathesis* without material matter to be provided by us. But however, **if** this is a possibility, could it then not well be that worlds of these different species would exist at the same time in such a way that to each [world] cognizing subjects would correspond which only singly would be given the world of the one species, to which their kind of experience is accommodated, which in their kind of experience is constituted **for them**? Then we would have separate worlds, each in its coexistence relative to separate subjects belonging to it.

But now we have to take into account as being essential for the realization or rejection of such a considered possibility that *a priori* the possibility that multiple variable objects do exist necessarily includes the possibility of a subject with insight cognizing all these objects in a coherent cognitional consciousness. Thus an Ego must be possible which cognizes in a cognition all those worlds and all those subjects cognizing them. This therefore leads to the **universal problem** of those apriori conditions for the possibility of the coexistence of a multiplicity of subjects which are predelineated within the possibility of their collective cognition through a possible subject.

Thus with relation to this universal problem also the problem of the compossibility as possible coexistence of multiple physical worlds and then universal multiple worlds as such is a double one: first [it is a problem of] the compossibility of multiple individual particularities of the intuitive-material eidos “nature as such” which we can designate as (the) idea “our nature”; second as compossibility of individual particularities, selected from different specific ideas within the formal region “natural multiplicity” of which our nature would be only a species. The first problem is to be regarded as solved. There is an infinity of possible particularities of our nature’s eidos, to each belongs a particular possible natural science (understood as total combination of matter-of-fact truths, including natural laws). But just a single of these possibilities can be an assertoric actuality and does exclude the con-actualization for all other possibilities. Hence there can be just one natural science with assertoric validity. All other [natural sciences] are empty possibilities belonging to free fiction. **[159]** But the other problem remains unsolved. It is like all problems worked out here by us an exactly formulated and correspondingly rational and necessary [problem]. As you see, all these problems touch on formal ontology. Since, as soon as we leave the ground of material intuition and consider possibilities of subjects and worlds **not** originating from our exemplary **intuition,** which in itself does not guarantee that it is the only one possible, we move within a formal, in the widest sense, mathematical sphere.

Yet I want to remark here that the formal *mathesis*, in the way it is presently developed in the shape of formal logic and above all [in the shape of] formal analysis and theory of multiplicities, cannot satisfy such problems. Indeed it [the formal mathesis] remains within a formal universality designated through its fundamental category “object as such”, of which all other categories are apriori changes, like e.g. property, relation, whole, part, multiplicity, number, etc. Of course a “world” and a “thing” within a world and subjects are also subsumed under the formal title “object”, but they are individuals. But object as such, this comprehends all and everything that can be a predicative subject of predicates, therefore [it] also [comprehends] ideal objects like genres, sorts, specific differences. The color species form a “color body”, i.e. a multiplicity in mathematical sense, likewise the sound species, etc. They are not individuals. Therefore the formal-mathematical theory of multiplicities treats, up to [the] theory of **Euclidean** and non-**Euclidean** multiplicities, being by the way by far not the highest and ultimate ones, forms of standardization of an infinity of sets by way of formal regularities of the relational complex, of the relation, of the connection, irrespective of the question whether the singular singlenesses are **individuals** or not. Yet there is, as I have cognized years ago, a formal *mathesis* of the individuality which should treat the formal Apriori of the individuality as individuality and with the help of the formal ontology of objectivity as such the formal Apriori of possible worlds as worlds, as an infinity of not self-contained multiplicities of individuals. And this formal ontology of the individuals is completely lacking. To this [formal ontology] also belong the formal questions relating to the possibilities **[160]** and necessities of the integration of Ego-subjects into worlds and as by them to be cognized and further to be valued and to be treated worlds, the integration in the form of existing individuals.

The highly important set of problems which marked our last lecture arises from the world-concept which is gained from intuition, the expression of an eidos which is pure but bound by the material essential content, being accessible for a formal-mathematical universalization, thus the space of the world to the **Euclidean** multiplicity, which is mathematically to be universalized into a definite multiplicity, called mathematical space as such, under which an infinity of species of particularities is subsumed (like[[59]](#footnote-59) it is *a priori* accepted for each contentually determined concept of objectivity. The intuitive space explicates itself ontologically within geometry, an apriori discipline bound to material, only from sensuous intuition to be gained beings. But the intuitive space has a mathematical form, the [form] of **Euclidean** multiplicity of three dimensions which is acquired when all intuitive is suspended in a similar way, like if one hypothesizes the formal idea of a set of objects as such in undetermined optionalness to a set of spheres, or the formal idea of an optional, numerically to be divisible and determinable Something as such to the idea of a quantity, like now the space after the formal mathematization towards the multiplicity enters an infinity of other possible multiplicities, and thus the eidos or the concept “nature” [enters] an infinity of formal concepts, encompassed by the formal idea of a nature as such expressing a **formal** community of essence. From there emerge great tasks, on the one hand to mathematically determine the form-type of multiplicities representing the highest genre under which the form of the intuitive nature as a lowest formal difference is subsumed, and likewise to construct with respect to the spatiality of the intuitive nature the highest formal genre of spatial multiplicity from which the intiuitve **[161]** space is just a formal difference. On the other hand) arise from the relation of intuitive eidos and mathematical form the problems of possible, for us **not intuitive, worlds and spaces** that have to be solved to prevent our blundering into false metaphysics and overestimating the range of the apriori ontology of nature.

Certainly the intuitive-material Apriori-as-Apriori is unconditionally accepted, thus e.g. the [Apriori] of geometry, <of the> pure theory of time and motion. But if other empirical apperceptions *idealiter* are possible and accordingly other worlds with other constitutive determinations and forms analogous to space and time, then to each type of world another apriori geometry belongs as system of unconditional necessities of coexistence.

If these prospects in wide horizons of investigations **connecting** **material** and **formal** ontology have admonished us to exercise foresight and prevented the tendency to overstretch the extension of ontology and phenomenology of “our” nature, then we approach this field in a materially more determined way, from the exemplary intuition of acquired cognition.

<For> us it is the lowest layer of the intuitive world-eidos, the layer of physical nature. What we need, according to the previously said, is the essential description of this layer in the form of essential concepts and axioms, acquired originally in an intuitional way. What is included therein analytically-logically, an endless host of laws governing the mediate essential formations, this the scientific theory within the apriori natural science investigates, [within] the apriori ontology of nature, in endless deductions. Thereby a universal frame of laws is predelinetaed to which like any possible nature, thus the individually given nature as fact of the experience is connected. The empirical natural science as a concrete one, continually using in a methodical way the Apriori of this ontology marks the theoretically determined and scientifically explicated idea of the individual nature within this universal frame. (By way of experience and induction it determines among the ideally possible natures the ones which are all left undetermined within the formal ontology but are included in their pure universality, the one which is the individually actual one.)

**[162]** If we now look at the disciplines of physical ontology as far as they have been developed yet, geometry, pure theory of time, theory of motion, the parts of apriori mechanics then it becomes apparent that not the whole content of the intuitive physical nature enters them, but rather that they everywhere only grasp in a certain sense an empty form of nature. Certainly it is not a merely logical-mathematical form in the sense of the *mathesis universalis*. It is an intuitionally connected mathematical form. A physical thing of possible experience is *res extensa* and *temporalis*. It is extended within space and lasting within time. The space and time of nature are intuitive mathematical forms to be grasped in their essence only from intuition of the physical. Shape, position, motion, change of shape, those are intuitive and yet in a certain sense formal determinations. Formal, since they and all determinations of their type point to a changeable **filledness** constantly co-given in the concretion of intuitive givennesses: for instance we find things of the actual experience or of the free inventive fantasy visually qualified. The shaped extension of the thing, its geometrical body so to speak, is never a merely geometrical body but rather presents itself visually as colored, the color spreads over the shape whether it is a colorful shade or a not colorful [shade], a colorless gray, black, white. Likewise we find things to be qualified in a tactual way, smooth, rough, sticky, wet, etc., furthermore warm or cold, with the quality of taste or scent, with acoustic determinations, all this in uncountable differentiations.

Geometry, kinematics, mechanics, for short, the science of the Apriori of the physical world standing in de facto formation, knows nothing of all these qualifications and in parallel to this also the empirical-exact [science], the so-called mathematical natural science. The new era of physics for **Galileo** begins with discrediting the specific sensuous qualities (the so-called “secondary” [qualities] in the terminology of **Locke**) as being irreal; they do not, it is said, belong to the true being of nature, they are not objective, [they are not] qualities belonging to the things in themselves, but rather merely subjective illusion, belonging to the contingent subjective picture which the cognizing human subject acquires of the Objective something, of the true nature in itself.

**[163]** Of course the methodical proceeding of the disciplines of apriori natural science we are speaking of, and no less the [proceeding] of the exact natural science of **Galileo**, regarded as the ideal of **all** empirical natural science, will have its good sense, that is, genuine sources of the evidence. Of course on the other hand it is the **task of the philosopher** to make this ultimately clear and not to let the authority of the exact sciences hypnotize oneself, to accept the evidence of its proceeding at face value instead of clarifying it and its sense according to the primal source, that is, investigating it phenomenologically. Certainly previous philosophy has failed deploringly in this respect, it did not even become conscious of the existing problems at this point. Nothing shows this more clearly than the assertion, ridiculous for everyone with a deep insight, which is treated as long since firmly grounded and universally accepted, (that) the new empirical natural science, whether it is physics or physiology, had shown the mere subjectivity of the sensuous qualities.

The first task here is the “primal-ontological” [one], to take up the previously used expression. To gain and to describe the eidos “world” and later “physical nature” <is> not such an easy matter as it was for the eidos “sound”. In this case we have as an example a completely intuitionally given, concrete sensuous datum, immanent thus adequately given, to which we can add other such data of similar simplicity, another, a third sound, and within the **overlapping congruence** the essentially unified, the universal essence sound comes forward, the descriptive components of which stand out in proper comparison.[[60]](#footnote-60)

**[164]** On the other hand the world is indeed given to us in an exemplary way intuitionally, but de facto only inadequately, constantly, like we have cognized previously, with external and internal horizons of undetermined determinability, constantly only according to sides, to presentations, to modes of appearance; as an in changing appearances appearing x of traits only partially showing and corroborating themselves in an actual way. Within the endlessly open stream of possible experience the world and each given thing are only given as an intuitionally proven presumption. But this does not exclude that in complete evidence, thus **adequately**, we grasp exactly this apriori type of such an infinity of harmonious experience and as its correlate the idea of the true being of a physical objectivity and world, **namely as “idea” of a therein in infinity harmoniously corroborating itself presumption** of the “object” of reciprocally corroborating appearances. But this happens by the **necessary method** of letting the appearances flow in free fantasy action, regarding them and at the same time questioning them about **what** they understand their appearing to be, **as what** and how they have it already given, how they have to proceed to make appear the already properly appearing correctly and completely corroborating itself, how they have to proceed to fill the in every respect inherent **horizons of indeterminacy** through properly giving appearances; and in the course of this inquiring the free intuition itself will be directed, and the possibilities for its continuation in a harmonious series of experiences, lying within the essence of the possible experience, will be actualized. With evidence now it can be grasped what has to remain as an *a priori* running throughout (the) **style** of a truly existing natural object despite the infinity of continuing pretention, and what is the same, as the lasting essence of this kind of objectivity, like on the other hand, which apriori type of endless experience is the necessary originating place for such an [objectivity], a physical objectivity.

**[165]** Only in this way we thus gain a completely exhaustive and from purest evidence arising idea of nature. Thus in the most perfect way exactly by **systematically** making a theme the multiplicity of **appearances** of one and the same, by studying its **phenomenological** **structure**, insofar as they show themselves as appearances of an identical object (and at the same time continually inquiring their intention and fulfillment, and thereby constructing them ourselves for their course. The **interest for the phenomena** which of course gives us full domination of them, if it is theoretical-phenomenological interest, hereserves **for the ontological interest**. If we have studied in greatest perfection the type of an endless system of possible, harmoniously corroborating experience, then therein we have perfectly given in adequate evidence the style of the identical object as correlate, that is, of the thing, of the thing-connection, of the world, in other words, its regional essence which has to be the measure for all rational statement concerning nature.)

The systematic **primal ontological** proceeding demands that the selfsufficient whole leads the non-selfsufficient parts, that the concrete [leads] the abstract, because by necessity it is prior to it within the constitutive being original. Thus it is demanded that the **concrete-complete** eidos of nature and natural thing, embedded within the mother soil of the concrete-complete (grasped and studied phenomenological) idea of possible experience and taken from it, will be systematically articulated according to proper members and abstract components, in parallel to the respective articulation and abstraction on the phenomenological side of possible experience.

If we thus proceed then soon within the concrete the essential structures will separate themselves which in their peculiar unconditional necessity separate themselves in a respective peculiar sense from something contingent and become a closed theme of own ontological disciplines – those natural-mathematical [disciplines] we have spoken of. Let us consider the following: A certain running throughout essential structure of the intuitive nature is already predelineated in each not yet further phenomenologically unfolded experience: The physical world shows itself as an **articulated** coherence proceeding in undetermined infinities; **[166]** single “things” stand out therein as in a certain, to be investigated manner “selfsufficient” unities. These, naturally, will be regarded first but together with their endless forms of actual existence, **space and time**, into which all things belong. We can conceive of each thing as being destroyed, that which remains undestroyed is the indissoluble necessity, the **space** with which each **shape** belonging to the essence of the thing coincided at the moment of its destruction, and this space is a part of the endless all-Space. As long as within the free changing of an exemplary intuitive world as such we still keep something which receives an identity and a community of essence, we have an endless space as form for things filling it out which can never lack. An **empty space is inconceivable**, and although *a priori* each thing is **contingent**, [and] could thus be assumed away, while its respective portion of the space giving it a position, a location, a placing within the space, in indispensable necessity remains at the same spot within the space, then this does not designate that **all things** **of a world** together could be taken away, in other words, that all real filledness could fall away for the endless space. Phenomenologically it is clear that the intuitability of the space, that is, its vivid givenness, is only the [intuitability] of a possible experiential givenness of any formations fulfilled in a qualitative way, but together with the essentially appertinent **possibility of motion**. The possibility of motion is an ideal one, in free choice to be run throughout [possibility], exactly in such a way that during optional variation of the real qualification for each point of position of the thing-body that ordered system of position-changings emerges which we designate as production of the **Euclidean** all-space through each of its points. As soon as we assume away all space-filling *quale* as such, we have no more possible shape and motion, we have no more possible intuition; thus nothing remains of a world. In this sense therefore the **well-known argumentation of Kant** of the necessity of the space as a form of intuition in my assessment needs to be completed and **corrected**. I pass over similar considerations concerning time.

Anyway, under the titles “space” and “time” we have designated within the eidos “nature” absolutely necessary contents, rigidly predelineated systems of possible, through deformation and **[167]** motion freely to be created, formations and positions that indeed systematically encompass **all** conceivable, namely in possible experiential intuition, originally to be given objective formations and positions, as apriori allnesses (multiplicities) of the known mathematical type. Of course an investigation which points out should from intuition acquire and formulate in a primal ontological way fundamental concepts and axioms belonging to the space and time. To these also belong the apriori laws of the distribution of the filling material for these forms, that for instance each optional time can be filled with every **temporal material** optionally appropriate for the filling of time, but that a concrete material can only fill one however optional **temporal extent** called duration, but **never a point of time** which only designates the limit zero (a never to be realized limit) of constant diminution of a possible duration.

Furthermore, each thing fills its duration; insofar (as) the duration belongs to its own essence. On the other hand it occupies a part of the time and as that **exists only once within the time**. An infinity of things can fill the one numerically identical temporal extent with their duration: They can last completely simultaneously.

On the other hand, the formation and the position belonging to the thing separates itself [sic] in an own specific way **within the space.** Within the time there is noshift of the temporal duration, it has its pure and simple unchangeable temporal position. Within the space there is **motion**. The spatial formation already belongs to the filledness of time, that is why it was wrong of **Kant** to treat the spatial form prior to the temporal form. The time-filling thing has its [spatial position] and a single spatial position in each point of time, and the respective spatial part can at the same point of time be occupied by no other physical formation, i.e. of no other thing having such a formation. The same holds true for all **physical parts** towards the limit of the formation in which all form-differences end, the point. In contrast to this within the temporal extent the same point of the space can be occupied with ever new spatial material, that is, by way of motion.

All these and similar apriori laws of spatial-temporal formation must be established and must already according to their fundamental concepts be originally acquired and made clear. Then every such original creation can be the clue for systematical constitutive investigations in which the formal set of types **[168]** of each possible physical experience is studied in its phenomenological structures, as the essential correlates of which the respective formal structures of each possible physical nature as original givennesses show themselves as factually existing and can ultimately uncover their original sense.

But all these apriori contents are only **formal**. They concern indispensable necessities for objects of possible physical, harmoniously corroborating experience, that is, in respect of space and time as *a priori* predelineated systems of possible differentiations for spatial formations and temporal formations in their positions. They say nothing concerning the **real filledness** of such formations, concerning genres or kinds of “qualities” belonging to physical things as such. A thing is, *a priori* speaking, not mere formation, but rather a formation is the shape of a form in which a **What** is shaped. This What remains within the previously regarded Apriori completely undetermined. This indefiniteness and the exactly by way of it, as we will see, gained and purely kept indispensable necessity of the acceptance for each conceivable physical characterizes, although not perfectly yet, pure geometry, pure theory of time and motion and dynamics, or rather, characterizes an **apriori-formal** **natural science** which we designate more clearly as **aesthetical-formal**, to at least remind of the **Kantian** concept of the transcendental aesthetics and to prevent a confusion with the formal of the *mathesis universalis*.

At this point we are not within the logical-formal, within the most empty universality of the idea of an object, a Something as such any more, but rather [we are] through the experiential type physical experience within the exemplarily, that is materially bound universality of a physical object as such, as of an object of such possible experience. An indispensably necessary, in absolutely strict sets of laws explicating itself, form advances giving to the disciplines belonging here a special kind of dignity of “objective” acceptance, whereas these disciplines on the other hand do not in any way encompass the whole intuitive-concrete essence of possible physical nature. The contentual What belongs to the formation, and this remains undetermined. However, now we have to add, that a contentual Apriori with unconditionally universal validity **[169]** for any kind of physical objectivity and nature as such can be enounced for the qualification despite of its indefiniteness; to begin with already this, that each single thing has its spatial shape as formation of a **content**, which is the content of a certain, originally acquired concept of **material** or else of **quality**. A constitutive trait of the thing, the logical content of the thing, its content as object as such is in the same manner shape and content of the shape, but the shaped content, the material formation within the region thing is something special, something only to be understood in this relation and only to be acquired from this kind of experience.

Furthermore the peculiar structure is generally necessary, according to which the **duration of the thing** indeed is also a “trait”, corresponding to logical parlance, like extension and material of the extension, but that the duration has the character of a **temporal formation** the shaped of which is the spatially extended “material”, being as one temporal content, **temporal material**. Certainly this is a [temporal material] which at any point of time is to be separated and possibly changed. But throughout the continuum of the points of time of the material duration runs *a priori* for each thing the peculiar unity, the unity of an identical substrate, of an identical “real” of identical physical traits, the same lasting thing which, throughout all phases of the duration has either the same formation and the same shape-content (shape-material) or another one from time-phase to time-phase. In the first case this means, the identical substrate, i.e. the thing itself, does not change, in the other case, it changes “itself”. **Change of the physical thing**, change of the physical real with the borderline case of unchanging thus is a certain concept specifically attributed to physical experience [and] as original concept imperatively needs an original creation and clarification.

The ontological concept of the **real proceeding** stands in correlation to the lasting physical real, i.e. the continuum of the momentary actualizations of the identical thing in the form of the continually shaped contents. But in this kind there is still a lot to be investigated, e.g. the necessary structure of a real proceeding, of the filling of a real material duration, the apriori demand of a continuity of all change, like the mathematical continuity for the motion as a change of position and likewise for the mere change of formation, **[170]** furthermore corresponding to the shaped qualities the continuity demand that indeed continuity is necessary, but in such a way that discontinuities are not excluded. At single points of time and at single points and lines, in areas of the spatial formation for instance the color can change discontinuously, but necessarily all discontinuities are limits in a continuous change of the coloring, etc. But these are **formal-universal sets of laws for the kind of filling (of?) the form with content**, because they do not concern the color as color, but rather each kind of filledness as such.

We descry in here that the **formal Apriori of physicalness**, which leaves the special genres and kinds of the contentual filling undetermined, is articulated in two layers, according to the structures we exhibited. The one aims at things as such with respect to the formation and position (in the double system space and time), also change of position, that is, motion. In contrast to this the other one aims at the concrete unity of shape and shaped, but only formally, namely irrespective of possible regions of the content which fill the shape [it aims] at the apriori requirements of the material reality; it thus concerns the formal essence of each thing as substrate of real properties.

We can now delimit the **dominion of the apriori natural scientific disciplines** that have been developed up till now (geometry, kin<etics>, etc.) in a more definite and complete way: They pursue the first of the designated tasks, the [task] of **natural mathematics**, that is, they explicate the (“aesthetical”) forms space and time intuitively belonging to the intuitive eidos “nature”, or rather [they explicate] under these titles the apriori determinations aesthetically predelineated for the possible things. But an own discipline would be necessary apart from them which would explicate the **Apriori of possible concrete physicality**. This discipline is missing.

(It has to be noted here that in the logical-formal *mathesis* one has to separate as well between the logical-formal apriori requirements of a multiplicity as such and the special apriori requirements which individual concrete being as such predelineates. The previous mathematical disciplines did not have consideration for the latter. But an **[171]** own formal theory of the concrete individuality is needed which is completely missing, but without which a radical and sufficient metaphysics would not be possible.

In our case we have as basis the material eidos “physical nature”. These are the special apriori conditions of the individuation as real **physical** individuation within the aesthetically distinctive **Euclidean** multiplicity of our eidos “nature”, which we initially consider generalized by leaving the genres of aesthetical fillings, like color, tactile, thermic, etc. qualities undetermined. This Apriori investigates the formal-aesthetical theory of the real individuality together with the aesthetical theory of the aesthetical forms. But the previously developed apriori natural scientific disciplines are again only related to the aesthetical multiplicities and their forms, thus pure geometry, pure theory of time, etc. What is missing, as I said, is an aesthetical-formal theory of the **physical individuality**.)

But we have yet **another fundamental stratification** to exhibit which finds its expression within the ingenious separation of the **Kantian transcendental aesthetics** and the **transcendental analytics** which has to be admired, although to **Kant** all separations here exhibited and also the proper essence of its transcendental “aesthetical” remained unclear which implies that his theories remained far from his eagerly anticipated scientific strength.

If we acquire, like we should do, the eidos “thing” from the eidos of harmoniously into infinity explicating experience (which in free intuition we exemplary create), then it becomes evident that each giving itself as a thing within the experience allows for a consideration and essential description disregarding all other things **apart** of it. We could appeal here to the apriori law which had to be formulated previously within the earlier context together with other laws, that each thing could as well not exist, and could be conceived of as annulled without the world ceasing to exist. It is not like this annulment does not concern the other things, as if for example not the most vehement changes would have to eventuate on earth, if the sun by some miracle vanished from the world. Whatever this fantasied possibility of the vanishing **[172]** means, that much is clear, that it calls attention to the combination of the possible dependencies existing under the title “**causality**” between things and to a necessary structure of the things of possible experience: To be able to be experientially given in their causality they “previously” have to be given intuitionally in an own content. And not only in a subjectivistic sense, but in itself a certain proper essence of each possible thing precedes the dependencies, and prior to all conceivable **causal** properties belonging to the reality of a thing stand as more original essential properties those which first of all enable causality. If we are quasi **blind towards causality**, then of the thing – always purely regarded as a correlate of originally giving experience – something remains, nay, something concrete remains: The thing of the transcendental aesthetics in a closer sense, the pure thing pertaining to the senses. Notabene, it is a mere layer of the real thing, it does not deserve the name “thing”, if we take the word naturally, since then the substantial reality is meant, having causal properties.

We also call this concrete substratum the **concrete thing-phantom**. To this corresponds on the side of the experience a narrow and closed concept of **thing-intuition** (sense-intuitional experience), also perception. The thing-phantom in this pregnant sense is the perceived and regarded, in pregnant sense the seen and visible, soon touched and tactual thing. The matter will become still clearer by way of a further distinction. We define by taking up an artificial word of **Kant**, the sense of which goes in a similar direction, as **concrete scheme** the spatial formation originally qualified in a sensuous way and as **schematic unity** the duration-unity which constitutes itself purely through a temporally extended continuum of a concretely filled spatial formation. Thus for instance, we take an iron cube exactly like it is regarded in a possible all-round giving experience. We are blind against all causality, the layer of experiential apperception, referring to actual or possible causalities is suspended. Then we are mentally blind for earthly heaviness, specific weight, for short, for all physical properties insofar as they may give themselves intuitively, prior to **[173]** physical theory. In other words, all properties of the proper physical materiality are gone. What remains? Well, that what is, in the pregnant sense seen or to be seen, to be heard, to be touched, etc. It is a cube, gray, iron-like shining, smooth, it is sounding, hot (that it is like this, **because** previously it has been struck or heated before our eyes is left out of consideration, against this Because we are blind), etc. This the **phantom**. Each thing has as a thing of possible experience in each moment of its duration its concretely filled space-phantom, *a priori* natural.

We will narrow this down now. Each thing has its spatial formation and within, that is, in completely proper and intuitively evident sense, a filledness is extended. The properly visible formation is a visibly colored formation, mediately and in itself; the color spreads over the formation, fills it, each of its points has a color-point and has its concretion only therein. Likewise with all tactual determinations: The tactual formation has a tactual filledness. Thus the iron-colored, iron-like shining cube as visual or tactual or double phenomenon, that is the **concrete** scheme, the **empty scheme** is the formation (as substrate-unity of the thing’s duration, that is, the unity of the shape-property of the thing, like it is experienceable, changing throughout the momentary formations. (But the concepts phantom and scheme may be used for momentary phases)).

The reason why we make this distinction between **phantom** and **scheme**, can be easily made clear. The cube sounds, but we do not find the sensuous determination of the sounding within the hearing as an immediately, properly given extension of the tonal over the cube-bodiliness. We do not hear it properly, we see or touch it together with a visual or tactual filledness, whereas the sounding is only spatial by being related to the visual and tactual phantom, without being in itself spatially formed. This implies, visual extension (formation) is nothing in itself. Such a fullness called color is needed, it does not need other ones previously. Conversely: The material moment color is in itself and immediately the necessary coloring of an extension, and the “immediately” signifies that we do not have to think of other sensible qualities and immediately necessarily corresponding **[174]** formations. In contrast to this, the essence of the sound does not immediately and for itself imply the spatial formation and position, but I rather must have already something spatial belonging to another quality.

Therefore we can thus say: The way in which sensuous data show themselves as extensive data is entirely different. Extension is something abstract which can only be concrete through qualifying filling. Those genres of filling that can only exist as immediately concretizing filling of an extension are the original fillings, with these an extension must be given at all events. A concrete scheme is the pure unity of an extension with its original filling and it is a concrete in itself. If such a scheme is already given, then it **can** but need not take on a further secondary filling like sounds, taste, warmth, etc. (and likewise the materially empty space will be filled with warmth or cold, with scent, etc., whereby certainly the empty space is in another and also in a certain way secondary sense intuitive in contrast to a physical formation).

A thing-phantom thus has a peculiar structure. A necessary core and a contingent cover. The necessary core is the concrete scheme with empty form and filling. Examples for pure phantoms, and among them especially for concrete schemes, are the blue sky which, honestly speaking, no one regards as a material thing, as really causal, the sun (of which <we> only know, but we do not see through experiential intuition that it is a material body), or as well a stereoscopic picture which, like it often is the case, is free from all causal apperception.

Phantoms and schemes are thus indeed concrete unities of experience. And in each external experience of a physical thing they form an *a priori* necessary substrate. Obviously here the **task of a systematic ontology of the phantoms** arises, and it is clear that geometry and pure theory of motion belong to it on the side of the empty scheme. Correlatively then a systematic phenomenology of the phantoms is required, and the **transcendental aesthetics in the pregnant sense** would be its designation.

The question is now, whether with the previously said we have transgressed the formal sphere, since we have been speaking of the visual and the acoustic, of **[175]** sensible qualities of each known genre. I think that we in the widest measure have insight into the specific of such qualities only in an exemplary way. We only find in such genres qualities of experienced things, also in free fantasy specific sense-qualities of the known genres must belong to the fantasied things as coloring, etc. But we also cognize the contingence of these **qualitative genres**, that they can fall away in empiric intuition, that is, [that] they are not necessary for the concrete intuition. During a completely vivid touching sensation of a thing there is no need for any visual perception, its concretion[[61]](#footnote-61) is intuitively given, but without any visual qualification, and likewise vice versa. In the same way things can be given without all corresponding apperceptive qualities of scent, taste, etc. It is only necessary that visual or tactual qualities are given, because in another way our intuition cannot offer any primary filled extension. But we derive from this “or” that neither the one nor the other, that is, none of them is a necessary requirement for the extension, and that possibly other inaccessible genres of qualification could be primarily filling. However, apart from the contingent qualitative genres **universal** necessities for phantoms and qualifications **as such** remain.

But the investigation would have to go deeper at this point. Do we not have to state that within our perception two phantoms pervade each other, a visual phantom and a tactual [phantom], each with **its own**, with the respective specific quality, originally necessary extension, so that we properly would have two “overlapping” spaces? But how is this possible? Why do we speak of one space? Is it not possibly thus that within the unity of the visual intuition originally only the visual spatiality is existent with visual quality, and that the tactual quality as well as the whole phantom, created through touching secondarily introduces itself into the visual in the same secondary way as sounding, acoustic, and other qualities introduce themselves? And likewise *vice versa*, that into the tactual givenness an initially lacking and then within creation **[176]** coming up visual [givenness] introduces itself? But we must not go on here although you see one could go on from question to ever new questions which all relate to the phantom in its essential structure according to unconditioned necessities and apriori possibilities.

(On purpose I did not use in this presentation the reference to the possibility that genres of quality that we have our neighbor does not need to have, that like we are born capable of seeing, others may be born blind, etc. For our eidetic proceeding the pure Ego, everyone for himself in his exemplary intuition and change of intuition, in his general apriori validity, must be able to have insight into all that, and foreign stories can be useful only after phenomenological reduction and change into actual intuition, whereby it turns out that foreign experience signifies something extra-essential.)

If we take the generically determined phantoms, then indeed it is contingent that we only with the help of examples can see the respective genres, but still that which roots within the pure essential content of these genres is an Apriori. (If we count to the idea of a cognizing subject as such the ability to follow all motives of cognition, to evaluate all cognitional intentions, to perform all acts of cognizing reason, then this idea leaves open, which genres fall into the domain of consciousness of the respective cognizing subject, what types of sensuous experiences form themselves together in a passive way through the present flow of the sensuous data, prior to all free rational action. Insofar it is something contingent that a cognizing subject has thing-phantoms like the visual or the tactual, etc. But) nothing prevents us from forming, with the help of the exemplary given sensuousness together with the known genres of sensuous data and the given types of phantoms, the eidos of a cognizing subject which is related to such a kind of substrate of sensuous intuition we obviously also can grasp in eidetic purity. We can *a priori* consider for such a subject then what <belongs> to the pure essential content, [what] is descriptively included within the eidos of a thing-phantom of our exemplary type, which possible layers such a phantom has, what e.g. essentially belongs **[177]** to a visual phantom, to a visual thing, which genres and differentiations of specific sensuous qualities can emerge as phantoms in a qualifying way, how they articulate themselves within their genres, e.g. the color-qualities within the so-called color-body, what forms of multiplicities determine the acoustic, the thermic and other qualities, etc. Thereby an Apriori is predelineated for a possible construction of all physical-thing objects of possible experience with respect to their sense-intuitional set of types, that is in regard of the phantoms falling into the proper and in a pregnant way so-called intuition. Thus the givennesses of possible physical-thing perception, of possible sensuous intuition have their Apriori not only in respect to the spatial-temporal form, but also in regard to the sensuous qualities, and thus also this belongs to a transcendental aesthetics which now has a moment of relative **contingence**, insofar as the present Apriori is not accepted for each possible cognizing subject as subject of a possible material experience, but rather only for each that is bound to the respective material eidos of a definite kind of sensuousness.

All the problems discussed up till now related to the sensuous-material substrate of the experiential object and were directed at its primal ontological description. They were to be posed in ontological attitude and when we performed the phenomenological reduction, then we had to direct our regard purely to the **noematic** contents of the experiential objectivity in inverted commas, but not to the noetic ones. But now the complete phenomenological problems arise which consider and study the experiential objective as something objective of the experiences originally constituting it. The question thus is now, what do the experiential mental processes look like, the single ones and the courses of mental processes, extending into infinity, in which a physical thing according to the concrete substrate which we called phantom would come to on all sides completely intuitive givenness? What do they look like not de facto, but rather in eidetic necessity, so that we understand completely with insight that, if a course of mental process of such a character takes place within an Ego-consciousness, this Ego in its immanence necessarily has to find a physical-thing phantom as existing, has to experience it **[178]** as bodily being there, and that it *a priori* can **only** experience an objective something thus?

Initially the manifold modes of givenness would have to be described which under the title “**orientation**” necessarily belong to each spatial-physical thing, namely as phantom, that everything physical stands **spatially** under the form of the now and then, like [it stands] **temporally** under the form of the now, of the prior and afterwards. Furthermore for example, that the There of a thing has the form of the right-left, of the above-below, of the in front-behind; that furthermore the **There** implies the free possibility to freely change these orientations to the **Here**, but also to make each There the absolute Here, the zero-point of the orientation. It is obvious that with respect to the analogous modes of orientation of **time** these possibilities do not exist: The present now *a priori* cannot change an Ego into a past or future free action; according to an apriori necessity the point of time constituted in an originally arising way within the immediate now changes of its own accord into the orientation mode of the beenness, and each future into a now – in an absolutely passive process. *A priori* no previously-been, no intuitive past can be changed back into a present now or into a future one, etc.

According to the systematic description of the apriori necessities of the temporal and spatial orientation modes and of the differences of the time itself and the oriented time, of the space itself and of the space in the respective orientation modes, the systematic question of the necessary pertaining set of types of constitutive mental processes comes into question and of the real noetic contents which correspond to the oriented temporal and spatial modes of givenness according to the space- and time-form itself and according to the qualification orienting itself along with it; thus the eidetic investigation of the constitutive modes of mental processes existing for an originally-past, a just-has-been and a farther-past, how the continuum of the oriented past presents itself within the continuum of mental process, how the mode of so-called fresh memory and of the recollection shows something past, how these modes of givenness differ in the manner of a mental process from the [mode] of the “now”, how and if the future as well is given in an original intuitive way, how empty horizons are included within the intentionality of the necessary temporal consciousness, **[179]** etc. Nothing but questions which certainly are thus universal that they are not restricted to the material sphere we call **things** and **thing-phantoms**.

Then the same questions to the **spatiality** and **spatial physicalness**, to phantoms. There would arise the theory of the aspects, in which a phantom *a priori* has to present itself, of the one-sidedness of the givenness which has its correlate in one-sided perspective aspects, of the spatial perspective and of the color-perspective and other qualitative perspective adumbrations, and the cognition that it presupposes the shape-perspective, etc. Thus cognition in such a way like we pursued it in the first half of the lecture in parts and prior to the insight into their character as indispensable essential necessities in order to then clarify the peculiar of the phenomenological sphere and to establish a theory of the pure Ego. Everything we had previously said of thing-aspects, of Data of sensation, of modes of appearance, of apprehensions, etc., was, like you will say without hesitation, related to things only with respect to their properly intuitive substrate, the phantom-stratum.

(To the questions belonging here also belongs the question which in some regard becomes significant: What does this within the frame of mere experience phenomenologically look like, which originally makes given the self-identity of an experiential object not only within a continuity of harmonious experiences, but rather legitimates it for separate experiences? For instance, I now live mentally a perception which in itself is a perception of a table, and another time, again perceiving an individual table due to the recollection I say, it was the same table. What does, in apriori necessity, the legitimizing intuition look like here?)

After having created a sharply outlined and clear horizon of problems and investigations of a transcendental ontology and phenomenology of the phantoms, we would have to go over to a transcendental aesthetics of the next higher level, which for **Kant** does not stand under the title “transcendental aesthetics”, but rather is woven into the transcendental anlytics, but certainly does not at all approach a pure formulation and the isolation **[180]** of other problems. (Certainly this already holds true for his transcendental aesthetics. He continuously blends in an unclear way ontological concepts and ascertainments with noetic-phenomenological ones, and he does not at all see the peculiarity of the specific phenomenological in spite of the great propulsion it shows during his investigations. Without the study of the “synthesis”, in which spatiality and temporality of an experiential world constitute themselves, ontological necessities, the way **Kant** elaborates them, are transcendentally unproductive. But if the synthesis determines the separation of aesthetics and analytics, then for an aesthetics exactly space and time would remain excluded and as residue we would only have the sensuousness of sensations.)

The higher apperceptive stratum of intuitive physical physicality is the [stratum] of **materiality**. Only this creates the proper concept of reality. If the concept phantom has the overtone of an empty illusion then in a certain way this can be alright with us. Because not without reason we call merely spatial phantoms which are apperceived without any determinations of the materiality merely subjective illusion; but notabene, this in a certain sense that later will advance. The concept “physical thing” has its primal source within the correlate for the kind of perception which usually is called in an unclear way simply external perception. Within this to the **original** sense-giving does belong a stratum of determinations of the perceived which in the pregnant understanding of the word are not sensuously perceived, like the pieces of content of the phantom, of the in a pregnant way so-called sensuous-intuitive thing. Here belong all properties of a specific materiality; they are the physical properties which are theoretically investigated within physics. Thus the weight, the elasticity, the magnetism and the electricity, the temperature, the physical optical and acoustical properties, etc.

The properties of the phantom and their change from moment to moment obviously enter in a certain way the properties of the specific materiality; a deformation of the bodily shape and a motion of course is a process within the phantom, e.g. within the visual thing as a purely visual thing. But his does not yet provide elasticity which is a properly real property, a property of the physical thing. The pure phantom just is **[181]** not a physical thing. What does the word “elastic” signify? Well, [it is] the constant property of the thing, under certain circumstances and if it is pushed in certain ways, to take over certain typical deformations and motion. To see a deformation and a motion, like at a kinematographical phantom, is not seeing elasticity. But if we see a swinging elastic plate, then we **experience** while pushing due to the deformation, etc. that, **since** the plate was pushed, it swings, etc. Likewise the color is a matter of the pure visual thing, but it is a physical property, it is an actual thing’s property for the phantom which is apperceived as a thing, when and as often as it is brought into the pool of light of a shining body, now more close, now more distant, etc., to change in an ordered way its phantom-color.

The sensuous heaviness and lightness belonging to the thing that is an object of the senses also has a relation to the actual physical property of the heaviness and the weight, namely when as often as I weigh a thing on a kind of balance against another thing, I will, as long as both things remain unchanged, always find the once found balance. And so on.

All specifically physical properties are properties of the “because and thus” or the “if and thus”; <in order> to describe them we have to speak of what under certain real circumstances necessarily happens, that is, [what] according to a rule of necessity is to be expected. And this rule relates back to changes of the respective phantom-determinations. From the side of the experiencing they are rules of preliminary expectation of the course of the changes of any determinations of the phantom. But thereby a content of physical properties belongs to the sensuous content of the physical experience prior to all theory, thus in a certain way [it belongs] to the **intuition**, to the perception and experience in an enlarged sense.

Nobody will take offense at the locution: “I see how the hammer forges the gleaming iron and thereby deforms it”, or “that the spring swings due to its being plucked”, “that the string chimes because it was bowed”, etc. In a narrower sense to be experienced is the **following-each-other**, but in a wider sense the **because-of-each-other**. We continuously apperceive things as substrates of physical properties, the essence of which it is to come to an originary givenness in the form of **corroborating expectation** of a **[182]** from thing to thing or from a part of a thing to a part of a thing with regard to the sensuous material changes proceeding succession which was grasped as a necessary one, as a because-of, as a because-thus. And this confirmation has as its own that it has essential levels of the determination and security.

Here lies the most original intuitive source of the concept of causality. All physical properties are **causal** properties, and the substrate of causal properties is called **physical substance** in a philosophical sense. The physical thing itself, taken in such a way as it is prior to all science originally existent for us in an intuitional way, and which is sensuously intuitive in the form of changing phantoms, is nothing else than the substantial unity of causal properties, and the momentary phantoms and their momentary determinations have a physically real meaning only as momentary “**modes of appearance**”, momentary “states”, “expressions” of the substantial thing and of its causal properties. The physical thing does not have two kinds of real properties, but rather through and through only real ones, only physical ones; but physical [properties] are what they are as making themselves known within the momentary states, to which they predelineate constant rules: The phantom as expression of the substantial-causal thing is often called “**appearance**”.

But everything we have said up till now is incomplete and has only conditional validity, because we have concealed a great dimension of analyses: the **matter of fact of the** **organism**, designating a highly important theme of transcendental-aesthetical structures with regard to all physical physicalness.

In our eidos “world” **our** body, and to put it more distinctly, for each cognizing subject having an intuitionally thus and thus shaped physical world in front of it **its** body, plays a conspicuous and, (through) the eidos of this world, essentially determining role. Do pay attention to the following: When we look around in an intuitive way within the respectively given nature, and when we in every way gain experience from it, then our body is in a certain way one thing among other things, according to the sense of the experience we have of it. But if we look more closely, then we find in an apperceptive way the body, more precisely, exclusively **our** body, to be characterized in a special way which makes it be something completely unique **[183]** in contrast to other things. For instance each thing can ideally be given in an endlessly multiple orientation, that is, **each one in any possible orientation**. The same thing appearing within the mode “right” can change its position “relative” to my point here (zero-point) in such a way that it continuously within any other orientation moves into the sphere of the left, from back to front, etc. whether this happens by way of appearing objective motion or not. (In the last case we say: “I have moved, and that is why all things appear in another perspective and position.”) In contrast to that my body has the wonderful property to always contain the zero-point of orientation within itself. It is always within the “**Here**” and never there, and the members of the body can change their orientation only in a restricted way, unless they are cut off: Then like other things they can instantly move in optional distance, but they are no longer a part of the body.

Connected with this there are certain other descriptive properties being only appertinent to the own body of the cognizing subject: Among all experienced and to be experienced things only my body is carrier of sensational fields perceptible at it, for instance only my body has within my perception a field of tactual sensation phenomenally spread over the appearing shape of the same. Only it [my body] when pushed, bowed, pressed by a thing gives contact sensations. And further: Only it [my body] has within the field of my possible perception the **kind of motion** which we for instance designate with the words “I move the **[184]** hand, the foot, I walk”, etc. Other bodies do exist, and they have the same peculiarities, but they are not available for me by way of perception, but only through empathy.

Every other thing has immediately only mechanical motions. My body as well can be mechanically moved, like when I fall over due to an external push, or when I am chauffeured, etc. But an “I move myself” is something totally different, no matter whether voluntarily or not voluntarily. A foreign body can within my perceptional field take over the subjective kind of motion which phenomenologically has its unique way of givenness only in such a way that for instance by grasping my body firmly it is connected to it and participates at its subjective moving-itself, or in the manner of the being pushed, or being shoved by me, etc.

But let us better regard now more closely the **way** the body partakes in the experience of all other things. It is given as a system of so-called organs of sensation which essentially co-act within experience, that is, according to the different phantom-strata: The eye sees, the hand and other tactile organs touch, together with the tactile organs there are organs for warmth, cold, etc.

But here now we encounter a peculiar relativity of the material changes, and therein of the sensuous-physical changes. For example if I burn my hand, all things pertaining to the senses which are given to me by way of touching with the hand do change. If all my tactile organs experienced a change, it would be as if the whole world with respect to their tactual determinations had changed. A so-called disorder of my eyes changes the whole visual world, everything looks differently; if I eat Santonin, it functions in the same way, the whole world appears like seen through a yellow glass. And so on.

We thus have two **systems of functional dependencies** within the sensuous-physical changes. If we determine the organs of sensation ideally in such a way that we speak of normal organs in normal function, then all physical-thing appearances intuitionally prove to be **reciprocally dependent** in a certain regulation, that is, in the sense of the intuitive properties which we would designate as physically causal [properties]. The blazing candelabra **[185]** illuminates all other things of the room, the iron put into the fire becomes hot and glowing, etc. Each thing according to its sensuous properties is experientially dependent on its circumstances.

If we now include the changes of the own organism then a new system of change enters our sphere of vision. And all things, more precisely, everything that up till now was purely and simply regarded as thing itself, changes **in dependence on the organs of sensation, on the changing set of states of the body**. But we do not say that the things change, but rather that they only look differently, they only appear differently. Therein lies the experiential consciousness, the perception has from the start within the developed consciousness a stratification taking into account both lines of change within the phantoms, and an **identical thing** constitutes itself for the act of experiencing in suitable harmonious experiential connections as an identical something which on the one hand constantly has its mode of appearance conditioned in relation to the body, and on the other hand in relation to other things, namely thus that through **all** these modes of appearance runs a material identity hiding in itself a reciprocal dependency of the identical things according to their identical properties, a dependency we call **causality**.

Some changes of appearance depend on the subjectivity insofar as the legitimating experiencing is a subjective act performed in the courses of the “I move my eyes in seeing, [I move] my hands or fingers while touching”, etc. As soon as the subject stops its free courses, what it can do at each point, the changes of the other courses recede on their own. Only through the deeper study of the somatological relation of all intuitive physical-thing data which is difficult due to the great implications, the sense of the pre-theoretically given experienced physical thing will be able to be clarified as that of the unity constituted in all dimensions of the intuitive relations, and thus the **phenomenology of the physicalness** in advance intertwines with the **phenomenology of the organism**; This then for its part is the fundamental substrate for the **phenomenology [186] of the psychic sphere**. Thereby we see already that phenomenologically regarded subjectivity (psychic mind) in the world and physicalness in the world are not two separate and only externally connected groups of real occurrences, but rather that in the form of the organims which in itself has a peculiar essential stratum of sensibility and free mobility, a connecting bridge is provided with the help of which alone mentality can have a place within nature, within the realm of *physis*.

Of course on the higher level of materiality a solution to the same parallel groups of tasks related to each other, the noematic-ontological and noetic-phenomenological, is needed. Thus, we here have a higher level of the transcendental aesthetics which indeed presupposes the other aesthetics, the transcendental aesthetics of the phantoms.

In advance[[62]](#footnote-62) it is clear to us and anyway easily accessible that each mathematical-physical concept, and thus each in the sense of physics exactly and in a concluding way performed determination of a natural object has a sense pointing back to its sensuous content of the natural object in the sense of the transcendental aesthetics, and thereby everywhere pointing back to occurrences of the experiential sensuousness, although none of its [of the experiential sensuousness] specific differences are ever mentioned, and in its particularity taken over into the concept, and although the physical concept as well is nothing less than a generic universalization of that kind like color as such for all single possible differences of color. We can thus characterize in a comprehensible way what these logical-scientific kind of physical concepts and sentences do: If I had an ideally complete physics (everyone is to take himself thereby as *solus ipse*), of course a [physics] developed within myself completely with insight, then I would be able to exactly determine each physical thing, each physical process of my experienced surrounding world. Each such exact determination would contain none of the contingent intuitions which I would use methodically, or of any other intuitions from the infinity of possible intuitions I have and could have otherwise. And likewise [I would use] nothing of the corresponding concepts, gained directly from the experiential intuition. But on the other hand I **[187]** could, due to my physical theorems, arrive any time at a “conception” (of) how in every respect my experiences would have to proceed, what my intuitive world will and must look like for each past and future point of time, no matter whether and how I freely changed or did not change my position within space.

But there would be one crux at the reconstruction. The things indeed are constituted with regard to the variability (of my specific organism-phenomena and) my physical-thing phenomena. A universal set of types of possible changes expresses itself in the physical-thing apperceptions. But I still cannot undertake such a capability of combinatory fantasy so that I would be able to freely create all possibilities of combination, all types of concrete formations. But as far as I could do physics still would make the rule available to me to construct the proceeding of the intuitive world, and anyway, I would anytime be able to carry on the correlative performance, to cognize in its strict necessity what the course of the intuitive world de facto shows me respectively. The physical theorems themselves say nothing of intuitively given or described things. But they point back to absolutely necessarily ordered courses of the intuitive phenomena, and each given thing then can be cognized in its absolute necessity. This is an **exact** **explanation** of the given thing of experience.

As human being within my present life-world, simply living within my intuitive world and acting and creating within it, I will thus highly benefit from physics. As far as I am trained to determinately construct the necessary proceedings of the intuitive world, I am also able to control them in a practical way. Of course one cannot gain any descriptive and concrete concepts from physics. On the other hand apart from it continuously there is the **necessary task** to describe the intuitive life-world in its concrete set of types according to relatively lasting formations of the being and formations of the becoming, to determine them for me in intuitively acquired concepts, and thus to get to know them thoroughly. Exactly thereby also ideal physics will become productive; I cannot apply physics on something grasped of the intuition in fleeting superficiality, it must already be suitably analyzed and understood **[188]**, and on the other hand, only thus I continuously develop my forming fantasy for concrete possibilities in order to be able to foresee not yet actualized proceedings during arbitrary experiments.

#### §4. The physical nature as field of sciences and truths

Up till now we regarded objects of a physical world exemplary given in our world and in their changes of fantasy, we followed the apriori set of types belonging to such objects, the necessary typical structures, and the ontological as well as the constitutively phenomenological problems corresponding to them. They were thereby conceived of as objects prior to all theorizing, prior to all sciences being natural sciences as related to physics. If we now regard this physical world as field of such sciences, then the sciences of course can be either apriori or empirical. Theoretical thinking can relate to nature in essential universality or in its factualness, thus it can aim at theoretically determining the de facto world with its de facto physical objectivity, to set up for it [the de facto world] scientifically valid truths.

On the one side of course those apriori-ontological explications of the pre-theoretically given physical objectivity would belong which we lately discussed, together with the corresponding mathematical disciplines like geometry, whereby certainly it occurs to us that the scientific investigators within the flowering of the natural sciences from (the) Renaissance to presence obviously only were interested in the **mathematical**-intuitive Apriori, but not in the **sensuous intuitive Apriori in qualitative regard**. On the other side then there are the experiential sciences of the nature as de facto given [nature]. Here we encounter the descriptive sciences which like all biological disciplines mainly bring to concepts the concrete set of types of the physical organisms according to their relatively lasting formations, and according to their regular developments, thus within the classification of the types of maturely developed **[189]** plants or animals the concepts of orders, families, classes, genera, species to the lowest species. In contrast to an intuitive and concrete way (of) describing (the) sciences there are the so-called abstractly explaining, or rather exact-mathematical, natural sciences, the different disciplines of physics and chemistry.

The great problems that have to be tackled in view of the fact of this big scientific groups related to the fact of the given physical nature of course change everywhere to **essential problems** compared to which the fact becomes a mere example. If we conceive of any physical nature, that is, merely as an **intuitive** givenness of the type which the transcendental aesthetics had described and explicated according to its essential parts in concepts and apriori theorems, what can, in relation to them, theoretical cognition and science achieve? Formal logic is, in (a) formally most universal manner, concerned with these questions in noematic regard; it relates to concepts, propositions and all those forms, how from the fundamental forms of primitive sentences arise propositional formations of any higher level, connections of such a kind like conclusions, proofs, theories present them. And it investigates the apriori laws governing the conditions of the possibility of the validity on all levels. It thus aims at giving a formal-universal scientific theory. To this then corresponds, like we said earlier, a phenomenology of experiences and later of the experiences of reason judging with insight, in which all such theoretical objectivities shaping science, and corresponding to which an intuitively pre-given field of objects determines itself scientifically according to its true being and being thus, come to systematic clarification.

But now the relations **between intuitively somehow constituted objectivity** and **possible, thereto to be related theoretical thinking** propose a conundrum, one initially is not ready for. If we go back to the **fact** of the given physical nature, and to the natural sciences, then this represents a type of the relation of intuitive givennesses, of the relation of a physical world of to be performed theory presenting itself to the cognizing subjects by way of sensuously intuitive phenomena **[190]** which indeed can engage contemplation. Namely it is clear that scientific thinking can only bring to concepts and conceptually mediated statement and theory what the “intuition” has set down as given within factual existence. It may therefore seem a matter of course that the descriptive concepts, like the ones related to space, time, motion, thus also [related] to the sensuous qualifications, must be included in the theoretical contents of the sciences and kept there. If the things present themselves as colored, that is, in harmonious experience, then they are thus and the concept of color must be a physical one. A causal property like the one of the optical property would then only express a rule of the sensuous qualities of the appearances, sensuous qualities which for their part point back to Data of sensation of the different genres emerging within the cognizing subject.

But in contrast to this we find the peculiarity of the modern exact physical natural science in that it devaluates and suspends in a certain way the specific sensuous qualities, and exactly thereby it considers its enormous superiority over the ancient natural science to be grounded. The specific sensuous qualities, this is what the scientific investigators since **Galileo** harmoniously claim, are merely subjective, they merely belong to the appearances the cognizing human being has of the things. The true being things themselves do not have such qualities, but rather only the mathematical-mechanical qualities, i.e. extension, motion, change of shape, and the like. But how is this comprehensible, since in the originally giving intuition a formation is only conceivable as formation of a sensuously intuitive quality?

What kind of comprehensible sense can this “suspension” of sensuous qualities have? Shall it be the opinion they were merely subjective illusion? In this direction goes the most common interpretation having become popular which without knowing anything of the transcendental-philosophical set of problems passes it off as profound wisdom: The things in themselves with the properties in and of themselves belonging to them, present themselves to the human being according to the stipulation of his de facto psycho-physical organization visually, tactually, with the sensuous qualities of the genres peculiar to the human being. The animals possibly have in part a similar psycho-physical **[191]** organization, but maybe there are also those with a completely dissimilar [organization], maybe they have at least parallel sensuous qualities of genres completely inaccessible for us. Also for each animal species there are differences corresponding to groups and individuals. Those born blind do not have any color at all, the colorblind [have] other colors than those seeing colors in a normal way, and to be precise not even two human beings have the absolutely same color-sensations. Normality is only an idea we practically attach to the common agreements of the intersubjective experience. If the one speaking is a philosophical theist he will then add: Whereas each perceiving living creature in nature perceives the natural things only through the medium of physical and psycho-physical aspects which in their composition we call the body whereby constantly moments of a subjectively determined kind enter the picture of the object, God regards the things immediately themselves, he has no body, he is not a psycho-physical subject.

**Lotze** once stated the theorem – one of those deep sentences the depths of which he, unfortunately a thinker of half consequence, never thought through to the end - : Everyone can see a thing only the way it looks for him, and never the way it looks in itself; and maybe from here indeed we receive an indication that the initially appealing popular philosophical apprehension is countersenseful. But certainly physics is right when within its theoretical treatment of the physical experiential givennesses, it does not stop at the descriptive empirical concepts and empirical-intuitive theorems, but aims at theorems of purely mathematical form, theorems in which nothing of the sensuous concepts remains, nothing of concepts like color, sound, scent, taste, and in which also with respect to the spatial formation all the floating concepts of the common experience are gone like big or small, like round, pointed, shaped like an umbel, lancet-shaped, etc. Even where it uses the same words like the common life, for instance straight line, angle, etc. its words have a new, an “exact” meaning, and therein they are not to be acquired through merely sensuous comparison and abstraction. Thus physics is certainly right (this is what the phenomonologically naïve insight tells us) with its locution of the true physical things in the predicates of which there does not occur any red or bitter or loud, and the like. **[192]** And likewise it is right in designating such predicates as merely subjective relative ones, namely as related to the changing organism and changing subjectivity of this organism.

But anyway, the meaning of this separation between physical nature which is objective in contrast to all changing subjectivity, and the subjectively changing natural phenomena is in high need of clarification. Now not the phantom, the changing sight-thing, touch-thing, etc, is called appearance of the thing, but rather, what results in a new concept of appearance, the thing itself, the physical thing the way it is prior to science intuitively given to each human being within the frame of his experience and the way it shows itself. In contrast to this the thing in the sense of physics is a theoretical product added to the intuitive thing. The “substance” of the experiential thing becomes a substrate of certain predications come about in the method of physics after long lasting experimental sessions and theoretical considerations, in which exclusively logical-mathematical concepts occur, and in the sense of physics only such a predicate is a predicate of objective nature.

(Of course this implies also the question of the valuation of the descriptive natural sciences which are mostly only regarded as a lower steppingstone for a future exact mathematical-natural scientific explanatory achievement, whereas it can be asked whether they do not have a necessary right in themselves and their kind of truth.)

These problems are of the highest difficulty. **As transcendental sense-problems they belong to the phenomenological sphere**. Only in their method and in the ways the substrata of which we have depicted can they be tackled in a scientific way and <can> the ambiguous talk of an almost worthless popular-philosophical literature spinning through the centuries be ended.[[63]](#footnote-63)

**[193]** One can and one must of course, in order to directly tackle the **problem of the physical objectivity**, that is, by sticking strictly to exact physics and by taking it now as transcendental example, study the eidetic type of its logical achievement at an intuitive experiential actuality, its logical and ontological direction according to the type of its theories, and of the truly being in the sense of these theories, and phenomenologically according to the performing acts.

Thereby the following needs to be pointed out: As long as we moved within the transcendental aesthetics, that is, within the sphere of the experiential intuition, we proceeded as if other cognizing subjects were not there for us. This of course seems to be legitimate, since even if we had considered them, they could not have given us fundamentally new examples for our inductions. Emotions, intuitions of someone else are for me right (and due to apriori reasons) only by way of empathy, and that which I cannot intuit within my own field of consciousness cannot give me any empathy because it is only a form of reproductive intuition. If we fantasy our surrounding world as a merely physical one, as if within it there were only animate beings, which is an evident possibility, then it seems that neither the possibility nor the possible content of our transcendental aesthetics does change. Also within this solipsistic **[194]** mode of observation we can then remain at the study of scientific cognition of nature, as if thus science was not a produced formation of the community achievement, as if a *solus ipse* had won all scientific cognitions purely within own thinking. We then would have posed the question of natural scientific objectivity in such a way that this objectivity would have no relation to the question, if and how other cognizing subjects we possibly communicate with can cognize the same nature and in the same physical-theoretical determination. Objective validity then does initially not designate inter-subjective validity, not validity which everyone can have insight into and of which everyone can convince himself that it relates to an objectivity which can be experienced by everyone, and that the intellectually seen was exactly the same as the intellectually seen by everyone else, and finally that a theoretically true nature is the norm for everyone. Thus the question would be only what is the advantage and the peculiar of the mathematical-exact thing-determination (according to the sense of the exact-scientific achievement) in contrast to the empirical description acting with intuitive experiential concepts, and how actually the suspension of the intuitive concepts from the cognitions they have to receive on another level can and does proceed.

If then the solipsistic fiction is suspended, and if one proceeds to the type of our given world and world-experience which is a world constituted in the inter-subjective understanding of an open multiplicity of subjects in the exchange of their experiences and theorizings, then additional problems emerge. However it has to be considered how pre-theoretically the one inter-subjective experience-world constitutes itself with the **one** inter-subjectively common space and identical really causal things although everyone has his own sight things, touch things, universal phantoms, and variants of phantoms, his **only for him** in actual experience actually intuitively determinable things. How come that these things being constitutive formations of the **single subjectivity** within empathy can be posited as **inter-subjectively** identical things, that thus everyone readily posits the thing which **he** experiences as numerically identical with the thing which someone else experiences? What does **harmony of experience** mean **[195]** now that each subject for itself has its harmonious experiential connections, its emotions, apprehensions, etc., its only for itself present orientation-givennesses, and everyone still in a completely conscious way attributes other courses of appearance to the other? How are within the inter-subjective relation, whereby obviously it does not come down to the incidentally communicating definite persons, the courses of appearances **differing** from subject to subject characterized which do produce **harmony** of reciprocal confirmation, and those producing discordancy and forcing the one who arrives at understanding to cancel his experience-positing?

It is obvious that what we call world receives its **complete sense** only by way of relation to an undetermined open multiplicity of subjects communicating with us, a multiplicity each optional anti-subject can exit, but also optional new ones can enter (insofar as they are only subjects entering into empathy-connections with us, whose bodies we understand as bodies, and who can understand our bodies as such, and as expressions of our experiences). Curiously enough, **Kant** totally overlooked the problem of inter-subjectivity. Already for transcendental aesthetics inter-subjectivity means a constitutive higher stratum, without consideration of which the constitution of a nature as pre-theoretical experiential unity cannot be performed. The newly emerging here is a factual existence of other animate beings in front of me, the phenomenologically new [is] the empathy as fundamental form of the experience. With it not only other subjects enter the field of our surrounding world, but rather thereby only does the surrounding world gain its whole meaning, and the highest constitutive stratum, the inter-subjective identity.

With astonishment we become aware that physical nature and animality with bodies and souls and personal peculiarities do not only exist among others within the transcendental consideration of the origins, and can be studied next to each other according to their constitution as unities of sense and being within pure consciousness, but that they are rather intertwined with each other in layers, that especially physical nature can only arise according to a lower stratum of senses within the single subject which we imagine as solipsistic, whereas the pure and simple objective nature is an inter-subjective **[196]** experiential unity related to animate beings constituted along, i.e. has a stratum of the senses which only through systematic phenomenology of the empathy achievements performed at appearances of a solipsistic surrounding world can be brought to understanding cognition. Of course the same holds true for the achievement of the natural science. What solipsistic theoretical thinking can and must perform at the intuitive surrounding world of the **single Ego**, is a first transcendental task. But what we call natural science is an inter-subjective achievement related to an inter-subjectively constituted world, and to make this clear of course is our final aim.

After having explained the systematic course of the investigations that lead to the clarification of the gradual constitution of the meaning of cognizable and scientifically true nature, I now touch on the problem of transcendental idealism clinging to its whole course and becoming ever more urgent. What in the phase of transcendental innocence, of natural naivety, was the most obvious thing, the factual existence of this world, initially of the physical world, as soon as we will have eaten from the tree of philosophical knowledge, as soon as we will have entered <the> Fall, the phase of reflection upon the Ego cognizing the world, and upon the cognizing consciousness of the world, becomes the biggest of all mysteries. We study within the frame of the phenomenological reduction the within lower and higher levels of consciousness constituting strata of senses of the world as a correlate of the sense-giving consciousness that posits being. We study within the developmental phenomenology the gradual developments of the other higher apperceived shapings. But thereby we still continuously study the **Ego**, the Ego’s consciousness and intentional correlates, noemata of the Ego’s consciousness.

But there now arises the problem which already clings to the beginning of all reflections of consciousness and which likes to clothe itself with the multiplicity of skepticism, the problem of the **transcendental idealism**: In what way do these gradual sense-bestowings, alone giving the true being of nature its sense, **necessarily** imply the relation to an Ego and an Ego’s consciousness? For instance would it be conceivable that the existent as physical nature remained existing, would remain conceivable as existing, **[197]** if we tried to posit not only all other subjects except the respective de facto experiencing one as not being, but also a *solus ipse* which remained? Is thus a de facto nature essentially related to a de facto subjectivity with a de facto consciousness and a de facto regulation of the consciousness in which the possible experience of the nature with determinately regulated proceedings would have to be predelineated not as an empty possibility but as a fact? Is it, we could ask theologically turned, a theological Apriori that a divine creation of a nature can designate nothing else (without countersense) but a creation of Ego-subjects with streams of consciousness onto which an absolutely strict rule of necessity for experiential courses of a certain style is impressed?

But with relation to the problem (of?) nature and natural science one can formulate quite different problems. Basically we have presupposed the phenomenon of physics as mathematical natural science up till now. It does not in advance and necessarily belong to the eidos “nature” we take from experiential intuition. To the whole eidos “world” do also belong human beings and does also belong culture, do belong sciences, but that sciences of the type of physics necessarily can and must belong there anyway is not obvious in advance as necessity. Or more precisely: We still have, even after we have described the **generic type** of the experiential world by way of a transcendental aesthetics, a multiplicity of world possibilities. It simply is a genre. What is the attitude of the included types of intuitive worlds to the corresponding possible sciences? What kind of distinction does a world have for which a mathematical natural science necessarily is valid? Based on what investigations and maybe logical demands is the necessity of such a natural science to be discerned, and therefore the type of this science *a priori* to be constructed? For the sake of simplicity we put the question on solipsistic ground.

But let us thus not presuppose physics, neither as actual for actual nature nor as pre-given type of a natural science for a possible nature, and let us now try to perform the development of a “transcendental-logical” set of problems bottom up **[198]** by placing ourselves again at the end of our consideration of transcendental aesthetics! Nature and natural object were exclusively correlates of connections of possible experience, connections of harmony in which a thing for example is originally intuited as bodily present pre-theoretically given. **A “transcendental-logical” set of problems, what is that**?

I have said previously that some in true sense to be called transcendental aesthetics, according to our discourse the transcendental aesthetics of the materiality, extends into **Kant**’s transcendental analytics. But the idea of the transcendental analytics or of the transcendental logic also encompasses a further field of problems, essentially to be related to the discussed questions of the secondary qualities, and of the meaning of physically true nature, for which exactly this discourse of transcendental **logic** (or analytics, being only the **Aristotelian** expression for logic) is characteristically suitable. The methodical form of the reasoning and of the rational groundings, that is, the transcendental-logical method demanded by the peculiarity of the transcendental logic, determines a peculiar sense of the discourse of transcendental philosophy and of the transcendental method, and since **Cohen**’s grounding of the Marburg interpretation of **Kant** it has become quite common, and possibly prevalent to think of the transcendental-**logical** method under the title “the transcendental method of **Kant**”. We will try to bring to light the deep, up till now less than clearly to be understood sense of this transcendental **logical**. We will always speak of “transcendental-logical” to exclude all confusion with the originally legitimate and never to be relinquished concept of the **transcendental** which encompasses the problem-field of the clarifications of all eidetic relationships of beings and consciousness, and to thereby hint at my protest against the well-liked pretention that the transcendental-logical method was the one and only method for all rational-theoretical problems.

**[199]** On[[64]](#footnote-64) top we place the question which certainly initially does not seem to be necessary what conditions such an initially intuitively constituted objectivity has to meet in order to meet the conditions of the possibility of **individuality** or of individuality in the pregnant sense. The question can even be put earlier and thereby more universally, on earlier levels of the transcendental aesthetics. One can try the question: If an objectivity as such is an objectivity of a sensuous intuition, that is, initially most universally a temporal objectivity, whereby it is not yet determined that it was a spatial objectivity, when can it be a logical individual? It is also possible to begin with the phantom and ask: if an objectivity is a phantom-objectivity, what logical conditions must be met, and along with this, what forms of concrete shapings must it have to be a logical individual? It would still have to be investigated in what way the questions on the lowest level are sufficiently determined, in no way can this be pre-supposed.

Of course all this clings to the concept of logical individuality, and it is due to the lacking of this [concept], and to logic itself remaining, in the course of millennia, unclear with regard to this fundamental concept and thus universally with regard to its whole primal ontological foundations, that the transcendental questions not only were put that late, but also that they could be conceptualized by **Kant** only in such an unclear way. The neo-Kantianism brought them to this form: “What are the conditions of the possibility of an **objective experiential science**?”, whereby again the concept of an **objective** science was lacking original clarification.

I will try to clarify with some indications and within some limitations the deepest sense of genuine transcendental inquiries of **[200]** this peculiar sense, of the inquiries of transcendental objectivity for objects of possible experience – and thereby the sense of the logical individuality.

I take up here something well-known. The pure logic together with the *mathesis universalis* has the realm of truths, being valid for objects as such without regard for a connection to a material region of objects, as ontological domain. The concepts acted with are characterized as purely logical by being applicable to all conceivable objects, and **object** here designates everything and each from which in truth can be predicated. Genres and kinds are also purely logical concepts, and it is clear that genres in the purley logical sense are objects as well; thus for instance the theory of cardinal numbers, of ordinal numbers, of multiplicities does not ask whether the final units that it leaves in undetermined universality possibly are conceived of as determined as genres or not as genres. One can easily ascertain now that the Apriori of each genre leads us down to objectivities not being genres anymore, and entirely not being something universal anymore having an extension. Finally, we *a priori* arrive at individuals. In this way **all** logical concepts lead us back to final substrates, to individuals. Considering now the correlative concepts “truth” and “being in truth” or “object of the logic” (in the widest sense of the *mathesis universalis*”) the way they historically developed according to the impulses of **Plato**, then it will be shown that it belongs to the sense of the truth in the sense of the logic to be **truth-in-itself** and correlatively to the concept of the object **being object in itself**.

What does this designate? Truth as such stands within the noetic correlation: A truth is *a priori* a discernible sentence within a possible discerned cognizing, that is, in such a way that each optional cognizing subject *idealiter* could gain the same insight, and would have to come across this same truth with the freedom of its cognizing action in its cognitional field. One ideal thereby is determining within the ambit of which each optional subject comes: Each can be conceived of as idealized, as freely acting in its intuiting and thinking, freely fulfilling all intentions. For each subject **[201]** each truth in the sense of logic is accessible, namely when, conceived of as an ideal cognizing subject, it is at least made the subject of the free evidential connections. Correspondingly in the sense of the logic something truly existing as substrate of such truths in themselves is accessible for each optional subject as subject of cognition, [it is] cognizable for it according to its factual existence and [its] being thus. In this sense each mathematical truth is a truth in itself. **De facto** **not** everyone can cognize it, certainly not any [note by the translator: at this point Husserl uses an expression which may be understood as offensive] and not an animal. And yet each cognizing subject, also some optional ape-subject **would** cognize it up to our most difficult theoretical truths if only within itself, in its consciousness, it would perform the predelineated concept-forming, axiomatic insights, deductions. And no consciousness is **conceivable** in the further development of which we could not think of the process of mathematical cognition as being placed into it. We can also say: A consciousness however low it may be could according to ideal possibility assume a development, by the help of which each true theorem of the arithmetic, of the theory of multiplicity would become evident to it. Thus also each cardinal number, each ordinal number, each valid mathematically existent formation belongs to each possible cognizing subject.

We had already the opportunity to discuss that the matter is different for the geometric truths and for the eidetic truths of the pure theory of colors, theory of sound, etc. Each subject has its field of sensations and its empiric apperceptions forming itself from sensational Data by way of a de facto course of the sensuous affection. Correspondingly it is in the forming of material essential concepts bound to examples of its experience or reproductive fantasy. Thus the geometric truths or the Apriori relating to the essential structure of the bright or not bright colors or to the essential structure of sounds, like the theorem of variables that each sound has a variable sound-intensity are **no** longer truth in itself in the strictest sense. Certainly we can conceive of each subject, also of an originally blind one, as feigned into such [a subject] which begins to sense colors or to imagine color, and that it develops within itself a type of visual phantom in a **Euclidean** space. But still the difference hits the eye: if a subject **[202]** has intuitively given objects at all, some material by which it has constituted objects within its consciential development, and if it is a thinking subject at all, then it can in a free manner while abstracting from the material of its exemplary objects shape by way of thinking the formal concept object and its logically changing concepts, and thereby perform formal mathematics, pure logic, and each **other** subject, however the condition of its intuitions then has to form the same truths if it does think at all. In contrast to this, what kind of material truths each subject does think depends on its intuition, and this can be thus that both cognizing subjects do not have it in common at all.

Thereby we understand what the 17th and the 18th century meant by **innate ideas** belonging to the original, innate content of each human subject in the way of innate aptitudes without which no human being can be conceived of. They were guided by an ideal of the human being as of a pure subject of theoretical ration, thus [they were guided] by a rational ideal of which they had the in itself contained ideal possibility in mind. Within this ideal the “sensuousness”, all material of the objective intuitions is left indeterminately open like obviously thinking subjects are possible as *in infinitum* thinking with insight, that is rationally, which have completely different sensuous qualities and types of pre-given intuitive objects. The unconditioned necessity and universality of the validity of the truths of the type of all formal-ontological truths (represented by pure logic and pure arithmetic, etc.) thus has an own rank and gives a certain sense to the concept of the truth-in-itself or of the objectivity of a truth which does not have any relation to a random cognizing subjectivity. It obviously also determines a highly pregnant concept of Apriori in contrast to which the eidetic Apriori of geometry already has a certain contingence.

In the last lecture we discussed the correlatives truth and object as fundamental concepts of the traditional formal logic. We ask ourselves what does the existing in itself, the being valid in itself of the truth signify due to which it also is called within logic **truth in itself**, and correlatively what does **[203] object in itself**, i.e. an object being in itself which is the correlate of truths in themselves related to it, signify? *A priori*, we said, truth and insight belong together inseparably, namely like sentence signifies a judgment-complex as such of an ideally possible judgment as such, thus [does] truth or true sentence [signify] such a sentence which in an ideally possible judgment with insight can be judged with insight.[[65]](#footnote-65) We can understand this now in such a way that **each** **optional** actual or possible cognizing subject could act as subject of such an insight, namely that within the freedom of its cognizing functioning, wherefore we conceived of it as ideally unlimited, would have to come across this same truth with insight. If we understand truth-in-itself in this way then there is an over-subjective validity included within this idea, limiting the concept of truth in a certain way. Thereby it has to be considered: The cognizing subject as logically thinking, as performing free thinking activities of the comprehending judging, is *a priori* related (because without this logical thinking would not be conceivable) to a pre-logical, pre-theoretical sphere of givenness. However this might be qualitied now, we can think of the ideal possibility that the subject was thinking in **freedom**, that it performed with insight all through its pregivennesses to be motivated theoretical, or, what is the same, comprehending and conceptually judging steps, and thus gained the **allness** of the truths which are to be gained in relation to its sphere of pre-givennesses. The respective de facto to be conceived of subject may have its de facto limits; but we can always **idealize** it in the sense of a free progress <as> developing towards the ideal. If we leave **undetermined** the field of intuitive pre-givennesses of an ideal logical subject then indeed a **field** of truths delimits itself which each subject corresponding to the ideal could within itself develop in complete identity with insight, a field of **truths-in-themselves**. Obviously these are truths which *a priori* belong with necessity to each theorizing subject, [which] present for each [subject] a horizon of truth that it **could** pervade **[204]** according to its freedom, and this the more perfectly the bigger its freedom, the more thus it approaches the ideal of the logical cognizing subject. This horizon thus would be *a priori* identical for everyone. Of course it encompasses all the truths which essentially relate back to logical acts as such, that is the formal scientifically theoretical truths, the ones of logic itself and the ones of the formal *mathesis*, e.g. of arithmetic, of algebra, of formal analysis, of function theory, etc.

**How far now does this concept of truth-in-itself reach**? Is it all-encompassing, can it encompass **all** truths as such? That is, do **all sentences** which every optional cognizing subject, moving within the forms of the *logos* can ground with insight correspond to this demand which we have just incorporated into the idea of a truth-in-itself? Is that which any subject logically cognizes with insight accessible for each conceivable other subject for a grounding with insight, provided that we think of it only as optionally free in theorizing?

Certainly the domain of these truths-in-themselves reaches **further** still. Certainly we may address it as an Apriori that certain truths regarding individual being or, if you like, [regarding] absolutely singular being, to which logic leads us back everywhere, correspond to the idea of an In-itself. Thus the universal separation between the egoical and the Ego-foreign, and the sentence, that everything individual is, in a different way though, time-related; more specifically that all Ego-foreign was only existing within the form of time, as something lasting and changeable within its duration, etc. With respect to the Ego and the Apriori to the Ego’s consciousness belonging to an Ego as such then belong further universal essential truths-in-themselves, of course the whole content of those being the noetic correlates of the logical-mathematical truths themselves. This then is considerable.

And yet, the multiple infinity of these truths-in-themselves does **not** encompass **all** truths; infinities are excluded corresponding to the insight we have already previously gained. Excluded are infinities of possible essential truths and infinities according to possible **individual** truths. In the last respect it is clear that if I sense colors under the title of the Ego-foreign, not every cognizing one has to sense **[205]** colors at all. It is a truth-in-itself that it indeed does have any Ego-foreignness, [that] right at the bottom [he does have] any sensuous Data of sensation. “Sensuousness” understood in this way belongs to the realm of the In-itself for each possible subject, but the truths in which any subject sensing colors describes the being and the being thus of these data, are accessible only for this subject. Only for this one. Because also if another subject senses colors then the single color-data are of course different for each one, and however, perceptually they can be given only to him who has this data individually. And thus for all individual experiences belonging to the immanent stream of mental processes of the respective Ego. Maybe they can be accessible for another one, albeit not perceptually, thus in another form of experience through some kind of presentiation, through empathy. But it is clear that for such an indirect cognizance first of all conditions of the possibility are predelineated which restrict the whole type of the cognizing subjects.

The same holds true of course for the eidetic which shall constitute itself within examples of single empirical intuition, possibly of the fantasy. Certainly, if different possible cognizing subjects are assumed as sensing colors or fantasying colors, then each essential cognition for the color as such which the one subject has insight into will be accessible for the insight of every other [subject]. But this is simply not necessary that each logically-theoretically thinking subject has pre-given precisely colors, precisely ego-foreign data of this genre color. Furthermore it can be pointed out that scarcely anyone will assert that it belongs to the essence of an Ego as such that within its consciousness there has to constitute itself something like experience of a transcendent and of a world being in itself in the sense of transcendence, and even if this was the case, that each subject of a transcendent world must have been given a same transcendent world, qualified in the same way within intuition, and then in the same way to be determined within logical cognition with the same natural laws, etc. And again: Even if multiple subjects would be in this lucky situation, still, more precisely regarded, each such experiential world is constituted as a transcendent being of this subject, of the **[206]** respective one and of none else. Likeness is not identity. Again this also concerns the eidetic cognition. If subjects are already intuiting, [if they are] experiential subjects for transcendent worlds, or if they can only imagine them, then it is in itself contingent that the essential types nature, world are identical for different subjects. And this stated from the point of view of the experiential possibility like of the possibility of solipsistic theoretical sciences which besides may set their special conditions.

(But to all this comes something new to which the just used word “solipsistic” points. It is something different, 1) to consider possible cognizing subjects and worlds given to them and theories, and also to consider whether they have identical truths and could bring each for itself to evidence, which conditions need possibly to be fulfilled therefore, and 2) to consider, whether it then is a matter of course that a subject cognizes the truths, which another one cognizes, as truths as well which this [subject] cognizes, and likewise can convince itself that and what kind of objects are actual for the other one, and whether they are the same which it has determined and cognized within itself as actualities? Is it a matter of course that a subject can know of another one’s and its own cognizing field, does this possibility *a priori* and readily belong to the idea of a multiplicity of possible Ego and is it not rather bound to very limiting conditions which predelineate limitations to the concrete Ego with its de facto course of consciousness?)

Questions put in such a determined way already imply the predelineation of the solution. And indeed, how they are to be answered according to the most universal, each phenomenologist readily views.

The further consideration I attach to an objection. Can we not equally well like the ideal of a theoretically thinking in a perfect way, that is of a logical cognizing subject, also form the ideal of an Ego which has all possible “cognizing materials” accessible within its cognizing field, and which views into each possible Ego, communicates with each, possibly gains community understanding, inter-subjective science, etc.? Certainly we are able to, but whether this ideal, understood within this limitlessness presents a possibility and not possibly incompatibilities, **[207]** would have to be considered. And moreover, it is principal that the universal idea of an Ego as such, then more precisely of an intuiting Ego as such and of a thinking, cognizing as such gives the possibility to different formations of ideals, each of which has its special norm system which cannot be readily included into all subjects, as if each one could readily suffice for it.

Thereby apriori compatibilities and incompatibilities exist which we have to heed, and it is necessary to scientifically encompass and explicate all existing ideal possibilities. **Logic** is something undetermined as long as it does not clarify the ideal of the cognizing subject, the correlate of which is the truth-in-itself and the true being-in-itself, or rather, as long as it does not clarify the pure sense of these concepts within the noetic correlation to which they belong. Certainly for the logic we can and must begin with the idea of a **logical** subject, directed towards the truth. The truth is *logos* not of a judgment in each optional sense (like determined through a belief, possibly also through motion or change), but rather in the sense of the comprehending judgment: without concept-formation no judgment-formation. Thus, the beginning is a judgment with insight together with its correlate of the truth as judicial truth. At the beginning there is correspondingly the **ideal** of a subject performing logical acts with insight in absolute unlimited freedom. In the sense of the logic as a formal one is implied that for this ideal cognizing subject it remains open which material contents are pre-given to it, that is, the material type of its experiences remains completely undetermined. If we thereby *eo ipso* have a realm of truths-in-themselves which are essentially identical for each logically cognizing [subject], no matter whether they can communicate or not, then special ideas of truths-in-themselves are needed with relation to possible material and **regionally determined** cognizing fields, and each such special idea prescribes a limited rule to the subjectivity.

Now the common apprehension of the ideality and of the unconditional validity of the logic is determined by our putting ourselves out as subjects of logical cognition, we, being **subjects of this nature**, into which we include ourselves as **human subjects** and in which we communicate and **[208]** can and do perform science together. Without getting clear about it we take as our basis the ideal type determined thereby from which we do not suspect that it could be the only possible one. Correspondingly as basis for the logical individual is taken the limited idea of an individual object which in its individual material determinacy is the **substrate of experiential truths** **every cognizing [subject] can cognize** whereby each like a matter of course is conceived of as related to the same material sphere of existence, like each of us is subject of the same transcendent world.

But what plays its role here as a **matter of course** without contrast **does imply an enormous problem**: posited we think of any individual sphere of existence as experientially pre-given to a subject, which ontic and noetic conditions need to be fulfilled for other subjects to be able to experience individually the same sphere of existence? If it is for different subjects the same then **this identity itself** must be demonstrable for a cognizing [subject]. What does this prescribe to the experience and the ontic type of the experienced objectivities? Which conditions have further to be fulfilled that the truths which a subject gains for this individual sphere of logical insight can be **truths-in-themselves**, i.e. truths which every other cognizing subject can gain in an identical sense? According to our insight it is not a matter of course that two subjects experiencing each solipsistically a transcendent nature for itself, and experience it in the same transcendental-aesthetical type, namely colored, **Euclidean** spatial, etc., therefore already have the same truths-in-themselves, because for them **identical** objects have not yet been constituted. More universally these subjects could have constituted worlds of a different type. If we conceive of them generally as subjects, each of which experiences a nature: when is the nature the same, initially intuitively identifiable, when is it logically the same, theme of identical logical truths of existence, that is finally one and the same natural science? Still more universally we can leave it open whether the subjects under the title “world”, be it transcendent objectivities as such experience or, if already this, whether they have been given a world of spatial form, etc. There are inquiries of different heights of levels. **[209]** Still the form of inquiry is the same. What does the idea of individual objectivity, whether it be as individual singularity, or in the form of an endlessly open world of conceived [objectivities] prescribe as structures so that this objectivity **can be truly existent in the sense of a substrate of truths and sciences-in-themselves**, accessible for each cognizing subject which has or can have an experiential apperception of the respective type of the former subjects? What is prescribed to the subjects thereby? Is it thus contingent that we human beings (having a natural science and correlatively an identical, by each one singly to be experienced nature) are bodily talented subjects, human beings that as psycho-physical realities have to find their place within the world cognized by them? Is thereby not expressed an essential form belonging to the possibility of truths-in-themselves and thereby to the possibility of a natural science valid for all “human beings”?

**Kant**, in his transcendental analytic and later in the transcendental deduction, did struggle against parts of this set of problems. Transcendental logic is nothing else but the science of the conditions of the possibility of a logical truth for materially determined individual being, of a truth-in-itself, valid for an open endless multiplicity of subjects which shall be able to become cognizing subjects for this individual existence. But certainly **Kant** did neither here arrive at completely pure and radical settings of problems and therefore at clear solutions. The one main side for the problem of the transcendental possibility of a multiplicity of subjects which shall be able to cognize the same individual, namely <that> which relates to the performance of empathy, he did not see at all, to name but one.

The relation of these transcendental logical problems to the problem **of the primary and secondary qualities** is easily to be made apparent. Let us take the fact as a starting point: We human beings have about, “normally”, the same sensuousness, and inter-subjectively, by way of empathy, a common individual nature is aesthetically-intuitively constituted for us, correspondingly also common descriptive sciences like natural history. **[210]** But the dependence of the sensuously intuitive phenomena of the organism is thus that this normal accord is often broken and can constantly be broken without having it at our command. We will later allude to the facts of the inborn deafness and blindness, of the color blindness, etc.

We now put the question, if now in contrast to the subjectively bound descriptive truths considering this multiplicities of subjective variations an identical nature as the realm of identical truths-in-themselves shall constitute itself, truths which purely and simply remain insensitive against all differences of the psycho-physical constitution and intuitive apperception, what kind of peculiarities must everyone’s experiential world have, and which special kind and method of logical truth?

Whereby does the **exact physics** have the great primacy over natural history? Obviously y their truths being **truths-in-themselves**. But what characterizes them in this regard more closely? Which peculiarity do they have and must they have? Obviously this one that they may contain only concepts including no determined sensuousness, because we may not attribute them to each cognizing one in an identical way, that is, concepts of the logical-mathematical sphere. But within their determination these concepts and the conceptual judgments must be related to what each one experiences individually within his experience, they must be acquired in a strict method from the sensuously experienced. Therefore it must be **thus**, that **each one** with **his** special sensuousness and his sensuously qualified things must still be able to bring into play necessary thought processes, merely guided by the empirical order of his phenomena which give him a **certain** result of logical-mathematical shape, a result which is necessarily the same for each other. The mathematical determination thus is not an empty form but gains its sense and its application on the individual from the univocalness of the method. A natural science for subjects of a sensuous-intuitive and pre-theoretically, despite of sensuous variations, common nature can only then be a natural science valid in itself, when the **intuitive nature is mathematizable**, a **[211]** nature of purely logical shape in such a way that everything subjectively valid acquires its objective, inter-subjective expression in theorems of mathematical-logical shape. Only a mathematizable nature can be true in itself, a field of inter-subjective truths-in-themselves. Correspondingly all intuitive things of the cognizing individuals must be mere “appearances”, and must each specific sensuous quality of the intuitive thing in the methodical process of objective science fall from the scientific truth, whereas inversely each mathematical thing determination has its sense only within the determined pointing back to something sensuously qualified.

The result of the highly encompassing and difficult investigations all of which perform these allusions systematically, can also be formulated thus: 1) A subject can within its consciousness have been given a transcendent world only in the form of transcendent apperceptions to the essence of which their implying open presumption belongs; the transcendent world can only be an endlessly presumptive unity of harmonious experience which never gives the existence in an ultimately valid way. 2) For multiple subjects the same transcendent world can only be intuitively given and demonstrable as the same by way of empathy and due to intuitively constituted bodiliness. 3) Such a commonly constituted world fundamentally allows subjective variations of the experiences of the single subjects, and even if these facilitate a practically sufficient accord then the final perseverance of the identity of the varyingly qualified things is a mere pretension. True identity demands logical truths-in-themselves which prescribe a rule to the subjectively varying things and a method to the cognition, that of mathematical natural science.

#### §5. The problems with regard to the psycho-physical and the psychic sphere as well as of the respective sciences

Let us now have a look at the remaining transcendental problems of the world. **Those of the physical nature**, like our investigation brings out, were **essentially [212] interwoven with the problems of the intellectuality**. Nature as a physical world of true being is only conceivable as psycho-physical nature. We have already within the transcendental aesthetics touched on the **necessity of an eidetic somatology**. Bodiliness is more than physical objectivity and *a priori* designates a natural region in need of an eidetic investigation. Only the bodiliness facilitates animality in the first place which again is more than bodiliness. The body is intertwined with **psychic life**; The sensuous intuitively and in apperceptive peculiarity belonging to the body is impossible without any conscientious contents, but thereby the mental process and the corresponding empirical Ego is not yet determined as a subject of lasting habitual properties.

We have been given within the phenomenal eidetic type **our** nature, which initially is physical nature, **psychophysical being in the three-stage form**: animate physical organism corresponding to physical zoology, animate organism as sensuous organism and animate psyche. The physiology presently treats the sensuous-organismal, but without separation from the physical-zoological. But within the sensuous physiology for instance it clearly stands out. Here a clearly delimited specific **somatology** would be needed in my opinion, a precise name is still lacking here as well, and this would be the necessary substrate for **psychology**, the theory of the mental or the psychic within the world which simply can and does not have a mundane existence as such, but which is in need of an organism which for its part is not only a physical organism, but rather through sensibility, through relation of sensuous fields to the intuitive extension of the respective organism, through free movement becomes an organism.

For reasons of distinction I am used to say that a physical organism was an organism by way of **aesthesiological** functions belonging to it and corresponding strata of being, correspondingly instead of somatology I speak more distinctly of **aesthesiology** as next substrate for the proper **psychology**. To this the biggest ontological and phenomenological problems are attached, and moreover problems of their legitimate goal-setting and method. We here do not benefit like in the case of physics from having a science **[213]** which through the deepest sense of its objective sphere already actualizes the required scientific idea, that is, at least is completed **in** goal and method. Modern psychology certainly performs much valuable. But how that which it performs relates to the necessary goals of a psychology and how this itself is to be delimited is completely unclear. However strong the action of the beginning **phenomenology** may be for the contemporary psychology, they still, because one was too lazy to acquire the radical sense of phenomenology and correspondingly to perform a radical methodical renewal within oneself, remained quite external.

If we study within phenomenological reduction the pure Ego and Ego’s consciousness according to its essential formations then the **world** given to us in natural-naïve attitude changes into the **world phenomenon**, into a multiplicity of noematic correlations of the consciousness as the essentially but in an unreal way, merely as intentionally supposed, belonging to it. The **psychological attitude** of course is something else because there we shall not suspend the empirical thesis of the world and especially of the animate-psychic world, but rather **perform** it and thus not only regard it as mere phenomenon in the sense of phenomenology and as a constitutive possibility among endlessly other possibilities. But in advance it is clear that everything we have discerned of the pure essence of the Ego and the Ego processes in eidetic necessity must also be valid for the **empirical consciousness** which together with physical nature and organism has objectivated itself as **natural intellectuality**, as **animate** Ego and Ego process.

If we now consider within the naïve natural attitude the existing nature with regard to its included psychic, whether it be empirical or ontic according to its type, what in the latter case would result in ontology of the physical nature, then initially it is necessary to become clear how something **psychic**, Ego consciousness and the Ego itself fit into the just constituted world, into the physical nature. By way of the physical organismal connection within the apperception human being all phenomenological consciousness **mediately experiences a** **spatialization**, although in itself it is not spatial, in itself it has nothing like spatial form and **[214]** position. Something similar is already valid for the temporal form of the Ego (and of the Ego’s acts. We may ascribe duration, extension within time to them. But considered more closely the temporality is here essentially something else, like with all physical, but also already in all sensuous, for the touch field, the view field, etc. as well.) Only mediately through the apperceptive connection to the organism and the constitution of the animate psychic a quasi-temporalization and –spatialization of the consciousness subject results as if it had an extension within the natural time. Thereby it has to be remarked that the natural time is a spatial time and due to essential reasons is measured through spatial apparatus and spatial magnitudes. The empirical subjects thus fit themselves through an apperceptive spatialization and temporalization into a single physical nature, **according to classification** not originally, as if they themselves were *res extensae*. If the improperty of this transformation is not clearly cognized, and [if] the completely different constitutive sense of physical reality is not fittingly taken account of, then the temptation is close at hand to readily transfer all the categories of the physical nature having their point of origin only within it, to nature in the enlarged sense. The true being of physical nature theoretically works out the much admired mathematical natural science which indeed according to scientific strictness and insight was allowed to become a **model**; but not readily were the basic notions and the type of their method depending on its original sense bestowing, allowed to be transferred. What this designates, the **intuitive nature** is a **world of mere “appearances”** having an unintuitive and only logically-mathematically to be determined In-itself, we have learned to understand.

We also understood that the physical nature has a peculiar In-itself as correlate of **logical truths-in-themselves**, whereby it is stated that all being of physical nature is univocally determinable “in an objective way”, and that the **causality** belonging to it must be mathematical functionality within a definite mathematical multiplicity. If now **physics** is **externally imitated by psychology,** and if what is accepted for the physical nature is readily transferred to psychophysical nature, then the **apprehension** which governs the development of modern psychology **[215]** **that unexperienceable psychic In-itself also corresponds to the psychic being** as substrate of **exact laws** by which it has to be **univocally** constructible, determinable for each cognizing [subject] universally in the manner of objective science or “truths-in-themselves”. In ruthless consequence certainly only **Herbart** has completed this apprehension by his experiment of a **mathematical psychology** in exact analogy to mathematical physics. But however strongly this mathematical psychology was rejected the leading basic intuition was not abandoned resolutely, and thus within new psychology the meaningless naturalization of the mental actualities is still effective, a completely illegitimate, nay **countersensical** transference of the ideal of physics (concerning goal and method) to the mental sphere.

The senselessness already emerges from the fact that whereas the **natural object** is a logical-scientific, that is, unintuitive unit, and only can be such a unit, and <according to > its sense finally points back to subjects, consciousness, psychic, the psychic itself again cannot be such an unintuitive unit which has in the same way the consciousness as correlate behind itself. Indeed the animate subject, the psychic unit, is also something constituted of constituting multiplicities of consciousness, but all these consciential experiences in which it presents itself respectively themselves belong to the psychic, and thus all subjectivity is nothing less than something like an appearance in the sense as it is <a> thing of physical experience, but rather actually something **self-given** within the psychic experience, **within the intuition**, intuitively given with an own essence having no senseful task, an In-itself which first of all manifests itself within it as a unit of theoretical validity to be brought out and determined. To point it out in a more distinct way: nature is according to its constitutive **sense** a through inter-subjective reciprocal understanding self-constituting unity of identity of the separately within the single subjects constituted intuitive natures, something identical apperceptively attributed to all of them, in contrast to which the intuitive nature everyone finds within himself is called appearance. The same holds true for the physical **organisms** of the subjects; but the subjects themselves are absolute, they are what makes appearances possible, but [they are] not **[216]** appearances themselves. *A priori* thus subjects are only in themselves perceptible and reciprocally empathitable, [they] can be followed and understood, and therefore [they are] de facto only theorizable in the form of description.

Something like a human Ego subject, the personal unity with its personal psychic life, simply that which characterizes the psychic-real within human life, can never be objectively determinable in exact-natural scientific method as an ideal substrate of nomological predicates, as something which every cognizing [subject] could work out according to a strict method from appearances, and what **Laplace’s** mind could pre-calculate. (It results thereof that, like the sense of the true being of a psyche and psychic personality, thus the sense of science relating to psychic must be something totally different than what for us is under the title “natural science” a strictly delimited, but simply *physis*-related idea.) Thereby **a complete difference between natural science and the socio-cultural sciences** announces itself, and to the latter belongs a complete and whole and a correctly understood psychology.

Certainly, what is confusing is that psychology as well necessarily has layers of problems, methods and truths showing essentially a community with the natural scientific ones, and that the designation of psychology as exact natural science with regard to these layers has a certain limited right. With the empirical apperception in which the egoical, inserted into physical nature, is apprehended, experienced as real mundane being, in advance a certain ordered correlation of psychic to organismal-physical as belonging to the sense of the psychic is constituted. The transcendental apperception of the psychophysical as a presumptive one like every other transcendental apperception sets the task to pursue the more closely determining special rules for the classification of the psychophysical dependencies. This does not need to relate only to the sensations and phantasms; how far this reaches is a matter of experience and of the apperception enlarging along with it and of the scientific determination.

Insofar as the physical organism stands under the idea of mathematical-natural scientific determination, mathematized being-in-itself here connects itself to the non-mathematical being of **[217]** the aesthiological and of the specifically psychic, what results in a set of problems of a completely peculiar style, the style of all psychophysics. In a certain measure mathematical determination emerges here for the psychological. Supposed the ideal of mathematical natural science was realized with regard to the animate organism, and in the sense of an approximate mathematics the set of types of the physical organism was mathematically delimited, which as an animate set of types carries a psychic function, that is, characterizes a complex of atoms in such a way that it actually mediates sensations, etc. then to certain psychic occurrences certainly mathematical determinations do correspond, namely psychic processes determined in exact physical values. Then the psychic itself would in accordance to the correlation be exactly determined, and immediately the idea of a universal psychophysical parallelism is attractive according to which the psychic indeed would not be itself determined in a mathematical exact way and in its own sphere, but in an indirect way under the idea of a strict correlation to the complexes of the physical nature determined in an exact-physical way, that is, under the idea of a set of laws that each material organism, of this or that exact determination, and equipped with these and those physical processes in a univocal way should carry certain psychic correlates, like inversely [under the idea of a set of laws] that psychic correlates can only emerge in nature as correlates of objective physical processes univocally belonging to them in exactly such physical organisms. As long as this ideal is not realized and insofar as it is not realized, one would only out of **necessity** content oneself with intuitive-descriptive constitutions of types of dependencies like natural history does, and the exact physical would only occasionally step in, relate back the intuitive typical to the exact. This is a thought which all those pursue who already notice that there is something else in psychological exactitude than in the physical, according to meaning and method.

This would all be well if it was not countersenseful to regard this scheme as universally valid in that sense that for each psychic one had to search for a physical-organismal correlate especially belonging to it, and to thereby believe that the science of the mental was exhausted. **[218]** The essence of the intentionality is thereby completely overlooked, the essence of the consciousness as a constitutive consciousness, as well for the real psychic itself as moreover also for the physical. And however much within the empirical apperception the psychic must be related to the constituted nature and must be relatable, thus dubious and wrong is it to naturalize all psychic in a parallelistic way. All empiric apperception points back to “association and custom” as title for all style of the constitution of the “if and thus”, and to completely naturalize the psychic is the same as bringing back all psychic to regular orders originated in an associative way and thereby de facto unintelligible, while thereby one passes by that which within the psychic makes the original peculiar, and [makes] each psyche a unit of pervasive connected intelligibility in which as unintelligible rest only the fact of the sensations remains.

(Here I must immediately add that the matter is more complicated and that the following needs to be heeded.) A certain parallelistic correlation of the psychological, to which in this consideration the aesthiological is counted as substrate that supports the idea of a correlational exact determination of something not logifiable in itself (in the sense of a natural-in-itself), certainly is legitimate. One can now pursue the thought that a separation is needed between a substrate within the animate psychic life, immediately parallel to the physical-organismal, and a higher stratum, having no immediate relation to the physical, but which through its connection to the substrate is mediately physically conditioned. According to this we would have 1) the direct parallelistic regulation of the substrate, 2) the rules of the dependency of the upper stratum on the substrate, 3) possibly own rules belonging to the upper stratum. In correspondence to this certainly valuable distinction then there is the question what kind of regulations shall come into question especially for the psychic of the upper stratum. With the lower stratum we think of course of the sensations and phantasms, of sensuous emotions and impulses, with the upper [we think of] manifold formations of the consciousness as intentionality, whereby of course it is certainly truly dubious whether this separation may count as an actual separation. Anyhow one would like to try an approach thereby, and now, **[219]** again following the natural scientific model [one would like] to regard all rules in the same way as the empiric-inductive rules within physical nature which, as long as we cannot perform exact physics, present approximate and yet valuable rules within the descriptive-intuitive nature.

But you have to learn to see the great problems here. The **empiric** regulation of the intuitive-physical nature has a relation to an **exact natural set of laws of a nature-in-itself**. One can say, like the intuitive things and their empirical-physical properties are appearances <of> natural realities-in-themselves, namely of the physical nature, thus the empirical rules of the intuitive-descriptive natural consideration are appearances of respective, yet complex, exact-nomological connections.

To clarify this completely besides belongs to the transcendental theory of the nature. Let us now proceed to the **psychological sphere**. There as well we have an **empirical set of types**, e.g. human characters are empirical units we all continually describe with descriptive-typical concepts, and in relation to which we enounce empirical rules, like all languages enounce them already, but likewise also the rules of the development of the human steps of life, etc. But if now the whole psychic life of the animals and human beings is to be brought into empirical regulations then there is the question what is the substrate of these regulations which here cannot have their final truth in a mathematical-exact psychology. And does not **each psychic** in each psyche must have a univocal determinacy, that is, its individual necessity for existence, and finally something which on its part explains all empirical rules from final reasons?

Now it must not be overlooked that empirical consideration of nature as a consideration of any connections of spatial-temporal existence, also of the existence of the psychic within nature, according to the sense of experiential apperception **exclusively** relates to the regulations of the constancy and succession being under the title of substantiality, causality, and these are through and through **unintelligible** connections. What is cognized there is always only that this and that here and now occurs together, **[220]** because according to experience such a thing in such a type usually occurs together, and there are rational presumptions to suppose a strict conformity to laws here. But **phenomenology** has opened up endless fields of an Ego- and consciential cognition in which **completely different regulations**, regulations of **inner motivation** occur, and connections having already in a **single case** a totally different character, the character of the **intelligibility**, of the only genuine intelligibility. To the question: “Why do I judge, assess, decide, and act thus and thus, why did I choose this or that instrument, what were the reasons, motives thereby?”, etc., within the inner consideration I receive an intelligible answer, and this is based upon intelligible connections. This does not relate any more to human psychophysical being with regard to its psychophysical and empirically natural connections, not any more with regard to their constancy in the sense of the spatial-temporal experiential existence, but rather it is related to the **subjectivity as mind, in its internality, in its intelligible life and acting**, it relates to the mind as performing subject as well as to its mental performances, how they objectivated themselves as works, as objects with significance-predicates, as significational formation of every kind.[[66]](#footnote-66) **[221]**

### Appendix I

Above all[[67]](#footnote-67) now concerning **the method**. It is always and due to good reasons proper to radical philosophical clarifications that they have to begin with doubtless evidences, and, if they are concrete, do begin; that they furthermore proceed in evident connections, whereas within their assertions they are not definite because of such evidence. A radical phenomenological investigation is not similar to a radical mathematical investigation, the idea of which is well known to all of us. A perfect mathematical investigation may be however difficult to be put under way, it may take many centuries that it will be realized in the work of generations of researchers; once it is there it offers a way of thinking which, from the beginning stepping into the heights and proceeding into infinity, never has to be turned back; i.e. right at the bottom there are the axiomatic evidences, axiomatic concepts and principles which within the evident thinking viewing them are given as firmly determined, once and for all realized truths. And exactly the same then holds true for each progress. Within[[68]](#footnote-68) mathematics corresponding to its idea, and if it actually is or is actually valid as a realizable idea, within the progress of science de facto no new work is needed for the assertions of the lower steps. Each step is definitely realized. Each [step] is forever ready and complete. Every beginner can immediately understand the beginning of perfect mathematics, can immediately have insight into it, and if he does, then he has insight into it as something once and for all realized to which further mathematical work cannot add anything.

It is different within the development or rather the grounding of phenomenology. An extent of evident thinking proceeds and is necessarily the first, the first with which the philosopher like the learning beginner has to begin. But de facto **[222]** this first extent does not result in a definite assertion in the stated sense, and thereby it is said at the same time: The first work directed from a beginning towards a proceeding and a goal demands despite the evidence of the givennesses a second work going back which presents itself within the already ascertained, that is, which again considers everything already cognized, treats it anew and leads it to a higher level of cognition. The investigation thus follows a **zigzag**,[[69]](#footnote-69) whereby it is not stated that it never arrives at something completely and definitely realized, and goes into no direction. One must not here be astounded by formalist objections, or rather, let oneself be seduced by such [objections], but in a calm way look the situation in the eye. The clear beginning we have made in actual inner participation, we have thought through in clear evidence, provides already the understanding. **Is another beginning of philosophical sense-investigation concerning nature and mind, more universally concerning the world, conceivable, than that we begin by asking ourselves, how the world is given to us**, that we say science gave us the statement claiming truth-value, etc.? And is it possible in a different way that we in such evidences speak of the world being problematic for us, and not only that we speak, but rather have something clearly in view along with it, something clear and yet rather vague. Something undetermined? And the same is accepted of other concepts emerging within the investigation as doubtlessly and radically belonging into it. Thus we continuously speak of We or of <an> Ego which in a cognizing way, of the Ego which within thinking and prior to thinking has my surrounding world, my world, my mental process, etc.

Gradually we have something evident before the eyes; but after we have proceeded, after having brought some things closer from the already given, but conceptually not delimited or in vague words delimited and <thus> designated, [after having] delimited in more determined concepts, [after having] cognized, after having worked out certain connections we cognize instantly, that something else which remained undetermined, nay, what stood at the very beginning as a leitmotif receives a new light, becomes determinable, conceptually to be grasped, delimitable. Thus one goes back to this point from an end again to the beginning. I here divert your attention to these methodical necessities, so that from early on you become aware of the incomparable peculiarity of philosophical investigation. Philosophical thinking proceeds within a progress of radical evidences which in exactly **[223]** this development recoils to the content of the previous evidences, lifting their sense-content onto a higher step which a new thinking going back has first of all to vitalize, indeed form and elevate it to the developed truth. For the already mature this is not that wonderful since all mental life consists in mental development, and mental development according to its essence carries along effects reverberating to the run out life, nay, in each phase is possible only thereby.

But now back to our previous way, and the now necessary work turned backwards. We begin our considerations in the first person and in a corresponding, initially easily intelligible, but unresolved Ego’s attitude. Everyone should say “I” and ask himself: What do I find, that is, as pre-theoretical givenness? He should not let anybody tell him anything, report anything, he should neither take over anything from tradition, from prejudices, anything of a thinking, nor of that of a, however secure and accepted by himself, science. This would suffice to motivate everyone to the wished for attitude; moreover also the exhibited would serve to keep him in this attitude. Indeed I proceeded in thinking, and you were thinking along with me. But of course you were thinking within yourself, or rather, you looked into yourself, in the circle of your pre-givenness, and strictly you intended to put me and my intuiting and stating out of action, as soon as the evoked intuitive material presented itself. In other words, I then received a mere place in your pre-theoretical life-world as an externally given like the desk and other found objects.

Before we now due to the evidently viewed in this Ego attitude set about making the Ego of this attitude and the attitude itself in a new phenomenological reversion a clarifying theme, we want to regard more closely the sphere of pre-givenness of this attitude within the articulation we have gained, and make clear the difference between pre-given content as such and pre-given world. Since we have come thus far as to acquire a first, indeed in the manner of a primal source delimiting, concept of the world.[[70]](#footnote-70) This is performed by the radical separation between the egoical and the external of the Ego which we have made to be outstanding and [which we] investigated in some depth. If we take it purely that way it presented itself within the pure Ego’s attitude, then thereby **[224]** pre-theoretically the Ego emerges, or rather my Ego for me being the subject of all these reflections, as the subject to whom all egoical, all its streaming mental processes, also its memorial beennesses of mental processes are not given as world; rather, world is obviously and according to the sense we connect with the word prior to all conceptually strict apprehension a title for the all of the objects being “in themselves”, the transcendent ones, […], the objects which, like we anticipate, are substrates of possible **“objective” truths**, truths-in-themselves. Within the Ego’s attitude there is a world for me, that is, there are manifold objects for me which soon will enter my experience, soon will leave again, and yet are in contrast to the experiencing (of) an In-itself. I am not myself given as an object to me apart from my being there for me presently only in special acts of reflection, and the same is valid for all my egoical.

The world, irrespective of its being-in-itself, nay, according to the sense of this being-in-iself, is thereby given as my **surrounding world**. This does not only designate that I have consciousness of the factual existence of this and that thing, and original perceptional consciousness, and [that I] am related to it within this perception, but also what I do not see, what I do not fantasy in own fantasies is firmly related to me, like it is already apparent from the clear beginnings of the analysis of thing-perception; because the perceived is necessarily surrounded by a horizon of possible perception. I may well say there is within the world, in the realm of the objects being in themselves much of which I do not know anything, what I have never experienced and will never experience, but still: There is nothing in it I could not come across in possible perceptual courses coming from the now experiential givennesses, or would have been able to come across, and possibly with the suitable proceeding into the spatial-temporal world would have to come across. Everything I as pure pre-theoretical subject not only do find as something external of the Ego, but [which I] should be able to conceive of as actual, I either actually have to be able to find it as actual within my own perceptual courses univocally confirming and completing themselves, or <it> must allow for being discerned as something that could make itself known within my actual perceptions, as something which has a motivated “possible perception”. This is to be performed.

**[225]** I[[71]](#footnote-71) can so to speak fantasize within the horizon of the unknown, surrounding my perceptual sphere, everything, and that which I imagine presents itself in a certain sense also as an object of my possible perception. But the world is thus given to me as a world extending beyond the presently seen into the unknown in infinity, that in advance it is decided what is actual within the unknown, and what in contrast to that is fiction. Correspondingly the courses of perception are predelineated and distinctive as belonging only as such to the (open) **actuality** in contrast to others which are possible only in the way of **fiction,** and which are bound to burst in the process of actual experience through discordancy.

Thus in a peculiar way (although still in need of clarification) is given to me, the Ego of the pure reflection, within well-ordered formations of egoical life contents (in ordered courses of sensations, adumbrations, appearances) an objective world as my surrounding world, as objective, as being in itself and yet related to me myself as a world into which I look, but in such a way that I still can embrace it in its whole infinity, also as far as I do not see it, namely insofar as *a priori* nothing of this world can be which I could not reach within the assorted process of my pre-theoretical consciousness, more precisely, of my perception.

This may suffice for the time being. We have gained a concept of the world, namely as surrounding world of my [subject], the pure subject of reflection.

But now, before we proceed, it is necessary to perform a reversion of the phenomenological analysis with regard to this Ego practicing pure reflection. Why this talk of pure reflection? Certainly we are not enough prepared to further the problem of the Ego – of the so-called pure Ego. But we have to dwell on this at this point, to prevent the danger of great aberrations. Within the Ego attitude it was clear to us that the **mundane** and the **egoical** do contrast extremely, that the egoical, the realm of the absolutely evident *cogito*, is not a transcendence, not an appearing, not an In-itself.

**[226]** Through these investigations we have gained something important. They had the form of an ex post facto theoretical reflection concerning the Ego attitude and the way of the ascertainments performed within it, and universally to be performed. Now we understand that the **Ego attitude** was nothing else but the **direction of regard of the pure Ego to its pre-givennesses**, namely the pre-givennesses of its immanent and transcendent experience, but then again to the respective pure possibilities, and the apriori and evidently corresponding general predicational complexes of affairs. But the statements that have been made thereby and which we considered according to their sense, were themselves statements of the pure Ego, and their content was nothing but relativities towards the pure Ego, which reflectively grasped belonged into all these statements; they all had the form: “I find immanence”, “I find something external”, “I find as apriori insight the countersense of the negation of any immanent something”, “I find the apriori necessity that each conceivable external must be given through appearances”, etc. If we now abstract from the self-positing of the pure Ego onto the subject-position of these statements, and if we only look onto what the Ego states as its pre-found, then it is clear that a class of statements concerning **pure immanence** falls into this circle, concerning purely immanent actualities and purely immanent possibilities and laws of possibilities which is not concerned by the putting out of action of all actuality theses performed by the pure Ego in relation to its external surrounding world. Besides there was a circle of statement-contents positing and describing how **external actualities** were found as actual ones; possibly we can also take statements which thereupon induced for external things in the manner of science. But if the pure Ego states: “I find this thing, this external world, I judge it now thus and thus”, then obviously every such statement can be changed into an immanent statement, and then takes its place within the first circle, namely like the Ego, which initially and necessarily had taken actuality as its basis, had accepted it, puts out of action it actuality belief and regards, describes, analyzes the respective external perception only as perception of its perceived, the respective judgment only as judgment of the perceived as such, so to say without taking the actuality’s side. As soon as the pure Ego thus proceeds, and it is evident that it can do this anytime, it has purely delimited the all of its pure Ego contents; it is the Ego, which neither accepts nor denies any transcendent, external world, which neither has nor admits any position taking concerning this **[227]** world, and exclusively has its pure consciousness, prefinds it and makes it the theme of position-takings. This Ego is the **phenomenological Ego** in the pregnant sense, the Ego of actual and possible purely phenomenological investigation, the subject of all transcendental-philosophical investigation.

### Appendix II

**I, the present pure Ego**, find myself as performing natural positings, as thereby possibly practicing phenomenological reduction. The pure Ego or, which is the same, the active Ego as performing phenomenological reductions and purely within phenomenological reduction acquiring a phenomenological field in phenomenological intuition and in scientific thinking. We speak of the “phenomenological Ego”, or more precisely [of] “the phenomenologically investigating Ego” (= the Ego of the purely phenomenological attitude. = the phenomenologically focused Ego), i.e. not <of> the Ego as theme of phenomenology, but rather as of the Ego functioning as Ego-pole of phenomenological investigation, of the Ego for which the phenomenological field and only this is constituted. **The phenomenologically investigating Ego** finds within his field **the natural Ego** in parenthesizing (thereby as noema), i.e. the Ego positing nature and transcendent being of different kind, whereby the positings are put out of action; and it finds all natural world within parenthesizing.

The Ego of the phenomenological attitude and investigation has prior to all theory (that is prior to all phenomenological theory, the only one actually performing it) given its field in pure intuition as a givenness of immanent experience, or rather of immanent eidetic viewing, that is its pre-theoretic field (which parenthesizes all transcendence, intuitively and externally given and theoretically thought, also valued and practically apperceived). The natural Ego has before itself the natural life world, the intuitive one in the common sense, the one which lies prior to its theoretical investigating, but also prior to its otherwise active taking position. Reduction processes allow it to work out a world of pure sensuous intuition here.

**[228]** The phenomenologically focused Ego considers in transcendental deliberation, what the natural Ego does posit, what sense the posited has through its sense-bestowing effected within the immanence, that is, which sense its pre-given life-world has, what structures this sense grasps. All fundamental deliberations relating to the natural sciences and the other forms of transcendently directed rational performances like art, religion, individual life-wisdom, special individual ethics, politics as social life-wisdom, etc., are deliberations of the **essence** of these formations or deliberations relating to the apriori sense which are to be cleared up from the original sense-bestowings within pure consciousness, that is, in phenomenological attitude.

### Appendix III

What[[72]](#footnote-72) in this regard has already emerged for us is the first fundamental piece of a determination in the manner of a primal source of the concept “**world**”, that is, in the necessary form of the correlation “I and my surrounding world”, and grasped more closely of the correlation “I and my pre-theoretical surrounding world”. Indeed, also my Ego and my egoical are pre-theoretically given to me while reflecting, but they are, when I take them purely the way I find them within mere reflection, and when I keep free from all further **[229]** pressing apperceptions, not merely <given> in an objective way, not as In-itself, simply not as transcendently perceived, with transcendent presumptions afflicted. What these pressing apperceptions mean, and the corresponding objectivation by which the pure Ego loses its purity, and the Ego then apperceives itself as human beings within the world, as object among objects, we will have to investigate. But initially you see the worked out contrast, you see how each pure inwards turning of your view onto the stream in which you live each manner of fantasying, thinking, feeling, etc. as Ego subjects, and onto the Ego of this stream itself brings simply the Ego and such acts to pure grasping, and then not as objects, as something being in itself. Thus “**world**” gains a first original character. It is the whole sum of the objects presenting themselves to the **pure Ego** (the Ego of the pure reflection). Certainly this does not yet completely suffice for this step of the consideration. By “world” we do not only universally understand a plurality, but rather a multiplicity of unified objects. Indeed also unifying is already a basic character of the pre-theoretically given world, and this character as well is predelineated through the essence of the object-perception, through its immanent sense.

Here we do well to give the corresponding clarification only after we have performed other clearing ups relating to the separation into two classes of the objects belonging to the surrounding world. We have mentioned them already, we find among those things belonging to the surrounding world or those foreign to the Ego on the one hand **things**, on the other hand **subjects** as well, foreign subjects. Let us consider the essential characteristics of these classes.

**Things** are not only universally something “external”, i.e. simply given to my Ego as something foreign to it, but rather their characteristic is a certain **absolute Ego-foreigness.** Namely each of the foreign subjects I perceive is indeed given to me as something external, as foreign to my Ego, but still it is for itself an Ego, and as that it finds itself. But a thing, a stone, a house is not only something foreign to my Ego, but rather in itself it is not an Ego, it is something which in itself is heterogeneous to an egoical. This is the characteristic of the real objectivity in the absolute sense, the counterpart for all subjectivity. Again we emphasize: A thing like every material thing of our experience is characterized as this absolute Ego foreign through the own sense of the perception giving it in original bodily presence (of the distinctive **[230]** type “thing perception”). Only from this kind of perception we separate the first pre-theoretical concept of a thing, and without it the word would make no sense for us. And everything we then ascribe more closely to a thing as such, we have to ascribe as necessarily constituting the essence of a thing as such, this we only separate, we may only separate from the essential type of the consciousness in which a thing universally and as such is made intuited in its original selfness.

Let us thus study the typical essence of a thing-perception as such, according to the side it means its object, with which sense it is necessarily equipped within it. It belongs to the essence of a thing, we then find, that towards other things it can never be something without relation, as if each was and could be a world for itself. Rather like everything externally perceived thus each thing is embedded in an endless context of actual and possible perceptions, that is, in the following way: the perceptual connections belonging to different things are de facto not separated from each other, rather they are necessarily united in one single experiential connection motivating all, the correlate of which is a unit encompassing all actual, nay, universally all possible things with unity-forms representing an endless open frame for all physical possibilities. Each thing is a **thing within the space**. It is, although it is now seen alone, nothing isolated, it is surrounded by an open horizon into which the Ego can freely enter, <which it> can get to know in proceeding perceptual courses, and thus it finds there this stone, but further stone upon stone, house next to house, street after street, mountains, forests, etc. In one word, we always have a consciousness of unity of a whole **thing world** which only partially according to single things and thing connections enters our present small piece of streaming perception, and [which] in this respect as well is imperfect, and shows us the **things only one-sidedly**, only according to contingent aspects, sides, views. Each eye-movement, each change of location means, even when the things are standing still, a constant, continuously flowing change of our perceptions; and even insofar anything thereby remains continuously within our field of vision, field of perception, the perception of it still is not necessarily a resting, unchanged one, but a stream of manifold changing perceptions. Of these we say, they were all perceptions of the same, since indeed **[231]** in person the thing (e.g. of the sides) stands there in front of us as the one and same in the course of these changing perceptions; but on the other hand we say, and with no minor reason, this same thing shows itself once from the one and then from another and ever other side, it “appears” with “views” changing on different sides. The perception, where it gives just some views and possibly just a single one, that is, brings only one side of a thing to properly intuitive givenness, never means merely this one side, and this is *a priori* impossible, since the side of a thing is non-selfsufficient, something which cannot be conceived of as being in itself. This implies that in each perceptual consciousness are to be separated a non-selfsufficient component of actual and of proper perception, perception in a pregnant sense, and a component pointing back to the expressions of other perceptions and to representations of other sides which would come to a real actualization in possible further perceptual courses.

Thus the sensuous content of the perception goes far beyond the in the most pregnant sense bodily conscious; the whole thing, but also the surrounding thing-context, nay, finally that which is still lying outside of the perceptual fields is also encompassed. Each experienced is surrounded by an endless spatial temporal and physical horizon of things partly known from former experience, partly open, unknown, by way of further experience to be learned. They[[73]](#footnote-73) are always meant along; partly, but only exceptionally, some of them, e.g. the known line of streets over there, are intuitively present in the form of a contingently emerging clear memory. Otherwise they are conscious in an empty unintuitive meaning along, which we cannot describe otherwise but with the word “consciousness of a certain open horizon”.

This brief description makes thus evident that there is more to the thing-consciousness than the single thing, that always, and in every single pulse of continuous experience of something material, there is an endless **physical world** conscious as pre-theoretical givenness.

The further question would be the one relating to the **structure** of this pre-given experiential thing-world, or, like you might tend to say, nature. But we must not proceed that quickly. Initially we must keep the original relation in mind, which connects things and subjects, **[232]** the first natural presenting itself with the first “mental”. This is not only the relation, which we have already discussed and which you must no longer miss. The unitary thing world, lying prior to science, and which on the other side is what it [the science] has in view, what in all its theories it processes by way of thinking, is essentially related to subjectivity. It is originally what it is, only as the in perceptions of the respective subjects given, in these perceptions simply perceptually meant world, by the perceptions equipped with a certain content or sense. Whatever the theory of science may work out of this intuitive world, it only processes a sense of the perception and can never destroy this sense without then becoming simply senseless. But something else comes into consideration that at the same time essentially belongs to it in order to determine and delimit the significance of this first, still in many ways preliminary, ascertainment more closely.[[74]](#footnote-74)

### Appendix IV

**[233]** As always we initially keep to the course of actually receded and possibly still flowing perception in its absolute immanent constancy, and we ask: What is therein under the title “object” actually a piece of content which can be brought to light? Obviously we cannot in faithful description say otherwise: The appearances do not only flow consecutively and thereby have merely the unit which we metaphorically call unit of a flow, of a constantly streaming over into something different, but rather each of these appearances is what it is here, as phase of a completely different unity-experience, namely each is consciousness of one and the same. The appearances may be ever new ones, in every, in every optional phase one and the same appears, this-there, this just once thus and then again appearing differently, and in our example it even presents itself as an unchanged, as substrate of different traits, each of which again is something identical of adumbrations and unchanged identical. Thus an identical x as substrate, an identical This-substrate for other and multiple identical things which we call trait, whereby the identical This and its identical form, color, etc., is within this stream of the perceiving and appearing “meant”, perceived within the perceptions, appearing within the appearances Same; and spoken even more concisely: It lies within their own essence to ground a peculiar **phenomenon of the overlapping within the same**, to constitute within the transition the original phenomenon “**Same**”, to facilitate *a priori* a direction of regard of the pure Ego in which the Ego in doubtless evidence finds the same, and to facilitate in contrast to this a different direction of regard in which it finds the changeable appearances, adumbrations of formations **[234]**, etc., but each within the primal essential peculiarity “appearance of this identical”.

These are “originary phenomena”, that is, they are the final peculiarities of the consciousness which can only be exhibited as something inseparable from the essence of the consciousness of the object, thus determines the sense of such locution: Thereby it is evident that the identical x is absolutely given as substrate of the identical traits, but [that it] is absolutely given exclusively as appearing of the appearances which have actually run their course, as something conscious of the actually mentally lived consciousness. Only as that it is immanent actuality, “piece of content” of the immanent actuality of the consciousness. We may thereby not forget the horizons of the openly determinable indeterminacy belonging to the essence of the external perceptional consciousness and of all its appearances. Each appearance “means” as it were its x, or rather, the respectively appearing trait in such indeterminacy or new determinability; the x, the Same is thus always given and immanently being as This-there, that is, appearing in these and those traits, but leaving open other traits as indeed appearing evenly red, but possibly on closer consideration not being evenly red, etc. The identical is indeed absolutely given, but it is only factually existent as identical in this and that way of givenness, as correlate of the these and those appearances conferring its content, i.e. its sense content, that is, of the actually lived in a mental way and of no other. When new appearances then join the old ones then a continued new sense bestowing takes place, whereas the substrate point x, the objective substrate of all sense bestowing, of all trait-attribution always and according to apriori necessity remains as the Same running through. But actually immanent obviously there is nothing else than this empty point of identity as the substrate of the sense bestowings performed within the actual mental processes; And only this we can say that, if further perceptions and univocally corresponding ones were proceeding, this x then would remain and likewise those of its traits which would not experience other determinations.

Object in the immanent sense is thus nothing else but a certain, within the essence of consciousness itself, evidently to be determined correlate of what we call “consciousness of something”, later “appearance of something”, “thinking something” (because also in manifold cogitative acts we single out an identical as something thought), and likewise everywhere. Or else: within the immanent **[235]** sphere under the title “consciousness of something” we meet mental processes which in a wondrous way allow a double direction of analysis and description, thus have double peculiarities. On the one hand we can analyze them according to their real essential components, i.e. according to lower ones that build them, like an object is otherwise built of its constitutive traits and parts. Thus for instance the perception of a group implies the perception of the members as parts. Likewise perception is separated from a memory or free fantasy through (one’s) own peculiar real moments. Or else a certain judging in contrast to a mere supposing or taking as possible. But on the other hand we find the wonderful thing that mental processes of that kind in themselves, in their real moments and through them all have something conscious, are intentionally related to what within these real moments does not really lie itself. Or what results in the same, we find that the essence of the conscientious mental processes as intentional implies that they take their place within the context of the identification, of the consciousness of the one and same, that thereby manifold mental processes in a bound way due to their essence connect with each other into a consciousness, which is consciousness of the self giving itself within the different mental processes in different kinds of consciousness. Many kinds of objectivations, many kinds of perceptions and memories, or else added judgments, feelings, etc. relate in themselves to the same, the same is conscious within them, and lies therein as something which can be brought to light as the same meant. This same is what it is, as intentional correlate of the respective present mental processes whereby always endlessly other mental processes are conceivable which, if they presently joined, would constitute the numerically [and] identically same correlate in themselves, or rather would keep it continuously.

In phenomenology this principal difference is terminologically expressed as well through the relative separation of **noesis** and **noema**. “Noesis” designates in this relation the consciousness itself according to everything real that analysis may find in it. “Noema” is the title for the evident contents on the sides of what is on the sides of the meant, of the conscious within the consciousness, that is, of what the consciousness is simply consciousness. All noetic moments thereby have a noematically constituting function and to show this is the goal of the noetic conscientious analysis.

1. *Later side note* begin of the systematic explanations [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *The text on the following pages up to page 22[German edition] replaces the older, not cancelled version* Thus we will commence by returning from science to pre-scientific consciousness. Not in historical-anthropological sense, as if we now had to investigate how mankind prior to Greek science, [and] how cultural and natural peoples outside our own scientific culture apperceive the world. The pre-scientific consciousness we mean and which alone can come into question for us, is constantly present for us scientifically cultured men as well. Since all the time, whether we are theorizing or not theorizing, whether we are engaged in scientific thinking or not, there is a world of experience, an intuitional world, a world which is pre-given to our just occasionally scientific activity, a world which according to consciousness is immediately present and will be present even if all thoughts deriving from science and all apperceptive conceptions no longer exist. They just form an upper stratum outside of the essence, reshaping it [the world], on the anyway continually transforming **life-world**. Indeed, it is the world which in the most primitive sense is present for us according to consciousness, the world in which we live, think, operate, work, and which within the alternation of those activities always retains a core of intuitional pre-givenness, which by those subjective activities covers itself with apperceptive strata, among them strata of thought in particular.

   We will now in an initially rough way try to analyze the characteristic structure of this world, purely considering it in terms of the How of its conscious pre-givenness, prior to all science. The first radical distinction we observe is the distinction between subjects and objects. As to the objects, they appear as temporally lasting and spatially extended in such a way that all durations range themselves in the one time, all expansions in the one space, so that space and time are the intuitional unity-forms for the allness of the intuitionally pre-given things. Further description would have to proceed to the more detailed structure of the determinacies which the intuitional things hold as dispositions filling their spatial form, and remaining or changing in their duration, furthermore [it would have to proceed] to the dependencies which, under the banner of intuitive causality, the things show in their changing disposition-being. It is vivid before our eyes how the wielded and falling hammer is forging the iron, i.e. changing it, how the moving violin bow is causing the vibration of the strings and producing a tone, etc. I do not want to move further in this direction, I want to generally direct your attention to the composition of pre-scientific physical-thing datum in the experiential intuition, and to the fact that these compositions necessarily need to be determining for the sense of all theorizations and sciences referring to those things. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *This sentence as well as the following were inserted afterwards*. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Later note* „Intentional mental processes.“ [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Later note*: Ego’s-acts in the specific sense *ego cogito*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Note*: this given is present for me, it is evidently apprehended as a being: as an **Ego’s own**. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Inverted commas are my insertion [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *The last sentence of this paragraph was inserted later.* [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Cancelled later*. The specific Ego’s sphere, [the sphere] of the egoical, is characterized by the term of the stream of consciousness, to which *eo ipso* the Ego necessarily belongs, the subject, whose life is this stream, the stream <of> perception, of imagination, of memory, of thinking, of the willing, etc. Everything which can be brought to light within as a piece, a moment, as a real component is subjective. This includes [the question] whether the Ego is engaged attentively or not attentively with the respective conscious object. However, on the side of the conscious object in the end we get to such a thing that is conscious and not conscious, although it may be that the consciousness is related to consciousness. A color, a note, a scent, and similar Data of the senses are perceptually conscious, are as actually being present for us, but they are no consciousness. An objectivation is an objectivation of something, a thinking [is] a thinking of something, a willing refers willingly to something, etc. This “Of” belongs to the essential character of each consciousness, and each Ego as Ego then is characterized by its being related, through the medium of its mental processes corresponding to the type of consciousness, to a conscious object therein. On the other hand a color is conscious, but it is not consciousness of something, [and] correspondingly each Datum of the senses. No stream of consciousness, i.e. no streaming Ego’s life is conceivable without such sensuous components; every conscious life requires a *hyle* which enters the consciousness, and takes shape according to the consciousness, and, which can be shown in higher investigations, every process of consciousness which does not include a hyletic composition yet, refers back to other, mental processes hyletically occupied. We speak of the blind and the born blind, of the deaf and the born deaf, etc. But on the other side, if we, with good reason accordingly, although due to indirect conclusions, consider an Ego to be possible which does not own certain sets of sensuous Data, our Ego is inconceivable without anything sensuous in general. Thus these Data are characterized as non-consciousness, as not “intentional” mental processes. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Later note* **External impressions,** and, if the grasping attention sends a ray of regard through it, **attentive perceivings** of an “external”. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Later note* Cf. supplement, better. *The supplementary sheet in question contains apart from the reference Ad 17 to the passage at hand and the later note* but compare later explanations, 19 <page 31,1-32,21(first paragraph) German edition>! *the following text* External impressions (external impressional perceptions, possibly attentive perceivings). Their objects are characterized by their involving neither the Ego (i.e., I do not reflect upon myself in an Ego’s-perception) nor an egoical of **my** sphere, in short: the perceived is an “external” something, the perception [is] an external perception. Words which exclusively shall determine themselves through these determinations. The relation between perception and the perceived shows itself [on the one hand] for immanent perceptions which are precisely the reflecting ones (turned back on me and my egoical), and for “external” perceptions on the other hand <as> being something entirely different. It will be best if we leave out at first the reflection on the Ego itself, which has a special position, and compare only external <perception> and [the] immanent perceptual mental process, which alone we want to call immanent in a pregnant sense.

    In immanent perception, perception and the perceived are inseparably and in reality one; both are individually being or, what is the same thing, both are temporally being in singular uniqueness (the contrast here is the temporal repeatability, while preserving the identity which belongs to the being as such). **Berkeley’s** equation *esse= percipi* does apply for the immanently existing individual. Temporal being is present being, individual being in the pregnant sense or past being, having been or being not yet but will be, future being. The immanently present being is by necessity a presently perceived being, maybe a present attentively perceiving (or an object of a lower intentionality). At any rate perception and the perceived here are inseparably one: The immanent cannot be present for me without being perceived, and it cannot exist after the perception. It cannot be perceived in repetitive, separate perceptions, and still be of unbroken duration.

    Whereas perception and perceived being coincide temporally for the immanent, that is, both commence together and end together, namely the immanently perceived not only ends as something perceived (ends to be perceived) to further exist in an unperceived way, the situation is different with the externally perceived. This “transcendent”, on the contrary, can be “**in itself**”, that is, can be, without being perceived, and can further exist after its perception. Accordingly it is generally in contrast to perception called “**in itself**”, and is also called being “**outside of**” perception, or being “separated” and “separable” from the perception, although these are rather dangerous metaphors, thought of in analogy to the separateness of things which, if we disregard their binding causality, can be imagined as independently commencing, ending, enduring.

    The inseparability continues in remembrance. The past immanent is an immanent perceived in the past. This is at first nothing distinguishing. **Each** remembrance includes generally and necessarily the perception of the remembrance, remembered past being is remembered having been perceived. But for the immanent it holds true that having been perceived corresponds to having been, that a past immanent, a mental process of my stream of mental processes is not conceivable which I had not been “conscious” of, i.e., which had been perceived, noticed or unnoticed. *The last two paragraphs were arranged in reverse order originally*. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Later note: Esse*= continual and coincidental temporal being [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *A later note to this paragraph* Later in detail, 19ff <page 31,1-32,21ff German edition>; *compare later note*, page 31, note 1, German edition [note 15, English text] [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *Later note* (supposed being – true being; to be actually and not to be in actuality.) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Later note* (already explained in 17 <page 26.5-29.21>?); *compare above, later note on page 28, note 2[German edition, note 13 English text]* [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *With question marks on the margin until the end of the sentence* [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Later parenthesized and cancelled* “In itself”: it has to be strictly heeded that for example when an object is present for me it is my mental process of perception in which and because of which this object shows itself to me, and that the way in which I am conscious of this object as being bodily actual is simply a matter of this mental process. It should not be forgotten that even if I am convinced afterwards that I was subject to an illusion, this does not alter the perception in itself, which I then reject as illusion, having provided me with its perceived bodily object as an actuality determined in this or that way; like everything else, also scientific knowledge that I may gain of an object and objects in general, refers back to perceptions and their original sense-bestowing performance. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *The following three passages were inserted later as* supplement. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Later parenthesized a second time and cancelled* (Attention should be paid to the equivocation of the word “appearance” which first designates the appearing object, and then the appearance of the object, an equivocation certainly which has a lack of clarity as its source.) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Later parenthesized and partly cancelled, partly marked with a 0 on the margin* If I mean them as pure possibilities of my sphere of prior givenness, the Ego thereby of course is no mere possibility and posited as actual. But, as we will see, as “pure” Ego which generally keeps its pre-eminent position, and besides has its own manner to be apprehended as pure possibility. If the grasping of pure possibilities does not use the consciously posited actuality, whether as present perception or as memory or otherwise, if a pure possibility-stating does not build on this, then therein is included that in such grasping and statement-formation a modification of the actuality-consciousness is performed all by itself. Pure possibility gives us as well a free fiction as does an experience. The fiction of a closed line provides us the possibility of such a line as well as a seen line on a paper does, the possibility of a color- or tone-constellation is given as well by free fantasy as by an experience of the like, etc. In fantasy the invented stands in front of me as a quasi-seen, it is, as if we had it before our eyes and found it as actual, but actually we do not have it before our eyes and universally we did not mean it as actuality. This as-if lying in consciousness designates a modification of the actuality-consciousness. But obviously, when we presently experience and consciously posit actuality, but thereby are focused on mere possibilities and their confirmation, the actuality consciousness experiences a modification; a putting out of action of the actuality-belief takes place, whereby it gets a similar rank and character as the fantasy’s as-if-character in the attitude of the grasping of the possibility grasped by way of fantasy. The difference solely consists in the fact that in the case of free fantasy we can only pass over from the attitude of the possibility’s grasping into the attitude in which we state it was mere fiction, a Nothing actually, while in the other case we have the possibility at hand to pass over into the attitude of experience and state: “This and that is actually present” or “it has been there memorially” and the like. But if we make possibility-statements in the sense of purely apriori statements concerning all possibilities of a universally delimited sphere, the singly seen possibilities act as “**example”** of universalities; in a pure universality-consciousness we see universal connections which, however, according to their essence, stay completely free of all positing of actualities which remain entirely out of action. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Note* The sense-data remaining identical in the passing over from actuality-consciousness into possibility-consciousness is called “essence”. “Eidetic laws” are laws which belong to the pure essence or to the pure sense, and that is why one also speaks of “law of essence”. Denial signifies countersense. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Later Note* Every object after all, every field must be under eidetic laws. – extensively discussed orally. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Later Note* continuous changing not required for gaining of region [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Later Note* Compare for quite good and yet oblique explanation the bundles about the constitution of regions, genera, species [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *Later cancelled* At most we possibly have to overcome the prejudice that the known ones, all amounting to quantitative laws, were the only ones possible. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *Later Note, cancelled and made valid again* Pfingsten*: compare below the hint to the Whitsun holidays in the text on page 72 (of the German original)* [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Later note* Principle of phenomenological suspension [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Interruption of the text at the end of the page, a continuation could not be found*. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Later note, relating probably to the continuation of the text after the parenthesizing* Here. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. *Later note* Suspension of ideally transcendent possibilities. Cf.51 <page 75,19-77,7 German edition>, reiteration*; compare below the later note on page 76 (German edition), note 1* [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. *Interruption of the text at the end of the page; to the later cancelled continuation compare below page 78,27 (German edition), where the text originally was continued, as well page 78, note 1 (German edition) [note32 English text]* [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Later note* Presented priorly, cf. 48 <page 70,20-72,14 German edition); *compare above the later note on page 71, note 2 (German edition, note 30 English text). The following five, possibly six paragraphs were later marked with a* 0 *on the margin.* [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Later cancelled* and in continuation in this boundless infinity of appearances this centaur continually transcends the appearances. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *Before this later cancelled the original continuation of the text interrupted on page 72,14* of the immanent fantasy experiences, and the transcendent, i.e. the external which is here not conscious as actually being, but as possibly being. It results from this that not only the **experiential sciences** of the external world, the sciences which have their field by way of experience as consciousness positing actuality (that is, [sciences] which investigate the actual as posited and eventually actuality, validly grounded by experience) will be suspended, but also the **apriori sciences**, as far as according to their sense they are sciences of possible externality, of possible external spatial shapes, of possible external motions, of external objects in general. We could also say: Like the whole science of the actual world, thus is the whole science of possible worlds in general … suspended, sciences like pure geometry, pure mechanics, etc.

    If science is to be won out of the immanent in pure sense, a science of the shapes of pure consciousness, it may only be possible if we take every question concerning actual or possible world out of action. A science of possible worlds or of possible spatial forms or temporal forms, of possible causal forms, etc. of these possible worlds is never science of what shall be the only theme here, science of the pure consciousness. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *This paragraph replaces the later cancelled text* We thus are certain that, like the phenomenological suspension of actualities leaves us the endless field of the de facto and of the possible pure consciousness (and like no judgment passed on it, [and] based on the immanent experience, does in the slightest presuppose a judgment on the external world as premise), through suspension of the pure possibilities of external actualities and [through] the suspension of all apriori sciences relating to it, our field of immanence is what remains for us, but also an apriori science, namely the one investigating the pure possibilities of immanent shaping. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *Later note* repetes 60² <page 86,4-49 German edition> in more detail; *compare below the later note on page 86 (German edition), note 1[note 40 English text]* [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *Later note to the following three, later parenthesized paragraphs* suspension of all Apriori, of all ideal objectivities. Omitted. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. *At this point are found the later inserted sheets with the text of* supplement IV *(page 233 German edition) in the omnibus collection; but compare below page 83, note 1 [note 39 English text], the note to their allocated position within the omnibus collection, according to a former pagination of Husserl.* [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *Corresponding to a former pagination of Husserl later cancelled, at this point of the omnibus collection the two later inserted sheets with the text of* supplement IV *(page 233 German edition) were supposed to be integrated; compare above page 81, note 3 (German edition, note 38 English text) the note to their current position within the omnibus collection.* [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Later note* 54 <page 80,2-81,30 German edition> already stated; *compare thereto above the later note on page 81, note 1 German edition [note 36 English text].* [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *The rest of this paragraph substitutes the later cancelled text* We will outright proceed from an example. I am perceiving manifold things within this room. Perception contains a perceptual belief. This is what the phenomenological reduction is concerned with, I must not participate. Since I am an apriori investigator it does not come down to actuality but to pure possibility. But the pure possibility I can gain as a possibility of things from these perceptions, by way of a modification of the perception equating it to a pure fantasy of physical things, I must not choose. The taking position on this possibility as a transcendent one is affected by the phenomenological reduction as well. Thus I neither judge these and any actual things nor possible things, nor possible things in general in apriori universality. (To judge actual things means to commence by taking them as actualities, and this is a taking position. And likewise regarding the judgments of possibilities.) What remains in this exemplary case is actual or modified perception as well as, within my eidetic attitude, pure universality seized upon an example, the intuitive grasped essence of external perception as such, and, more precisely, of physical things’ perception as such. But perception is within its own essence perception of the respective thing, and the universal essence “perception as such” is perception as such of a thing as such. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *The following two paragraphs replace the later cancelled text* (thereby a question directed at me from the audience is answered, how come that data of sensation, that is, color-sensation, tone-sensation, etc. can belong into the sphere of consciousness. If I perceive a house, I do have according to the phenomenological reduction the house exactly the way it there appears as colored, provided with this and that sensual qualities. I may not judge the color as property of something actual. But the red color belongs to the perceived house as such, if in fact in perception the house appears as being red, and insofar it does. If I then pay attention to the adumbration in which the color like the shape presents itself perspectively within this perception obviously the shade of red belongs to the real composition of the immanently given mode of appearance. It [the shade of red] is not something within the perception supposed and posited as external actuality like the red house, while possibly it does not exist, but it belongs to the necessary composition, to what own-essentially and actually belongs to the perception. *Continuation of this later replaced text compare below page 93, note 1 (German edition)[note 44 English text]* [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *Later parenthesized, cancelle,d and marked with the marginal note* To be looked up. But from the outset the case can as well be much easier, like if someone else utters a judgment which according to our opinion is wrong, in which we do not participate, or if he has perceptions we assess as deceptive perceptions, in which we thus again do not participate. If we then speak of the object he is judging, of the states of affairs he supposes to being true it is clear that we insert into his consciousness an object and a state of affairs in modified sense, whereby it is irrelevant for the attributed being that we negate, we also can put this negative position-taking out of action. For the philosophically experienced who has heard about the famous disputes concerning the sense of the existential judgment, it is clear that what is explained here has a close relation to these same. The judgment “A does exist, A does not exist” can impossibly judge A as a pre-given actuality by way of a categorical judgment, because it first has to pass judgment on actuality, and what it judges can not be the pure and simple object. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *At this point the rest of the later cancelled, and substituted text of page 89, note 1 (German edition, note 42 English text)* There the perceived house as such belongs as well, and the perceived red color as such. Because this, like everything immanent, remains untouched by it, whether the perceived, and the transcendently posited in general actually exists, or not, or whether I participate in position-takings thereto or do not participate.)

    We see at this point how to the two fundamentally different attitudes, directions of grasping, and directions of judgment which in the doctrine of the phenomenological reduction are separated distinctly, corresponds a fundamental equivocation of the discourse of “object”: We separate pure and simple object and perceived object as such, remembered object as such, thought of object as such, etc., or, like I love to call it as well, between pure and simple object and object in inverted commas. (Intentional mental process – intentional object as such.) Because in writing we express a modification of sense when receiving the word through inverted commas. The object in inverted commas expresses an immanent peculiarity of the mental process which as consciousness simply is consciousness of something. If we posit this intentional Something as such, we posit a fundamentally non-selfsufficient, a Something that is what it is, just as Something of this or that consciousness. Like the other way round the consciousness is just what it is, as consciousness of its Something. This is a completely peculiar correlation, including the essence of the consciousness, a wonder if one, mislead by the habits of the natural attitude, soon slides from the phenomenological attitude into the naturally positing [attitude] (into the dogmatic, like we also say, in contrast to the phenomenological). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Later note* The following numbered sheets which were planned for the next lecture, were not read out; a-g <page 95,1-102,14 German edition> [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Note* The (*later cancelled* transcendent) clues. *On that point later addition* Or the noematic-ontic clues of transcendent investigations. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *Later note* 2) The corresponding for particular regions. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *This sentence was later introduced*. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *Later cancelled* Certainly, a phenomenology and phenomenological theory of cognition can commence without all that, but it then hovers within the limited or the accidental, and in order to go beyond that, a “transcendent clue” is needed. Thus in another and deeper sense than Kant used, the logical forms and the ont<ic> objectivities become essential formations or transcendent clues for a formal transcendent philosophy. Likewise the forms filled with regional, that is, material content, in other words, the categories of each region and the principles of each region become transcendent clues of the regional phenomenologies and theories of cognition. Everywhere it is accepted then that the transcendent accomplishment becomes endlessly productive for the empirical and apriori disciplines themselves, for the radical clarification of its fundamental concepts and methods. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *Later cancelled* And, like I said, to fully actualize this understanding, to make these predicates actually „intuitive“, evident, clear, a recourse to subjects and subject’s acts is needed, in which these predicates originally constitute themselves as productive correlates. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. *At this point the stenograph is not clear, possibly readable as* actively *or in another way.* [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *Later cancelled* Before we go on, we go back to the rough ontological determinations of essence for things and subjects, which essentially only concern temporal [form] and spatial form. We readily cognize that the determination of the thing as *res extensia* remains when we consider the mere realities, the mere natural things. And there is more. The *extensio* properly and originally belongs only to reality and its first essential character determines its essential form. And it is just because of this that the predicates of reality belong to each thing, also where it is apperceived like usually with its significance predicates, because they belong to the necessary real core. The respective significance predicates only improperly, that is, due to the spatial determination of the real substrate, relate to the extension and thus to all spatial determination. A flag or a sign-post is extended as a **natural object**, that is, it has a shape, a rest or movement within the space, [and] thereby a changing position. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *The text of the following later parenthesized three paragraphs also later was marked with a 0 on the margin.* [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *Later cancelled* All real predicates are on different levels originally appertinent to the thing as *res extensa*, they are external of the essence, thus in some sense [they are] contingent, and this shows itself in that significance predicates for a thing need not in any way be intuitive or in another way consciously constituted, whereas the real is brought to complete intuitive legitimation. What we have shown here in a regional structure of the real objectivity which is made understood in a relatively easy and quick way could be shown for real subjects as well, the structure of which is not thus easily to be exhibited, namely that we view each subject as a reality and can find it originally as being intuitive, whereby we would meet exclusively individual predicates under the title “real subject **as something real**” which according to their sort belong together, absolute or relative predicates, and which, if we take together the absolute [predicates], join together to a proper essence to which all significance predicates are foreign, external of the essence. The significance predicates indeed do refer to possible subjects performing certain acts, but they are not themselves acts, as physical predicates they are not predicates of the subjects, only correlatively do predicates at the subjects correspond to them, namely that they are able to or actually do constitute such predicates thus and thus through acts. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *This sentence was later inserted*. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. *Later note* To this point. *The following three, maybe five paragraphs were later marked on the margin by a 0 and received the note* Not read. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. *Later note* First 1042 <page 144,1-24 German edition> [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. *Later note* Compare another time worked out for the next lecture. *Before this cancelled text* We, each of us, views into a world, the given nature, given to him as a harmonious unity of his experience, or rather, which so far continually demonstrates its actuality as it ascertains itself by way of harmony of continuous experience. What resists will be suspended as deception under the titles “illusion”, “semblance”. Therein now each of us is able, by gaining the purely apriori type of this world-givenness as eidos in the described way of regional generalization, to also gain through explication this eidos, that is, the pure essential form of this world as of a world of this regional type as such. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. *Later note, possibly relating to the end of the parenthesizing* F<ollowing> P<age> [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. *Later cancelled* But the physical world is an open infinity of things of which only single things can fall into proper intuition, whereas the others are only determinable possibilities of a certain style. If we take into view a single thing, abstracting from its horizon of infinity, then it immediately shows its inner infinity within the eidetic analysis. We also grasp the single thing only according to single moments properly, and to this properly intuitive being given an endless horizon of undetermined and possibly completely unknown traits belongs; we are referred to new and ever new experiences of the same thing which have in advance only a predelineated, but yet to be investigated set of types. Of course the primal ontological task (here and in analogy in every other field) has to consist in beginning with the complete concretion within the eidetic-intuitional proceeding and then to follow gradually, in ordered proceeding, the set of types of possible experience which is *a priori* predelineated through it, and correlatively to follow the *a priori* necessary articulations and moments of an experiential world. Each essence grasped in an abstractive way then has its determined place and at this place its determined function building up the concrete. In advance thereby the phenomenological reflection must not be missing. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. *The stenograph is not clear, possibly to be read as* extension *or otherwise*. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. *Later note* Is this to be disposed of? [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *Later cancelled*, Since 1781 certainly this empty wind blows around the inaccessible and foggy mountains of **Kant**’s transcendental philosophy in which the most important but primitive and clear motives of the post-**Cartesian** philosophy come to grand, but not yet mature and scientifically strict effect. Unfortunately the enormous guiding by **Kant** in the direction of an elevation of the rational criticism to a strict science did not produce much benefit; it was only the **Marburg Neo-Kantianism** which remained free from a flattening of the enormous intuitions of **Kant**; but neither there does the whole **Kant** live on, and the whole **Kant** can only be gained from **Kantian** scripts. But to gain something from them is so very difficult because **Kant** indeed did presagingly view into the deepest depths, but he did not investigate them systematically with the one possible method (and he did not do this because due to his time and his individual development he did not arrive at the idea of a radical phenomenological investigation of consciousness). The one approaching **Kant** from phenomenology, after the fundamental parts have been developed, will gradually find with wondering admiration in **Kant’s** ambiguous and far from the level of scientific strength remaining concept formations and theories again and again **anticipations of the essential separations and theoretical essential connections** that have been worked out in an ordered session from the bottom up as strictly scientific ascertainments of phenomenology. But for someone coming from phenomenology **Kant** will become a source of the highest acknowledgements: Capable to view behind his theories he will have a look and discover shining formations which can and must guide his future strictly scientific work. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. *At the beginning of this paragraph later cancelled* But now there is another field of difficult problems which **Kant** has first seen in his transcendental analytics, and which has given a peculiar deepened stamp to the concept of the **transcendental** which lives on in the Marburg neo-Kantian school. Up till now we pursued the natural object in the original intuition, thereby as an object of a possible experience based on all he can ontologically and phenomenologically teach us if we take it as a pure correlate of legitimating intuition. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. *Note* (Neither does it lie already within the concept of a sentence that the mere sense would have to be accessible for each conceivable judging, nor within the concept of experience and object that each experience of every object would *idealiter* be accessible for **each** subject.) [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *Later note* Then two final pages of the lecture at the Society for the science of culture; *compare* introduction of the editor, *above German edition page VII, note 1*. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. *Later note* Is the right order of the pages not the one tried here? *The first three paragraphs were later marked by the note* excurse*. Side note at the beginning of the first paragraph* **Methodical**. Basic character of philosophical clarifications and *later note* zigzag-circle. *Cancelled at the beginning of the paragraph* We began by investigating the whole pre-theoretical content pre-given to the cognizing Ego, and made an allusion that possibly the expression “world” was not suitable for the whole content, that thus possibly an essential distinction would have to be considered. We have proceeded far enough to be able to gain clarity determined in this regard and not only in this regard. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. *Note* Ideal of a perfect mathematical cognition. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. *Note* zigzag. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. *Note* First concept of the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. *Later note* From lectures „Nature and Mind“. **First draft**. Still to be heeded *instead of the later cancelled* *marginal notes* Concerning the course of the considerations of the missing beginning p.4, 2nd page <?> *and below* gives a complete orientation This is the transition from the natural relating back of the surrounding world to the Ego (the natural “What do I find?”) towards the phenomenological reduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. *Later notes* Maybe belongs to the lecture „Nature and Mind“, *and below* preparation, but I have not read the other pages; therein something pedagogical and remarkable for the possible course of presentations. *The two following paragraphs were later marked as* appendix *and maybe substitute the later cancelled text*. The externally perceived is simply always the goal of a new directing intention; although it has given something in the mode of personal actuality, the given always implies something not given but meant along. It is due to this intentional structure that external perception is a transcending opinion which can be affirmed or as illusion be cancelled in the further experiential course. On the other hand, the immanent cannot be given as an illusion. It is absolutely “given in an evident way”, it is given in the evidence of the *ego cogito*, that means nothing else here, it is evidently countersenseful to bring the contrast of merely supposed or truly being and of truly being or actually not being.

    But let us first of all exclude all questions of the true actuality, and let us further consider the objects as mere perceivedness, and according to the sense in which they pre-theoretically present themselves. Within the external, ego-foreign sphere things and foreign subjects are separated. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. *The last two sentences of this paragraph were later supplemented.* [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. *Later cancelled* Each Ego, we said, has a world in front of it which is, freed of all theoretical additions, its pre-theoretical intuitive surrounding world. (“Theoretical reduction”) In this [world] the pre-theoretical thing-world of the respective Ego, and considered singly for each Ego forms a singly closed context as correlate of the going through unity of manifold, but in their sense entwined perceptions of this Ego. Is now the sum-total of foreign subjects belonging to the content of an Ego’s surrounding world a world in itself as well and a mind world co-ordinated with the physical surrounding world or nature? Obviously this question has to be denied. If we consider how a thing is given then we are referred to the thing perception. This is obviously possible without any foreign subject being within our conscientious field. It is conceivable that except of me no other subjects are given, nay, possibly do not exist at all. A world would be constantly there for me, only it would be mere nature, a mere thing world. If we now ask how subjects, that is, foreign subjects, are perceptually given to us, then again one will possibly answer: through perception, and in a certain way this is correct. But what kind of perception is this? Foreign subjects are perceptually given as human- and animal subjects <*later note which possibly should complete or substitute the following text* In each animate being bodies and psyches are separated, the latter then designates the subjects themselves in their connection to the bodies, and only thus connected we can get hold of them. As to the bodies now we take them all for things, and thus one will say the perception of human beings initially is nothing else but as perception of the human body a thing perception like any other. And thereupon is based the very first new perception, simply the one which gives us the foreign subject as an ego foreign objectivity of a completely new type.> Perception of the respective body which indeed initially is a natural thing like any other. But in a peculiar, with the organism perception (body perception) entwined kind of consciousness called “empathy” first of all the body is given to us as body and as carrier of a subject and of a subject’s life. Actually in the original, in the character of a direct perception, the foreign Ego is thereby not given, the foreign Ego’s mental processes, the foreign fantasizing, thinking, feeling, willing I cannot grasp in the original and themselves; this house, nay, this is thus in such a way itself mentally lived. Only my own mental processes I have given in complete originality and for them a special kind of perception, the immanent perception which is often also called “reflection”. On the other hand we have of the foreign man, insofar as he actually stands in front of us bodily and we perform the empathy together with the body perception, still a perceptional consciousness: the consciousness to actually have the man himself in front of us, he stands there himself, is with his thinking, feeling, etc. actually in front of us. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)